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THE FIRST CHANGE OF REGIME 
IN HUNGARIAN HISTORY 
DENIS SINOR 
Indiana University, Bloomington, IN, 
USA 
The fabric of history is almost seamless even though those who weave it may 
want it differently. Hitler proclaimed to lay the foundations of a new, a Third, 
Reich, one to last for a thousand years, but - though his actions affected the lives 
of countless millions all over the world - he built but a house of cards that stood 
only for a dozen of years. It was an event rather than an epoch in German history. 
The First, Second, and Third German Reichs - and I am ready to add to them the 
Federal German Republic - represent but a continuum of German history. The 
situation is not very dissimilar in neighboring France now living under her Fifth 
Republic. Years ago the billboards in the Paris Metro - pasted there by the manu-
facturer of a wall-paint - could justifiably declare that Les Républiques passent 
mais la peinture Soudée reste. Yes, the republics come and go, and to use again a 
French saying, plus cela change, plus c 'est la même chose. In the course of history 
significant caesurae are few and rare between, and are seldom the works of any 
one individual. There is considerable difference between pre- and post-Napoleonic 
Europe but, as I see it, it was but a new game on the old chessboard. In European 
history, I submit, the rules of the game were changed for example by the Reforma-
tion, or the French Revolution, in Japan, the Meiji Restoration may have marked 
a decisively new epoch in the country's history. To the question whether the French 
Revolution had succeeded, Zhou Enlai is said to have replied "It's too soon to 
tell." Only time will show whether, on a world scale, the Leninist Russian revolu-
tion was really the watershed Lenin and Stalin wanted it to be. Yet I have no doubt 
about its significance for Russian history. This paper would like to express some 
thoughts on a change of regime which, while it may have had little effect on 
European history, constitutes, without any doubt, the decisive watershed in the 
history of Hungary. Without it, it is safe to say, there would be no Hungary today. 
In this millennial year of 2000, Hungary is celebrating another millennium: 
that of the founding of the Hungarian state. A few years ago, in 1989, Hungarians 
were proudly remembering the eleven-hundredth anniversary of the Conquest of 
their land (though, for reasons of political correctness the term was seldom used 
in texts destined for foreign readers). Thus, apparently 111 years were needed to 
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transform a de-facto occupation into a legitimate state, recognized as such by 
contemporary Europe. Today, a thousand years later, Hungary once again knocks 
on the door of a European Union. 
In the course of Hungarian history I see but two instances of a definitive change 
of direction. The second of these was reached in 1945 and marked the end of a 
continuum. 
It was a definitive break with a political construct which lasted for about 950 
years, from the founding of the kingdom of Hungary by Stephen I, or, as he is 
called, St. Stephen, to the probably definitive creation of a Hungarian republic. 
To assess the role of St. Stephen in Hungarian history one must compare the 
state of the land in the second half of the 10th century with that prevailing after the 
end of Stephen's reign. The transformation was enormous. In seventy years a 
weak, militarily battered tribal organization, destined to be absorbed by the pre-
ponderantly Slavic population of the region, and to be integrated into the 
neighboring Germanic world, became an independent regional power to be reck-
oned with by both the Byzantine and the Holy Roman empires. 
In Hungarian historiography more pages have been written on St. Stephen than 
on any other person, so it may be presumptuous for me to attempt to say anything 
new about him.1 Yet, speak I must, since his activities cannot be left unmentioned 
in a symposium dedicated to political transitions. However, it is most important to 
remember that the big watershed in Hungarian history was negotiated not by 
Stephen alone; his oeuvre could not have been accomplished and, today, cannot 
be understood, without examining the policies followed by his father Géza. 
Géza is undoubtedly a ruler of what I like to call the "precursor" type, such as 
Louis XIII of France or Friedrich Wilhelm I of Prussia, whose work made possi-
ble the more spectacular reigns of Louis XIV and Frederick the Great respec-
tively. Géza became head of the Hungarian confederacy probably in 970. He was 
the great-grandson of Árpád, head of the Magyar tribe under whose leadership in 
896 the conquest of the land that was to become Hungary took place. 
The occupation of the Carpathian basin met with little resistance. The Hungar-
ians moved into a sparsely populated region with a mixed population, which cer-
tainly contained an important Slavic segment, but also remnants of the Turkic or 
Mongol Avar population, which survived the destruction of its state by Charle-
magne. In my History of Hungary I put the number of conquering Hungarians at 
about 250,000, but in light of recent research this figure should be adjusted down-
ward to about 100,000, about half as many as the local population. 
Here I must make a short detour into the fog-bound regions of Hungarian proto-
history. The great, unsolved puzzle of Hungarian ethnogenesis can be summa-
rized as follows. Hungarian is a Finno-Ugric language, yet, their linguistic affili-
ation notwithstanding, in the earliest written sources in which they are mentioned, 
the Hungarians appear in a Turkic garb, as a warlike people of mounted archers. 
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Although, in principle, military tactics cannot be linked to the race or the language 
of the people that make use of it, the specificity of Hungarian comportment firmly 
places them in the world of Inner Asian nomads. In the second half of the first 
millennium, on the eastern approaches of Europe, the nomadic population of the 
steppes lying north of the Black Sea was essentially Turkic and, in their general 
comportment, the Hungarians do not seem to have differed from them in any 
significant way. The Hungarians are called Turks not only by some Arab writers 
such as Ibn Rustah (early 9th century) but also by the Byzantines who were in 
direct contact with many of their leaders. Interpreters were needed for the negotia-
tions and the Logothete of the Course in charge of their services could not have 
made a mistake in their choice. To this must be added the fact that most of the 
Hungarian chiefs had Turkic names and that in Byzantine sources the land of the 
Hungarians is called Tourkia. We are thus bound to assume that the social stratum 
that sent envoys to Constantinople, was Turkic speaking. As of now, no satisfac-
tory explanation exists of why the Hungarians speak Hungarian, and it cannot be 
of my concern here to offer some relevant theories. By the end of the 10th century 
the name by which the Hungarians were referred to in western, Latin or Greek, 
sources was changed to Ungri, Ungroi, the basic form from which all the western 
variants with an initial h-, such as English Hungarian, derived. That this name, 
too, is ultimately of Turkic origin and passed to the West through Slavic interme-
diaries is, from our present point-of-view, irrelevant. Magyar, the Hungarians' 
self-appellation, though known to Arabs, appear in the Latin sources only much 
later. The contorted efforts to give the ethnonym magyar a Turkic, Finno-Ugric or 
Turkic/Finno-Ugric etymology have remained fruitless as witnessed by the still 
ongoing debate that surrounds the question. 
In the course of the first half of the 10th century, important segments of the 
Hungarian tribal confederacy appear to have been reluctant to abandon their pre-
Conquest way of life. Hungarian incursions plagued their neighbors. It is safe to 
say that, to this day, the reputation of the Hungarians has not fully recovered from 
the constant reviling of which they were the objects in medieval chronicles. Gens 
ferocissima or crudelissima belonged to the milder adjectives used to describe 
them. Marauding Hungarian troops went as far as France and Spain and plagued 
northern Italy. In 949 King Berengar II of Ivrea had to pay a huge sum to Stephen's 
grandfather Taksony to obtain his withdrawal. The aim of these forays was not 
conquest but booty. Hungarian mercenaries also served various rulers of Italy and 
of Bavaria.2 In these military campaigns the Hungarians appear as typical mounted 
archers as witnessed by the oft-cited Carmina Mutinensia in which the inhabitants 
of Modena pray to their patron saint St. Geminianus to save them from the arrows 
of the Hungarians. During this period of "adventures" the dominating personali-
ties were the great war-lords, Bulcsú, Léi, and Gyula, while the descendants of 
Árpád, theoretically still heads of the Hungarian confederation, lived in relative 
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obscurity and the influence of the Magyar tribe does not appear to have been 
preponderant. It is worth noting that the Byzantine emperor Constantine VII 
Porphyrogenitus expressly states that the first leader of the Hungarians is of Árpád's 
tribe, but they also have other leaders. According to the Emperor, Bulcsú was the 
third prince of Tourkia, and in a Latin source he is even called rex. Bulcsú and 
Gyula had both been admitted by the Emperor to the dignity of a Roman patrician. 
At the same time the two great warlords were also baptized in the Byzantine rite. 
An alliance with the Hungarians played an important part in the Emperor's policy. 
Léi and Bulcsú overplayed their cards. In 955, at Lechfeld, near Augsburg, a 
federation of German armies organized by the German King Otto I the Great 
(from 962 Emperor) annihilated the Hungarian forces; the two Hungarian leaders 
were taken prisoner and hanged. Even by the standards of the time the procedure 
was shocking but it served its purpose. Dead men do not fight. For the Hungarians 
the so-called "era of adventures" was over. 
The habitats of Bulcsú's tribe lay in what is now western Hungary, near Lake 
Balaton. The proximity to the Germanic world facilitated the hostile incursions. 
With the ignominious death of Bulcsú his greatly weakened tribe inevitably lost 
its influence and allowed the Magyar tribe to emerge from the shadows. Géza, 
realizing that no heathen people would be admitted into the European community, 
embarked on a wholesale conversion of his people. For Géza this was a purely 
political decision and his own conversion was formal. 
By that time Christianity, both in its eastern and western forms, was well known 
to the Hungarians. It should be remembered that parts of the local populations had 
already been converted before the arrival of the Hungarians. In the Transdanubian, 
i.e. the western part of the Carpathian basin, the missionary activities of the epis-
copal see of Salzburg introduced Roman Catholicism already in the second half of 
the 9th century. At the same time, Method and Constantine, the great missionaries 
of the Eastern Church were also active in the region. Ultimately the influence of 
the Western Church prevailed and the invading Hungarians found in their new 
land a partly christianized, in the western regions mostly Catholic population, 
closely linked with the bishopric of Salzburg. The earliest missionaries active 
among Hungarians came from Byzantium, but following the Hungarian defeat 
near Augsburg at Lechfeld Constantine VII lost interest in sending missionaries to 
what he considered a doomed nation and Latin missionaries entered into the vacuum 
thus created. A request to Rome for Catholic missionaries had been presented 
already by Géza's father Taksony. 
The land occupied by Árpád lay at the crossroads of Germanic, Slavic and 
Byzantine influences. Different as these might have been, they were all Christian, 
so there was no real external challenge to the religious development of the new 
kingdom. In all other spheres there were examples of different types to follow, 
and it does seem as if Géza, perhaps with the ultimate aim of securing independ-
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ence, deliberately chose what seemed to him the best in the institutions of his 
neighbors. As his closest neighbors were Roman Catholic Germans, Géza staked 
his fortune on collaboration with the German Empire; and he won, a fact which 
had immense consequences not only for the Hungarians but for Eastern Europe as 
a whole. Whilst some of the most aggressive Hungarian tribes had bled to death at 
Lechfeld or elsewhere, the Magyar tribe that occupied territories west of the Dan-
ube, acquired a certain stability and prospered in comparative peace. 
The chief apostle of the Hungarian conversion was St. Adalbert, bishop of 
Prague. Géza himself saw in the conversion only a means of securing the confi-
dence of Hungary's neighbors, and chiefly that of Otto I, the Holy Roman Em-
peror. In 973 a Hungarian delegation appeared in his court at Quedlinburg and, 
shortly after, Géza and some five-hundred Hungarians were baptized by a monk 
of St. Gallen, the very monastery visited by marauding Hungarians in 926. Prob-
ably on Adalbert's recommendation, Géza's show of goodwill secured for his son 
the hand of the Bavarian Princess Gisela, daughter of Henry II, duke of Bavaria. 
The death of Géza in 997 lead to a conflict between Turkic and western sys-
tems of succession. Chief Koppány, a senior member of the house of Árpád, fol-
lowing the system of levirate practiced among steppe peoples, claimed for him-
self Géza's widow Sarolta - and the leadership of the Magyars. With the help of 
the Bavarian knights brought in by Gisela, Stephen, Géza's son, defeated him and 
dispatched his quartered body to various parts of the country. His German ties and 
sympathies notwithstanding, Stephen defended the independence of Hungary 
against German encroachments. Thus, for example, in 1030 he successfully re-
sisted the wanton attack of the Emperor Conrad II, and in a counteroffensive Hun-
garian troops even occupied Vienna. Though a saint, meekness was not Stephen's 
strongest virtue. 
The nomadic political structure under which the conquering Hungarians had 
lived had no firm rules for princely succession, but in this instance, quite clearly 
levirate was replaced by primogeniture. Koppány's murder was not the only ruth-
less action undertaken in defense of the new state and a new system of succession. 
To secure the throne for his son Imre (who was to predecease his father), Stephen, 
or Gisela, caused Vazul, son of Stephen's uncle, and thus a likely candidate for the 
throne, to be blinded. As it happened, after a period of turmoil following Stephen's 
death, Vazul's son Andrew, returning from exile, occupied the throne (1047-1060). 
The kings of the Árpád-dynasty, which ruled over Hungary until 1301, were the 
descendants not of Stephen but of the blinded Vazul. 
The new order had asserted itself; all that was needed was a recognition by the 
outside world of the fait accompli. As tradition has it, this came in the form of a 
crown sent to Stephen by Pope Sylvester II with which he was crowned either on 
Christmas Day 1000 or on January 1, 1001. The symbolism of the act, recalling 
the crowning of Charlemagne on Christmas Day 800 by Pope Leo III, is obvious. 
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The importance of papal recognition of temporal power lasted well into the 16th 
century as witnessed by the coronation of Charles Quint by Pope Paul III. 
Let me mention here that recent research has convincingly shown that, con-
trary to the belief generally held by the Hungarian public and by earlier historians, 
the so-called Holy Crown, venerated symbol of Hungarian statehood, is of a later 
date, made probably for King Géza I around 1074. The crown sent by the pope 
was lost. 
We know very little of the gradual disintegration of the original Hungarian 
tribal confederacy, but the result of the process was an autocratic system that showed 
no great difference from the political structures prevailing in contemporary Eu-
rope. However, while the Germanic world was held together by a common reli-
gion and a common language, one just cannot know whether there was an emo-
tional integration among the people living in Stephen's country. To create one, 
Stephen had to impose on the people a common ideology, to wit Roman Catholi-
cism, of which, unlike his father, Stephen became a convinced and zealous fol-
lower. His missionary activity was directed almost exclusively towards his own, 
Hungarian people since, as said before, Christianity was widespread among the 
conquered populations. In this respect it is interesting to note that the Hungarian 
religious vocabulary is mostly of Slavic origin. So are the names of the days of the 
week that are not of a descriptive nature, such as vasárnap (lit. "day of the mar-
ket") for Sunday. In this connection it should be recalled that there is no evidence 
to show that the conquering Hungarians were familiar with any calendar. On purely 
speculative grounds and in view of the fact that people generally have a method of 
counting the years, one may surmise that the Hungarians were familiar with the 
twelve year calendar of the animal cycle. But, while known to the Bulgars with 
whom the Hungarians had many connections, there is no evidence to show that 
the Hungarians were acquainted with, let alone used, this cyclical calendar. Inter-
estingly enough, so far as I can see, in the vast scholarly literature dealing with 
10th century Hungarian history, no one seems to have emphasized the all-impor-
tant step that at some moment, perhaps under Stephen, the Hungarians, or at least 
their leadership, had to adopt the Christian calendar. Yet this, indeed, was the 
decisive step taken towards integration in the western community of peoples. By 
taking it, Stephen, and through him the Hungarians, recognized as their own the 
common, Christian heritage. 
Within the Carpathian basin the populated settlements were separated by unin-
habited forests and - between the Danube and the Tisza - by swamps that greatly 
hampered communications. The efforts of generations of Hungarians notwith-
standing, the ethnic mosaic of Stephen's land showed many lacunae. For exam-
ple, the ethnicity and language of the "black Hungarians" mentioned in the writ-
ten sources remain the subject of speculation. There were also some Turkic ele-
ments who entered the country with or after the Hungarians, among them the 
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Turkic Pechenegs. The very people whose attacks caused the Hungarians to move 
west into the Carpathian basin appear as auxiliaries in Géza's service. Géza's 
mother was Pecheneg. 
Notwithstanding his reliance on German knights and the strong influence of 
his wife Gisela, Stephen was not a servile copier of Bavarian administrative prac-
tices. He adopted the Carolingian monetary system, but the Hungarian adminis-
trative terminology used for the new Hungarian state is almost entirely Slavic: 
nádor, ispán, tárnok, udvarnok. In Hungarian, the very title of the king, király, and 
the word designating the royal court, udvar, are Slavic. Social and administrative 
structures do not spring up like mushrooms after a rain. The Slavic technical terms 
of the Hungarian administrative vocabulary bear witness of a very strong influ-
ence of the sedentary population, much of which must have been inherited from 
the Moravian state. Particularly surprising is the absence of Turkic or Latin words 
among the designations of the various dignitaries of the state. In view of these 
undisputed facts, it defies understanding how in 1935 Bálint Hóman, a medieval-
ist of great distinction, could have written of the backwardness of the Slavs (of the 
Carpathian Basin) in matters of political organization.3 
In the late 19th and in the first half of the 20th century, Hungarian historians 
attached much importance to Stephen's choice of the Roman instead of the Byz-
antine branch of Christianity. I do not think that there is reason to see in this 
choice the proof of a singular wisdom foreseeing the development of European 
civilization. Stephen was Roman Catholic because he was baptized in that faith. 
Opinions vary whether this was done at his birth or later, but there is ample evi-
dence to show that from his youth he was surrounded by Catholic clergy. His 
mother Sarolta nominally belonged to the Eastern Church, but there is no reason 
to surmise that this strong-willed, often violent woman paid much heed to her 
son's religious upbringing. Also, it should be remembered that while Eastern and 
Western Christendom were already two different cultures, they were not yet sepa-
rated by doctrinal differences; the formal schism between the two churches was to 
occur only in 1054. We know of at least one Greek nunnery and one Greek bazilite 
monastery functioning during Stephen's reign in Hungary. The two rites coex-
isted peacefully in Stephen's state. Imre, his son and presumptive heir, was be-
trothed to a Byzantine princess. Of paramount importance was the opening in 
1018-19 of the road leading Western pilgrims to the Holy Land. It facilitated 
contacts between Roman and Byzantine Christianity and literally put Hungary on 
the map, made her known to thousands of all walks of life who passed along it. 
Only a handful of documents dating to Stephen's reign have survived and they 
do not provide answer to many important questions. The fact is that we do not 
know which was, at the millennium, the numerically dominant language in Hun-
gary, nor can we assess the extent of the magyarization of the previously Slavic 
population. Since the self-appellation of the Hungarians and of their language is 
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magyar, and since Stephen was a scion of the Magyar tribe, it is probably safe to 
assume that Stephen knew Hungarian, but it could be that his mother-tongue was 
Turkic, since both his father Géza and his mother Sarolta, bore Turkic names. It 
could be that Stephen's original name, the one he wore before his baptism, was 
also Turkic (Vajk). Projecting into the past the apparently general German inabil­
ity to learn Hungarian, we may presume that Gisela had never acquired that lan­
guage, surrounded as she was with German knights. Was then German the lan­
guage used in conversation between Stephen and his wife? Or Latin? Perhaps, at 
this juncture, it may be helpful to recall that we do not know whether Charle­
magne's mother-tongue was French or German. 
Hungarians of the Conquest probably had a script of their own, an alphabetic 
system recalling but unconnected with the Germanic runes, but with clear connec­
tions with some Old Turkic scripts. Some late examples are extant, but there is no 
reason to suppose that its knowledge was widespread. Of all the innovations intro­
duced by Stephen, the adoption of the Latin script for general use was probably 
the most important though, interestingly enough, this fact is seldom emphasized 
in the torrent of publications dealing with his reign. While the usage of the Greek 
alphabet is attested in the 11th century in Hungary, by linking his land to Western 
Christendom, Stephen was bound to adopt the script that was its vehicle, estab­
lishing thereby an unbreakable bond between Hungary and western Europe. All 
things considered, script was and remains the decisive criterion in defining the 
cultural identity of a population. 
Clearly, for better or worse, from its inception, Hungary was a multilingual, 
multiracial realm. Place names seem to bear witness to this. For example, of the 
names of the nine bishoprics functioning in the realm, four were Slavic (Bihar, 
Pécs, Vác, Veszprém), two were Turkic (Esztergom, Kalocsa), and only three were 
Hungarian (Csanád, Eger, Győr). The simultaneous use of several vernaculars 
would explain the lateness of the first Hungarian text that has come down to us 
and which dates from the 13th century. Anthropological studies clearly show that 
the majority of Hungary's population in the 11th century were not the descendants 
of the conquering Hungarians. On a heterogeneous substratum the Hungarians 
built a powerful state mixing their own traditions with those of the autochthonous 
inhabitants and adopted from the western, Latin, world its script, its religion and 
the political structure of a medieval European kingdom. In this respect momen­
tous importance must be attached to Stephen's legislative activity witnessed by 
two legal codices, the texts of which have survived. He created an administrative 
and legal system which provided the institutional and juridical bedrock of the 
state for about two centuries. 
Even without any written evidence one could have surmised that such wide-
ranging reforms might not have been to the taste of everyone. The cases of Koppány 
and Vazul clearly show that Stephen was ready to take drastic actions. During his 
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reign there was no need to suppress open popular discontent. However, resent-
ment must have been strong as witnessed by the revolts of 1046 and 1060-61, that 
is, long after Stephen's death. These were directed against Christianity, the intro-
duction of an alien legal and administrative system and, of course, against the 
German and Italian courtiers, knight-errants, who during and after Stephen's reign 
gained influence in the country's life. It should be noted that the revolutionaries 
did not come from among the conquered populations but from the ranks of the 
conquering Hungarians discontented with the changes introduced. The revolts rep-
resented a conservative backlash against innovations. 
The De instructione morum? the instructions written by Stephen to his son 
Imre contain a much cited passage concerning the presence of foreigners in the 
land. In the spring of 2000 it was even cited in a special, paid supplement to the 
weekly The Economist calling for foreign investment in Hungary. Its relevance to 
our times is clear. 
The advantage derived from the presence of immigrants and guests 
is so great that it should be called the sixth jewel of the king. The 
might of the Roman Empire arose through the influx of noble and 
wise men from everywhere. Guests coming from various countries 
and provinces bring with them a variety of languages, customs, skills, 
and arms. All these serve as decorations for the royal court, contrib-
ute to its splendor and frighten outside powers. For, a monolingual 
and monocultural kingdom is weak and frail. (Nam unius lingue 
uniusque moris regnum imbecille et fragile est.) Thus, I instruct you 
my son to treat [these men] with goodwill and honor so that they 
prefer to stay with you rather than elsewhere. 
In our time and specifically in the United States of America such views are 
"politically correct" though history has shown that they ultimately lead to disas-
ter. As Hungary's destiny in the millennium following Stephen's reign has clearly 
shown: a multicultural and multilingual state is bound to disintegrate. It is a cause 
for marvel that when, in the wake of World War I, it ultimately happened, it was 
due less to the spontaneous action of the various nationalities than to the meddling 
of foreign politicians, ignorant of the ethnic realities of the region. Without such 
intervention, for better or for worse, the Kingdom of St. Stephen would have had 
another lease on life. As a matter of fact - and I hold no brief to defend Stephen's 
views - these were applicable less to the non-Hungarian (Turkic or Slavic) 
populations of the realm than to the German or Italian knights and courtiers favored 
by his wife. Interestingly enough, in a subsequent section of his Instructions, the 
king seems to express some misgivings about the central, uniform governance of 
subjects of various ethnic backgrounds: "Who among the Greeks would govern 
Romans with Greek laws," writes Stephen, "or who among the Romans would 
govern Greeks with Roman law? No one." 
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It so happened that at the end of his life, Stephen, grieved by the loss of his son 
Imre, and plagued by ill-health did not follow his own precepts. He appointed his 
Italian nephew, Peter Orseolo to succeed him, a disastrous choice that plunged the 
country into internal and external conflicts. 
Many factors have led to the success of Stephen but, in essence, the diverse and 
plural ethnic groups within his realm were held together as a single political entity 
by his ingenuity and determination. He negotiated successfully the last transition 
in European history of a nomad people into a sedentary state. In less than a cen­
tury the gens detestanda, as the Hungarians were often referred to in the Latin 
chronicles of the epoch, became a gens adfidem Christi conversa. Once in Eu­
rope, the Hungarians, as it were, closed the door behind them, changed their role, 
and became the self-appointed defenders of Europe. Hungary became in the word 
of her poets the "shield of Christianity." 
Notes 
1. Not surprisingly the person and the rule of Stephen has been described, analyzed and discussed 
in hundreds of books and articles. Because of limitations of space and the genre of this essay, I 
had to forego justificative footnotes. I made good use of the recent publications by István 
Györffy and Gyula Kristó, both excellent scholars who, however, often disagree on important 
questions relating to Stephen. Let me just cite István Györffy: István király és müve (Budapest, 
1977) and Gyula Kristó: Levédi törzsszövetségétől Szent István államáig (Budapest, 1980) and 
a very recent article by Kristó, "Magyarország népei Szent István korában." Századok 134 
(2000): 3 ^ 4 . I liked Kristó's thumb-nail sketch "Szent István (980k-1038)" on pp. 1-4 of 
Nagy képes millenniumi arcképcsarnok edited by Árpád Rácz (Budapest, 1999). A judicious 
one volume selection of the fifty studies published in the three volumes of the collective work 
Emlékkönyv Szent István király halálának kilencszázadik évfordulóján, edited by Jusztinián 
Serédi (Budapest, 1938) appeared without date (!) probably in the late 1980s. It is a treasure-
house of useful information. I would not disown the portrait I gave of Stephen in my History of 
Hungary (London, 1959, several later editions). 
2. There is now the excellent survey by Maximilian Georg Kellner, Die Ungarneinfölle im Bild 
der Quellen bis 1150 (München 1997). 
3. Bálint Hóman, Magyar történet I (Budapest, 1935), 78: "Legfeltűnőbb a szlávok hátrama-
radottsága a politikai szervezet tekintetében. " 
4. I know of no translation of this document into any of the European languages. The Latin text is 
available in Kálmán Eperjessy and László Juhász, eds, Szemelvények a magyar történelem 
latinnyelvű kútfőiből (Budapest, 1935), 3-6. 
FORMATION OF THE HABSBURG-OTTOMAN 
FRONTIER IN THE DANUBIAN REGION: 
BUDA, 1541 
GUSTAV BAYERLE 
Indiana University, Bloomington, IN, 
USA 
On July 17, 1540 John I, the last Hungarian speaking King of Hungary, died. 
Stephen Werbőczy, his chancellor ventured to Istanbul to ask Sultan Suleiman for 
approval of naming John Sigismund, the infant son of the late king, as the new 
King of Hungary. This request was contrary to the agreement made in the secret 
Treaty of Várad of 1538 in which John I pledged that after his death Ferdinand 
will inherit his share of Hungary. Soon, Suleiman acknowledged John Sigismund 
as King John II just as the Habsburg General Vels besieged Buda to support 
Ferdinand's claim to the throne. In December Werbőczy returned from Istanbul 
and announced that Suleiman was planning a campaign in Hungary but the news 
did not stop Ferdinand; in May 1541 his army renewed the siege of Buda. 
Sultan Suleiman arrived at Buda on August 26 and, after defeating the with­
drawing Habsburg army - exactly 15 years after his victory at Mohács on August 
29, 1526 - his army entered the castle without opposition. There he announced 
that he would continue to protect John II as the ruler of an enlarged Transylvania 
but will make Buda the seat of a newly formed Ottoman province under the com­
mand of Suleiman Pasha. For the protection of John IF s rule he imposed on 
Transylvania a levy of 10,000 ducats annually. After a few weeks the Sultan left 
Hungary leaving behind a garrison of 3,000 soldiers. 
Ferdinand refused to acknowledge the status of King John II and soon besieged 
Pest in 1542 compelling Sultan Suleiman to lead a new campaign to Hungary in 
1543. In order to protect the military route between Buda and Belgrade he wid­
ened the narrow passage by taking Siklós, Pécs, Esztergom, Tata, and 
Székesfehérvár and make Vilayet-i Budin an indisputable province. In four years 
the de facto partition became recognized internationally. In the Treaty of Edirne 
of 1547, Emperor Charles V and Sultan Suleiman agreed to a truce for five years 
and both acknowledged the status quo in Hungary. The envoy of the emperor 
promised the payment of an annual levy of 30,000 ducats in the name of King 
Ferdinand for keeping the west and northwest parts of Royal Hungary as his share. 
The long process of dismantling the Medieval Hungarian Kingdom - a process 
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that began in 1521 with the Ottoman conquest of Nándorfehérvár/Belgrádé - was 
completed. 
Hungary remained partitioned for 150 years. In 1686-1699, in a series of fierce 
combats, the armies of the Holy League under the leaderships of Prince Eugene of 
Savoy and Count Louis of Baden wrested the region out of Ottoman control. An 
independent Hungary was of course inconceivable; the newly conquered territo­
ries were to be integrated into the Habsburg Empire. Not counting the short inter­
vals of self-determination under Rákóczi and Kossuth, the House of Habsburg 
reigned over Hungary until 1918. 
The year 1541 was indeed the turning point in the thousand-year-existence of 
the Hungarian nation dividing it into a period of sovereignty and a period of de­
pendency. But it was only in the twentieth century that historians made 1541 the 
pivotal year. National tradition has regarded the tragic events of August 29, 1526 
as the time when the Medieval Hungarian Kingdom reached its end. The carnage 
on the battlefield and the massacre of the prisoners, the death of seven archbish­
ops and bishops, twenty-eight barons, 3,000 of the gentry cavalry, 10,000 of the 
professional infantry and - above all - the tragic death of the young king Louis II 
made August 29, 1526 the day when "everything was lost." Every schoolchild in 
Hungary could recall the immortal line of Károly Kisfaludy: 
Nemzeti nagy létünk nagy temetője, Mohács! 
[Mohács, the great graveyard of our national existence!] 
450 years after Mohács, the literary historian Tibor Klaniczay still has main­
tained this position saying that the death of Louis II made the elections of two 
competing kings possible and in this way it precipitated the partition of the king­
dom and the ensuing loss of national independence. ("Mi és miért veszett el 
Mohácsnál?" [What was lost at Mohács and why] in Kortárs, 1976, 783-796.) 
Others, most notably Ferenc Szakály, the leading specialist of the period, have 
pointed out that the loss of Nándorfehérvár/Belgrádé in 1521 sealed the fate of 
Hungary. In 1456 that fortress was heroically defended by János Hunyadi who 
defeated the Ottoman legions of Mehemmed II under its walls. Two generations 
later it was virtually abandoned by the central administration of Hungary when 
they did not come through with the needed financial and military aid. Its garrison 
defended the walls as long as it was possible. On the day of surrender - it also 
happened on August 29 - only 72 of the original 1500 professional soldiers were 
still alive and well enough to retreat. Nándorfehérvár was the linchpin in the for­
tification system of the southern border defense. With its loss the road to Buda 
was open without any stronghold on the path of an invading army. Of equal im­
portance were the ineffectual measures of the Hungarian king that signified for 
the Turks that the earlier Hungarian resolve and determination to protect their 
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land were broken. Hungarians were still heroic enough to die for their country but 
not sagacious enough to muster a successful defense of it. As Szakály saw it, with 
this victory the eventual downfall of the Hungarian Kingdom became inevitable. 
After 1521 there was nothing King Louis II could have done that would have 
stopped the coming Ottoman expansion to the Great Plains and Buda. Already the 
subtitle of his article on the subject makes his views unmistakable. ("Nándor-
fehérvár, 1521 : The Beginning of the End of the Medieval Hungarian Kingdom," 
in: Hungarian-Ottoman Military and Diplomatic Relations in the Age ofSiileyman 
the Magnificent. Ed. Géza Dávid and Pál Fodor, Budapest, 1994,47-76.) 
In the last decades of the nineteenth century some Hungarian historians - nota-
bly Ferenc Salamon (see his Magyarország a török hódítás korában [Hungary in 
the Era of Ottoman Domination], Budapest, 1886) - began to question the tradi-
tional view that regarded the tragedy at Mohács and the subsequent Ottoman con-
quest as unavoidable. Around this time Turcologists like József Thúry published 
Hungarian translations of Ottoman narratives and administrative sources on the 
Era of Suleiman. Instead of looking at the events of 1521 and 1541 from a purely 
Hungarian point of view, they attempted to reconstruct the Ottoman perception of 
the events. They looked at Ottoman claims that emphasized the defensive charac-
ter of the conquest and found them plausible. Sultan Suleiman and the Sublime 
Porte wrote several missives to Hungarian and Western dignitaries stating that he 
was compelled to enter Buda in order to prevent the Habsburgs from taking it and 
that Suleiman was personally obliged to protect the kingship of John Sigismund. 
The Sublime Porte maintained that they would have preferred to have relations 
with a united and independent Hungary tied to the Ottoman Empire by a treaty of 
amity and friendship; a Hungary strong enough to defend itself against the Habsburg 
threat; a country that would constitute a buffer zone between the Ottomans and 
the Habsburgs. Salamon was inclined to trust the Turkish documents since the 
Ottoman Empire had already created such autonomous vassal principalities in 
Wallachia and Moldavia. He argued that Hungary was even further away from the 
core Ottoman lands of Anatolia, and that the Ottomans did not have enough troops 
to make a perpetual occupation of Hungary feasible. This sounded like a realistic 
assumption to him since - as he noted - the Turks did not make any attempts to 
convert Hungarians to Islam in order to make them loyal Ottoman subjects. In the 
inter-war period Sándor Takáts presented the Turkish world in Hungary in like 
fashion. After World War II, Tayyib Gökbilgin and Nejat Göyünc of Istanbul 
University in Turkey rekindled Salamon's lines of argument. They argued that 
Suleiman understood the immense material and manpower cost of occupying 
Hungary and for this reason he was unwilling to do so; in 1541 he did it anyway as 
his response to Habsburg aggression in the region. Göyünc published some of the 
annual budget summaries of the Province of Budin and proved that year after year 
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local Ottoman income from Hungary was not sufficient to cover the expenses; the 
central treasury in Istanbul had to send the total revenue from Egypt to Buda to 
balance the local budget, consisting mostly of garrison salaries. 
Géza Perjés, a Hungarian expert in military history, worked out a detailed the-
sis about why most of Hungary fell outside of the "action radius" of Ottoman 
military might. In his monograph Mohács (Budapest, 1979) he measured the dis-
tance between Istanbul and Buda, the daily progress of a complex military war 
engine of more than 100,000 men, and the logistic problems of providing supplies 
through the mountainous Balkans and the marshland region of southern Hungary. 
He demonstrated that for a moving army of this size foraging from the local in-
habitants would not be sufficient because of the fact that the military route crossed 
through sparsely populated regions. Supply problems could have been surmounted 
by establishing military depots on the route in advance; but the distance could not 
be shortened. The Ottoman Empire was centrally organized and Istanbul had to be 
the starting point of a major campaign. Furthermore the army could not start be-
fore April since they marshaled the feudal cavalry from several Asian provinces. 
The Ottoman forces usually arrived at Belgrade in July and they had to complete 
their task by October before the onset of cold, rainy weather. The small Hungarian 
fortresses further to the north-west could not stop the Ottoman advance but they 
could slow it down considerably. At best the Ottomans had forty to fifty days to 
engage the enemy; there was simply not enough time to break the resistance of a 
determined opposing army trained in the art of strategic withdrawal and avoid-
ance of pitched confrontation. According to Perjés this extreme time constraint 
was known to Suleiman and for this reason he attempted to avoid a direct military 
occupation of Hungary as long as it was feasible. In this view, the offers of com-
promise to establish a vassal yet autonomous Hungarian state were sincere and 
Louis II should have considered them seriously. 
The propagators of this type of conceptualization put the responsibility for the 
demise of the Medieval Hungarian Kingdom straight on the shoulders of the Hun-
garian government. The king and the Hungarian magnates should have under-
stood the perilous state of Hungary. They should have fortified Nándorfehérvár 
before 1521 with a larger garrison; the military payments should have been the 
highest priority of the treasury. These historians blame the Hungarian court for 
the suspension of diplomatic negotiations. The first two campaigns of Suleiman-
those of 1521 and 1526 - were both provoked by the arrest of Behram çavus, the 
Ottoman envoy who delivered Suleiman's offer of cooperation. The Hungarian 
government should have understood the need for compromise in order to save the 
territorial integrity of the Kingdom. Even if such a compromise could not have 
worked in the long run it would have given some time for Hungary, perhaps even 
a few decades. In hindsight, we know that Ottoman decline had started already in 
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the 1550s and that after the death of Suleiman at Szigetvár in 1566, his successors 
had little inclination for campaigns in Central Europe. 
Of course, no one in Europe at the time of Mohács could have anticipated such 
radical change in Ottoman military disposition. Nevertheless, for Hungary, com-
promise was the only viable alternative; all other options were manifestly futile. 
Some Hungarian historians have searched for a moral rationale stating that for the 
Hungarians - who were deeply rooted in Western Christianity for half a millen-
nium - a compromise with the Muslim Turks, the archenemy of Christendom, 
was simply not conceivable. Perhaps. But let me note that a compromise was not 
beneath the "most Catholic king" Francis I, King of France who made an alliance 
with Sultan Suleiman when it served his anti-Habsburg policy. As one result of 
the alliance the entire Ottoman fleet wintered in Toulon in 1543. 
To a modern student of the history of sixteenth-century Hungary the detain-
ment of the Ottoman envoy in Buda by Louis II is inexplicable. Granted interna-
tional diplomacy was at its beginnings in contemporary Europe and rules of con-
duct for the diplomatic personnel were not clearly defined. Yet it should have 
been known in Hungary that detaining a diplomatic envoy was a grievous matter; 
that the Ottomans often signaled the end of a truce by arrests of envoys. It should 
be taken for granted that the Hungarian government had no intention at this time 
to declare war against the Ottoman Empire. Why then the mistreatment of the 
Ottoman envoys? No satisfactory explanation has been offered by anyone on this 
subject except that it expressed a "non-negotiable" stance against any compro-
mise with the Sublime Porte. 
István Nemeskürty, the noted film critic and literary historian, wrote two highly 
popular essays on the critical years of 1526-1552, Ez történt Mohács után [This is 
what happened after Mohács] (Budapest, 1966) and Elfelejtett évtized: 1542-1552 
[Forgotten decade: 1542-1552] (Budapest, 1974). He lacks training in historical 
methodology but writes very well in a populist style. His hypothesis is a continu-
ation of the second school of thought. In his view the Hungarian gentry was cat-
egorically responsible for the events of Nándorfehérvár, Mohács and Buda. With 
foresight and solidarity they could have defended Nándorfehérvár, they could have 
won at Mohács, and even after the establishment of the Province of Budin they 
would have had the opportunity to chase out the Turks from Hungary. They could 
not accomplish these imperative missions because of the traditional Hungarian 
vices; dissension and factionalism, constant squabble, greed, and a lack of com-
mon purpose. For those unacquainted with Hungarian literature his extreme self-
torture would be unfathomable; but Hungarians are familiar with this "mea culpa" 
Ady-ist "Nekünk Mohács kell" [We deserve Mohács] mentality. 
Professional historians reacted strongly against Nemeskürty's denunciation of 
the Hungarian nobility accusing him of distortion; that he deliberately eschewed 
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evidence contrary to his premises. Pál Fodor's essay on the subject, Magyarország 
és a török hódítás [Hungary and the Turkish conquest] (Budapest, 1991) is the 
response of a Turcologist, who has meticulously culled Ottoman narrative and 
archival sources. He demonstrated that raids and military campaigns against the 
infidels were deeply imbedded in the Ottoman collective consciousness; already 
in 1938, Paul Wittek called it the "raison d'être " of the Ottoman state. Compelled 
by the legacy of his ancestors and also by the traditions of Medieval Islam, Sultan 
Suleiman could not have changed this policy of expansion to a policy of peaceful 
coexistence without courting major dissent - even mutiny - among his soldiers. 
Fodor also described the Ottoman method of gradual conquest originally formu-
lated by Haul Inalcik. According to this theory, Ottoman expansion traditionally 
took place in three stages: 
i. perennial raids across the borders causing havoc and a sharp decrease in the 
population of the frontier region; 
ii. defeat of the central army of the target country in a pitched battle and elimi-
nation of the ruling dynasty, yet with the continuance of a semi-autono-
mous state; 
iii. after a generation of vassal status, complete integration of the region into 
the body of the empire. 
In the past this three-stage method of conquest had been successfully employed 
by the Ottomans in Anatolia and in the Balkans. By providing an extended transi-
tional period after the initial shock of military defeat, the Ottomans secured a 
relatively peaceful integration of subject ethnic communities with many of the 
local traditions remaining intact. 
The Inalcik theory - as espoused by Fodor - explains the five-year hiatus after 
the loss of Nándorfehérvár and the cautious retreat from Buda in 1526. It also 
confirms that any compromise with Sultan Suleiman would have been ephemeral; 
with the illusionary compromise the Turks would have secured Hungary and used 
it as base of operations with little actual expense. The task of besieging and taking 
Vienna would have been their next logical maneuver. After the conquest of Vi-
enna, Hungary would have shared the fate of Serbia and would have been inte-
grated into the Ottoman Empire. With this final argument Fodor's interpretation 
of the events joins Szakály's theory; after the loss of Nándorfehérvár in 1521, the 
demise of the Hungarian Kingdom was inevitable. Heroic resistence or compro-
mise - whatever alternatives Louis II could have chosen, the end would have been 
the same. 
The varying interpretations of the partition of Hungary by capable historians 
who start with the same basic facts yet arrive at different conclusions are not 
uncommon in historiography. In the Hungarian case one must also consider the 
circumstances of the formation of the disparate interpretations. In the late nine-
teenth century there existed a friendly sentiment among the anti-Habsburg faction 
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of Hungarian intellectuals who remembered fondly the Ottoman Empire that pro-
vided safe harbor for Rákóczi and Kossuth when their causes were lost. Most 
Hungarian Turcologists in that period depicted Ottoman history in friendlier terms 
than it was customary in earlier times. The Mohács dispute of the 1970s was 
similarly influenced by modern parallels. Some people might have seen similari-
ties between the compromise with the Ottoman Empire and the compromise with 
the Soviet Union. Although I have been acquainted with most of the historians 
mentioned here I never thought it prudent to ask about this matter from them. 
Perhaps it is worthwhile to mention though that - in a different context - Lajos 
Fekete published a short essay in 1947 with the title, Magyarság, törökség: Két 
világnézet bajvívói [Hungarians and Turks: The champions of two ideologies]. He 
told me confidentially in 1965 that when he wrote Turks he really meant Soviet 
ideology. 
Every generation rewrites its perception of the past since the main use of his-
tory is the justification of the present. It is time for post-Communist Hungarian 
historians to reconsider the demise of the Medieval Hungarian Kingdom. In my 
opinion, such reassessment should focus on two major themes; the first one is 
internal and the second one international although the two are inter-connected. 
The first issue pertains to Hungarian society in the first decades of the sixteenth 
century. A society can be modeled as a structure of interrelated institutions. In the 
case of a kingdom the linchpin of the structure is - of course - the institution of 
kingship. In Hungary, numerous historians have observed that the role of the king 
changed radically between the reigns of Matthias and Louis II. By 1520 Louis II 
had lost most the economic base, the military authority and the policy-making 
power of his predecessors. His position was compromised, even undermined to 
the extent that he had no latitude for long range policy planning. Whatever he did 
was just an ad-hoc response to some crisis. Conjuring the chimera of the "tradi-
tional vices of the Hungarian nobility" is not a serious assessment of the complex 
forces that caused the deterioration of this fundamental institution. 
Recently I have read a fascinating monograph by Attila Zsoldos, Az Árpádok 
és alattvalóik: Magyarország története 1301-ig [The Árpáds and their subjects: 
The history of Hungary till 1301] (Debrecen, 1997). To my knowledge, he is the 
only Hungarian historian who has made an attempt to write an institutional his-
tory; alas, he did it for an earlier period. Monographs like his are essential for a 
better understanding of the structural changes in society. I am looking forward to 
scholarly research of this type for the age of Jagellos. 
The second issue concerns the international relations of Hungary in the 1520s. 
Much ado was made by Hungarian historians about the feasibility of the compro-
mise offered by Sultan Suleiman. Much less attention was paid to the threat Hun-
gary faced from the West even though some contemporaries considered the 
Habsburg blueprint for the annexation of Hungary more grievous than the Otto-
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man menace. It should be transparent to observers of the period that the Austrian 
Habsburgs targeted Hungary for expansion and that even without Ottoman pres-
sure Hungarian sovereignty was in serious peril. Hungarians could not choose 
between Scylla and Carybdis and their indecisiveness was the real cause of the 
partition of their kingdom. 
At this critical stage, diplomacy in Hungary was without perspectives. Her 
diplomatic endeavors amounted only to requests of financial aid against the Turk-
ish menace without indicating anything in return. In the early sixteenth century 
diplomatic activities in Europe reached new heights. Alliances were formed and 
broken in West Europe with rapidity; eventually even the Ottoman Empire was 
drawn into the fight against the Habsburgs. The Holy League of 1511 was formed 
not against the Turks - as in the seventeenth century - but against the French in 
order to drive them out from Italy. Under Francis 1(1515-1547) France was search-
ing for allies and concluded treaties with all potential anti-Habsburg regimes. Yet, 
in Louis II's reign Hungary was not a player in the diplomatic ventures in spite of 
the manifest need for international affiliations. Through the double marriage con-
tract with Archduke Ferdinand, King Louis II was commited to the Habsburg 
side; but it was a one-sided obligation that did not include shared responsibility 
for the defense of the integrity of Hungary against Turkish attacks. In truth, at that 
time Austria had neither the inclination nor the military strength to effectively 
protect Hungary. When Hungary needed it most she was left alone to face the 
Ottoman onslaught. Possibly the reasons for the ineffective diplomatic relations 
could be found in the deteriorated condition of central authority; nevertheless, this 
failure of Hungarian diplomacy to attract international alliances warrants further 
investigation. Without substantial foreign assistance - military, financial or diplo-
matic - Hungary was not able to withstand the increasing pressure from two sides 
of her borders; her collapse was predictable even without the Mohács disaster. 
The burden of the subversion of Hungarian royal authority and the lack of 
diplomatic perspectives proved to be fatal to Hungarian sovereignty. The decline 
of Hungarian central authority happened at the worst possible time; at the time of 
the global formation of the frontier between two superpowers, the Habsburgs and 
the Ottomans. Because of the simultaneous pressures from west and south, Hun-
gary ended in the worst possible position with the line of demarcation going through 
her center. 
ALTERNATIVES IN HUNGARIAN HISTORY 
IN THE SEVENTEENTH CENTURY 
ISTVÁN GYÖRGY TÓTH 
Institute of History, HAS, Budapest, 
Hungary 
During the seventeenth century and at the beginning of the eighteenth century 
the Hungarian political elite, the Hungarian aristocracy and the Hungarian nobil-
ity, faced dramatic political choices and very important alternatives. 
After the Battle of Mohács in 1526 and after the capture of Buda, the ancient 
capital of the Hungarian kingdom, in 1541 the territory of Hungary came to be 
divided into three - temporarily even four - parts. The middle of the medieval 
Hungarian kingdom, the region around Buda, fell directly under Ottoman direc-
tion. The Turkish authorities divided the area subject to their control into vilayets 
and sanjaks. The northern and western part of historic Hungary, or so-called royal 
Hungary, became a part of the Habsburg Empire. In the eastern part of the former 
Hungarian kingdom a new state, which had never existed before came into exist-
ence. This was the princedom of Transylvania, which - along with the two Rou-
manian principalities of Wallachia and Moldavia and the republic of Ragussa -
came to be considered as one of the sultan's Christian vassals. 
However, this simplified view corresponded only in part to seventeenth-cen-
tury realities and hardly at all to the image of Hungary, which contemporaries in 
the Carpathian Basin had fashioned. These previously mentioned states did not 
exist beside each other, they existed within each other. A letter of the Bey of 
Koppány from the year 1637 will help us to see this complicated situation more 
clearly. In his letter the Turkish officer wrote to Count Ádám Batthyány, a nearby 
Hungarian commander, about a matter concerning the peasants of Nagyegres, a 
village in the territory held by the Ottoman authorities. This village, as many other 
villages in Turkish territory, paid taxes to both sides, to their Turkish as well as to 
their Hungarian landlords. The existence of this system of double taxation re-
vealed very clearly how different the occupation of Turkish Hungary was from 
the occupation of the Balkan provinces of the Ottoman Empire. 
The inhabitants of this village paid taxes to both sides, but then suddenly ban-
dits had appeared and began to harass the villagers. Thus, the bandits were hin-
dering the normal payment of taxes. Therefore, the Turkish commander wrote to 
the Hungarian count that they should join in a common effort against these ban-
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dits because then the taxes would be paid peacefully to both sides, to the Turks 
and to the Hungarians. Even more interesting is the argumentation of the Turkish 
bey. The two captains, the Muslim and the Christian, should act together because, 
"The village of Nagyegres is in Turkey in my possession but it is in Hungary in 
the possession of your Lordship." At first sight this observation of the Turk ap-
pears to be completely nonsensical. But the words of the Turkish bey expressed 
better than many historians' monographs the almost schizophrenic situation of 
Turkish Hungary. It had become part of the Ottoman Empire without ever ceasing 
to be a part of Hungary. This situation was not simply a fiction maintained by 
seventeenth-century contemporaries but, as the taxes paid to both sides clearly 
showed, it also reflected hard realities. 
The Hungarian nobility never ceased to consider the territory occupied by the 
Turks as its own. During the seventeenth century the history of the market town of 
Csongrád included family inheritance disputes, the sale of the town from one 
noble to another, the assignment of the town in pledge, and the imperial confisca-
tion of this market town from a family, which had come to be considered as un-
faithful. In considering these events we can easily forget that the market town of 
Csongrád lay far behind the Turkish lines and had, of course, Turkish landlords as 
well. 
Transylvania was a vassal state of the sultan, but the Hungarians viewed the 
principality as a part of their country that had become provisionally detached. 
Even more interesting was the situation of northwestern Hungary, or the region 
around Kassa. Under Imre Thököly near the end of the seventeenth century this 
area became a vassal state of the sultan. Even before the time of Imre Thököly 
these lands, the so-called seven counties, were several times given by the Habsburg 
Kings of Hungary to the rulers of Transylvania, but each time only for the lifetime 
of a particular prince. Juridicially this region remained a part of the Habsburg 
Empire but was ruled by Transylvania and paid taxes to its prince. With one third 
of the country under Habsburg rule, a second third existing as a semi-independent 
vassal state of the sultan, and the final third constituting a joint Turkish-Hungar-
ian dominium, the political situation of Hungary was more than a little compli-
cated. In this situation the Hungarian nobles had to defend their interests and to 
balance themselves between the empires of two great emperors. 
At the end of the Fifteen Years' War the Hungarian nobility had a serious po-
litical alternative for the first time since beginning of the Turkish occupation. By 
1604 it had become clear that despite the enormous efforts of the imperial army 
and the Hungarian nobility and after a decade and a half of war Hungary had still 
not been liberated from the Turks. On the other hand the Turks had not been able 
to conquer Vienna and occupy the whole of Hungary. The Habsburg Emperor 
Rudolph II, whose behavior had become less and less rational, falsified a law on 
Protestantism and began to occupy Protestant churches by military force. For the 
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first time the Hungarian estates could revolt against the Habsburgs without endan-
gering the potential liberation of the country from the Turks because after fifteen 
years of warfare this liberation had proven to be impossible. 
The struggle against the Habsburgs was led by a formerly pro-Habsburg aristo-
crat István Bocskai. Over a decade earlier Bocskai had executed those Transylvanian 
aristocrats who had formed the Turkish party in Transylvania and who had wanted 
to break up the alliance with Emperor Rudolph II. Bocskai at that time had be-
lieved in the liberation of Hungary from the Turks, and he had also believed in the 
alliance with the emperor. However, later he reversed himself and carried out 
exactly the same policy that he had formerly considered treason and punished 
with death. The long war finally convinced Bocskai that the liberation of Hungary 
was not possible under the existing circumstances, and consequently the Hungar-
ian nobility had to try to secure whatever advantages the situation offered. The 
nobility has to use the presence of Turkish power in Hungary and the existence of 
an independent Transylvania to assist in the preservation of their rights as estates 
against the emperor. 
Bocskai was elected Prince of Transylvania, and thus he became a vassal of the 
sultan. After his military successes in the campaign against the emperor, the Hun-
garian nobility and the Hungarian estates elected Bocskai the Prince of Hungary. 
Since Hungary was a kingdom, this title was completely new, and Bocskai was 
neither a king nor a governor. Bocskai considered his position strong enough to 
ask the sultan for a crown. At first the Turks were surprised by Bocskai 's request, 
but then they hastily fashioned a wonderful golden crown with precious stones. 
(Today the so-called "Bocskai Crown" is one of the treasures of the imperial treasury 
in Vienna.) But when Grand Vezir Lala Mehmet offered the crown to Bocskai as 
King of Hungary and vassal of the sultan Bocskai would not accept it as such. He 
did accept the crown as a gift of the sultan. 
The explanation for Bocskai's change of heart can be found in the rapidly evolv-
ing military and political developments. During these months the military situa-
tion changed fundamentally. The imperial army had begun to reassert itself, and 
the behavior of the Turkish forces made clear to Bocskai that if he occupied addi-
tional forts from the imperial soldiers, then the Turks would soon take possession 
of them. Consequently the Hungarian prince would become a tool of Turkish ex-
pansion and help to return to Turkish hands important fortresses that had been 
liberated by the Christians from the Muslims. Bocskai responded by making peace 
with the emperor. He remained the Prince of Transylvania and the ruler of north-
western Hungary, but he renounced the title of Prince of Hungary and acknowl-
edged the rule of the new Hungarian king Matthias, the brother of the mad em-
peror Rudolph II. Thus, Bocskai had a crown but he never became a king. The 
rule of Bocskai, who was generally respected in Hungary, could have been very 
fruitful. In the peace that Bocskai had concluded with the emperor, he had made 
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dispositions for the future of his prospective sons. But he never even had the 
chance to marry. Six months after Bocskai concluded the peace with the emperor 
he died. 
If the end of the Fifteen Years' War had provided the possibility of a political 
choice for the Hungarian nobility, the beginning of the Thirty Years' War supplied 
an even better opportunity to the nobility for shaping the political world in Hun-
gary. After the success of his military campaign in Hungary Gábor Bethlen, Prince 
of Transilvania since 1613, was elected King of Hungary by the Hungarian estates 
at the diet of Besztercebánya in August 1620. The Hungarian nobles had cried, 
"Vivat rex Gabriel!" After having captured Pozsony, Bethlen had even gained 
possession of the Holy Crown of Hungary. However, he did not ask for a corona-
tion. Why not? Perhaps religious considerations restrained him. All of the Hun-
garian kings had been Catholic, the crown was considered to be a holy relic at-
tached to the person of a Roman Catholic saint and former king, and the Hungar-
ian kings had traditionally been crowned by the Archbishop of Esztergom. At first 
sight these religious difficulties could have been the reason why the Calvinist 
Bethlen had felt compelled to renounce the very Catholic coronation ceremony. 
However, this could not be the real cause of Bethlen's refusal because at exactly 
the same time the equally Calvinist Frederick of the Palatinate was being crowned 
by the leaders of the various Protestant churches with the crown of Saint Venceslas 
as King of Bohemia. The religious and ceremonial problems did not hinder the 
coronation of Bethlen. On the other hand the rapidly changing military and politi-
cal situation did. Even though he had successfully occupied royal Hungary, Bethlen 
had remained cautious in his policy. If we consider the fact that a few months later 
at the Battle of White Mountain an imperial army crushed the Bohemian estates 
and put an early end to the reign of Frederick, who would soon be ridiculed as the 
"Winter King," then Bethlen's cautious attitude was more than justified. The Turks 
had made it clear to Bethlen that they would never allow the unification of Hun-
gary and Transylvania under his rule. They would have been more than satisfied if 
instead of their great enemy, the emperor, their ally Bethlen had become the Hun-
garian king. But the sultan insisted that if Bethlen became King of Hungary, he 
must abdicate in Transylvania because could not rule in both. 
This policy of the Turks was in clear contradiction with Bethlen's hopes. He 
had wanted to unify the two territories under his own authority as the "raison 
d'etre" of his rule in Hungary and in order to legitimate himself as king. The 
Turk's reluctance to permit the unification of Hungary and Transylvania under the 
rule of one man was understandable. They simply did not want any of their vas-
sals to become too powerful. Nevertheless, it was true that during the second half 
of the sixteenth century, under the threat of a Habsburg gaining the Polish throne, 
the sultan had allowed Stephen Báthory, their vassal and the Prince of Transylvania, 
to accept the Polish crown. But as soon as the danger of a Habsburg ruler in 
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Poland disappeared, the Turks prohibited the unification of Poland and Transylvania 
under Stephen Báthory. When György II Rákóczi ignored the instructions of Grand 
Vezir Köprülü, who had prohibited Rákóczi's campaign in Poland and aspirations 
for the Polish throne, and went to Poland anyway, the Turks punished Transylvania 
with a brutal invasion. 
Gábor Bethlen was elected King of Hungary, and he also had in his possession 
the Crown of St. Stephen but he never became a crowned King of Hungary. As 
Bocskai before him, Bethlen remained an effective ruler in Transylvania, held a 
portion of northern Hungary - the previously mentioned seven counties - and 
exerted a strong influence on politics in Royal Hungary. One of Bethlen's succes-
sors in Transylvania György II Rákóczi, however, overestimated the possibilities 
for independent action by this small state. When the Swedes invaded Poland, 
Rákóczi, as an ally of the Swedish king, also attacked the Polish kingdom. The 
Prince of Transylvania hoped to follow in the footsteps of Stephen Báthory and 
become King of Poland. 
However the Polish adventure turned into a catastrophe. The Transylvanian 
troops occupied Krakow and Warsaw but soon afterwards fell into the hands of 
the Tartars, who took them to the Crimean peninsula and held them for ransom. 
These developments were made even worse for Transylvania by the complete 
political volte-face in Istambul. The new Grand Vezir Köprülü was determined to 
pursue a more aggressive policy and introduced a period of expansion in an em-
pire already on the brink of collapse. Köprülü came to Transylvania in person to 
punish his unfaithful vassal. Then the Turkish and Tartar troops devastated the 
flourishing small state, and tens of thousands of Christian prisoners were taken 
and sold as slaves. A civil war broke out between the followers of Rákóczi and 
those who favored a more pro-Turkish orientation. 
The Viennese court was very much aware of the danger that the assertive grand 
vezir would put an end to the semi-autonomous status of Transylvania. The 
Habsburg advisers were convinced that the Turks would like to transform this 
principality into a directly ruled Turkish territory. The imperial court was deter-
mined to prevent - by military force if necessary - this transformation of a cen-
tury old status quo. Nevertheless, when the Turks nominated Ákos Barcsay as 
their candidate for the Transylvanian throne, the imperial army withdrew from 
Transylvania. However, Mehmet Köprülü, the son of the former grand vezir, who 
had succeeded to his father's place, wanted to use the new strength of the Ottoman 
Empire for further conquests. He launched an attack in 1663 and in 1664 went 
after Vienna itself. He desired to finish the never completed project of Sultan 
Suleiman and to conquer the whole of Hungary. These Turkish plans, however, 
came to naught when at the Battle of Szentgotthárd the Turks suffered an annihi-
lating defeat in 1664. Nevertheless, only ten days later the Viennese court con-
cluded the Peace of Vasvár and conceded surprisingly lenient conditions to the 
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Turks. Vienna granted the favorable terms only because the emperor feared that 
the Spanish king could die at any moment and a war with France would break out 
over succession to the Spanish throne. Therefore, he wanted to end the eastern 
war as quickly as possible. After this shameful peace the Hungarian nobility fell 
into a state of complete despair. Many had hoped that the great campaign to liber-
ate Hungary from the Turks was about to begin, and now with the Peace of Vasvár 
it seemed that all hopes for a liberation of the country by the Habsburgs had evapo-
rated. Leading aristocrats, among them the palatine and the archbishop of 
Esztergom, began to conspire against the emperor. This constituted a complete 
about face. The conspirators decided that ifit was not possible to expel the Turks, 
then all of Hungary should become a Turkish vassal kingdom. I think that this 
solution would have been a political catastrophe for Hungary. It would have pro-
longed the occupation by the Turks and would have led Hungary down a path 
similar to that of the Balkan countries. Fortunately for Hungary, but unfortunately 
for the conspirators, after such an advantageous peace with the emperor and in the 
middle of a prolonged war with Venice the Turks were not interested in what the 
conspirators had to offer. The conspiracy was discovered and the leaders were 
arrested, tried, and executed. However, the project of creating a Turkish vassal 
kingdom in Hungary did not disappear. In the years that followed Imre Thököly, a 
young Hungarian aristocrat and the son of one of the original conspirators, rallied 
the jobless soldiers and the persecuted noblemen to a series of military campaigns 
against the emperor. In 1682 he got the blessing of the sultan for the territory 
around Kassa [Kosice] in northwestern Hungary. He wanted to hold it as a vassal 
principality. The Turks soon declared Thököly to be the Prince of Upper Hungary 
(in Turkish Orta Madzar, or Middle Hungary). The new territory together with the 
Transylvanian principality meant that there were now two Turkish vassal states in 
Hungary, and the territory of Hungary that did not depend directly, or indirectly, 
on Istambul had diminished dramatically. The raison d'être of Thököly's state 
was the axiom that the liberation of Hungary from the Turks would be impossible 
for generations because of the impassivity of the imperial court. Therefore the 
Hungarian political class had to forge an arrangement with the Turks and derive 
whatever advantage it could from this situation. The emperor was interested in 
maintaining the status quo in Hungary and in preserving his army for the inevita-
ble war over the Spanish succession. However, two decades after their campaign 
of 1663 the Turks overestimated again their power and directly attacked Vienna 
for the second time since 1529. It seemed to many that a new turning point had 
arrived in the history of central Europe, and the Ottoman Empire was once again 
as in the days of Suleiman the Great entering a period of conquest. With very few 
exceptions, the Hungarian aristocrats came to the camp of the Grand Vezir Kara 
Mustafa, when the Turks attacked Vienna, and the grand vezir promised them 
further Habsburg lands as vassal provinces, which they could hold in the same 
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way as Thököly held Upper Hungary. In this way, for example, Styria and Moravia 
were promised to new overlords. However, the Turks were decisively defeated at 
Vienna and a new era began. Thököly's state collapsed, when it became clear that 
there was a serious possibility for the liberation of Hungary. Entire regiments 
abandoned Thököly and went over to the imperial army to fight against the Otto-
man Empire. 
The situation of Transylvania also changed dramatically. As a Turkish vassal 
state, Transylvania was forced to fight against the emperor, a task that the state of 
the Prince Apafi fulfilled only with reluctance. However, it was evident that 
Transilvania could be a semi-independent state only as long as the castle of Buda 
was in Turkish hands. After the capture of Buda by the Christians in 1686 
Transylvania could no longer remain independent; and under the pretext of look-
ing for winter quarters the imperial army soon occupied it. In the next few years 
several treaties were concluded with Vienna. In these agreements the conditions, 
reflecting the changes in the military situation, became increasingly less favorable 
for the Transylvanians. During the great Turkish counterattack of 1690 Thököly 
came to Transylvania and had himself elected as the Turkish vassal prince. But 
only five weeks later, after the arrival of the imperial army, he felt compelled 
quickly to abandon his second Turkish vassal state. Ferenc II Rákóczi, the stepson 
of Thököly, would also lead a war of independence against the emperor from 
1703 to 1711. At first sight this struggle appears to be a continuation of those led 
by Bocskai, Bethlen, György Rákóczi I and Thököly. Hungarian patriotic histori-
ans for a long time tried to portray these wars as a series of anti-Habsburg strug-
gles for independence. In my opinion, however, there were very few common 
features between the movement led by Ferenc II Rákóczi and the seventeenth-
century conflicts with the Habsburgs. Ferenc II Rákóczi was elected Prince of 
Transylvania but this title was for a semi-sovereign state that had just ceased to 
exist. Although Rákóczi's title was Prince of Transylvania, in direct contrast to 
the other wars against the Habsburgs, rule in Transylvania did not at all form the 
basis of Rákóczi's power. His base was Hungary. As a consequence Rákóczi quickly 
abandoned Transylvania, and the territory came to be occupied by the imperial 
army. All of the seventeenth-century struggles against the Habsburgs were sup-
ported by an ideology emphasizing the defense of Protestantism (generally Cal-
vinism, but in the case of Thököly Lutheranism) against the aggressive Counter 
Reformation of the Viennese court. Ferenc II Rákóczi, however, was a staunch 
Catholic and the author of pious Catholic works. He never put the religious issues 
at the center of his political program. On the contrary he did everything to intro-
duce the toleration of all the denominations in the territory he occupied. The real 
difference between Ferenc II Rákóczi's war and those of the seventeenth century 
was, however, the lack of Turkish support. Earlier Bocskai, Bethlen, György 
Rákóczi and Thököly all fought against the emperor with the help of the Turks. At 
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first sight the lack of Turkish support for Ferenc II Rákóczi against the Habsburgs 
seems to be completely irrational. The Turks had concluded with the emperor 
what for them must have been a catastrophic peace at Karlowitz in 1699. Within a 
few years the War of the Spanish Succession broke out. This would preoccupy 
Vienna for the next decade and a half, as the emperor fought with France in Bel-
gium, Spain, Italy, and Germany and Ferenc II Rákóczi occupied Hungary. Dur-
ing this time the Turks did not try to attack the Habsburg Empire or attempt to 
recapture their lost Hungarian territories. After the collapse of the Rákóczi move-
ment and after the end of the War of the Spanish Succession, the Turks began a 
new war with Austria, one that the Turks quickly lost. However, it was reasonable 
that the Turks, who were in a state of shock after their defeat in Hungary - and 
very much occupied on other fronts, for example, fighting with the Russian Tsar 
Peter the Great - did not want to break the peace with the emperor by helping 
Rákóczi. For his part Ferenc II Rákóczi was also more than reluctant to ask for 
Turkish help because he feared that Turkish assistance would discredit his move-
ment in the eyes of the Hungarians, who had, after all, just been liberated from the 
Turks. The example of his stepfather Imre Thököly, who was abandoned by his 
soldiers, had to be a clear warning for him. 
This short overview of Hungarian and Transylvanian history between 1604 
and 1711 may perhaps convince us that for Hungarians not only the twentieth 
century was a period of dramatic changes and painful decisions, of repeated tran-
sitions between political regimes. However, I believe that it would be a great mis-
take to think that the Hungarian political elite had to choose between two equally 
bad solutions. 
Later, the historians of the nineteenth century and even those of the twentieth 
century have often presented these alternatives as a choice for the Hungarian no-
bility between two equally dangerous enemies, between two equally bad alterna-
tives. These works suggest that the Hungarians had to balance between the em-
pires of two great emperors, and they often use a quote from a late seventeenth-
century Kuruc [pro-Rákóczi] song, "Between two heathen enemies, for one fa-
therland we shed our blood." 
There can be little doubt that the Habsburg rulers were not at all respectful of 
the liberties or interests of the Hungarians. This was especially true for those who 
met Habsburg power in its worst form, in the form of its plundering army. On the 
other hand to believe that the two great empires constituted equal dangers for 
Hungarian interests would be a complete misunderstanding of the political alter-
natives of seventeenth-century Hungary. The basic question can be thus stated: 
Would Hungary remain a part of Latin Christian culture, a part of Europe, or 
would Hungary follow the fate of the Balkan lands, which would live for centu-
ries under Ottoman rule and in continuous stagnation? 
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After the defeat of Ferenc II Rákóczi the Hungarian nobility forged a fruitful 
compromise with the Habsburg rulers. Rákóczi's manifestos and letters from his 
exile in Turkey remained without effect. Neither he nor his son proved able to 
remobilize his former followers. The durable solution emerged from the compro-
mise between the Habsburg dynasty and the Hungarian nobility. The Hungarian 
nobility remained loyal even when the Habsburg dynasty faced its greatest crisis, 
when the dynasty died out in the male line and the young Queen Maria Theresa 
was attacked from all sides in 1741. The Hungarian political elite made a sound 
choice and supported the Habsburg Empire in its moment of crisis. The Hungar-
ian noblemen who pledged their lives and their blood knew only too well the 
danger that still lurked on Hungary's southern frontier. The possibility that Hun-
gary would follow the fate of the Balkans was still very near. 
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FROM ENLIGHTENMENT UNIVERSALISM 
TO ROMANTIC NATIONALISM 
MIHÁLY SZEGEDY-MASZAK 
Indiana University, Bloomington, IN, 
USA 
"Tradition ist nichts, was Einer lernen kann, ist nicht ein Faden, den 
Einer aufnehmen kann, wenn es ihm gefallt; so wenig, wie es möglich 
ist, sich die eigenen Ahnen auszusuchen. Wer eine Tradition nicht 
hat und sie haben möchte, der ist wie ein unglücklich Verliebter." 
(Ludwig Wittgenstein)1 
"Der Sinn aller Tradition ist Konzentration des Seelischen. Das Wesen 
allen 'Fortschritts' ist Zertstreuung, Macht und damit Verlassen des 
eigenen Zentrums." (Wilhelm Furtwängler)2 
"Das Überlieferte, das uns anspricht - der Text, das Werk, die Spur -
stellt selbst eine Frage und stellt damit unser Meinen ins Offene." 
(Hans-Georg Gadamer)3 
"(...) Mahler said that tradition is laziness, and I agree with him." 
(Pierre Boulez)4 
1. Imagined Communities 
As Benedict Anderson argues, a community can be called imagined if its mem-
bers have a sense of belonging together even though they have no direct, personal 
knowledge of each other.5 This characterization applies to religious communities, 
the citizens of states, social classes, and nations. All of these are of historical 
nature. Except in states in which ruling dynasties play a role, in most imagined 
communities canonized texts and "great narratives" guarantee continuity. For 
Christians the Bible, for Moslems the Koran is the sacred book, for socialists the 
works of Marx and his disciples may constitute the core of the cultural canon. 
Most nations were defined in texts. The self-image of the Hungarians was at least 
partly created by Ferenc Kölcsey (1790-1838), the author of Hymn (1823), the 
text that became the national anthem after it was set to music by Ferenc Erkel in 
1844. Four other works by Kölcsey, Zrínyi's Song (1830) and Zrínyi's Second 
Song (1838), two visionary poems predicting the death of the nation, and two 
longer essays, both published in 1826, Mohács, a meditation on the battle fought 
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in 1526 that led to the partition of Hungary, and National Traditions, a work that 
is usually regarded as an early statement about the significance of folklore, have 
exerted a decisive influence on the interpretation of Hungarian identity. Since this 
last can be considered the most important contribution to the shaping of the Hun-
garian nation, I shall focus on this text. 
Nation and class emerged after the dissolution of communities attached to reli-
gions and ruling dynasties. Homogeneous Christianity was so closely linked to 
the Latin language that the decline of monolingualism coincided with that of the 
unity of written culture. The authority of ruling dynasties suffered a serious blow 
with the executions of Charles I and Louis XVI. The idea that "workers have no 
fatherland of their own" was formulated as an antidote to nationalism and seemed 
to replace it at some stage. For the time being this prediction seems to have proven 
wrong. The distinction between ruling and oppressed classes can no longer hold 
in view of the growing stratification of societies. The prophecy implicit in the 
universalism of social Utopia that nations would disappear in the near future has 
lost its credibility. 
The cult of national character must be interpreted in the context of changing 
values. Although it would be misleading to sustain a monolithic vision of the 
Enlightenment, it is possible to suggest that some of its representatives saw a link 
between the perfectibility of man and the gradual move towards the unity of the 
human race. Paradoxically, the imperialism of the French revolution and the Na-
poleonic wars could be regarded as a logical consequence of the cosmopolitan 
dream about a universal society. Such technological inventions as Jean-Rodolphe 
Perronet's bridges or Mongolfier's baloons could suggest both the impracticable-
ness and the growing dimensions of war. 
For Count István Széchenyi, the founder of the Hungarian Academy, the goal 
was to imagine and create a nation. The attitude represented by the poet Kölcsey 
and his successor János Arany ( 1817-1882) was more ambiguous. For them tradi-
tion was partly to be established and partly to be discovered. Kölcsey was brought 
up on empiricist philosophy, and Arany lived in an age dominated by positivism. 
Both saw a link between tradition and oral culture. 
What may be of lasting value in Kölcsey's approach is the observation that 
culture is not only a product of individual talent but also of a collective memory 
that is not a matter of personal choice. The validity of this argument seems to have 
been confirmed even by deconstruction criticism: "Those who do not study his-
tory are condemned to repeat it, though studying is also a form of repetition."6 
The starting hypothesis in Kölcsey's essay is that poetry represents the highest 
form of culture, and the highest form of poetry is "deeply rooted in national tradi-
tions" and "stands close to the nation."7 In his view the perfect realization of this 
idea can be found in Homer. This assumption is based on two preconceptions: a) 
the definition of a national character has to be found in early history, b) orality is 
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superior to writing. The first of these hypotheses has never ceased to affect Hun-
garian culture, although some historians suggest that it is not possible to speak of 
nations before the Enlightenment and the rise of the bourgeoisie. The second served 
as the basis for the institutionalization of folklore in the nineteenth century and 
seems to have a revival, especially among those who speak of a second(ary) or 
second-degree orality. 
It is one of the inherent qualities of history that perceptions that appear dated in 
the short term may prove to be significant in the long run. An obvious example is 
the reading of Ossian offered in Kölcsey's essay. The premise that "the disappear-
ance of tradition makes it impossible for us to develop an authentic interpretation 
of the characteristics of the past,"8 leads to the conclusion that "in a late phase of 
culture the ancient is given the features of the present age."9 Other elements in the 
Hungarian Romantic's line of argument - the organicist view of national charac-
ter, the emphasis on the capacity of the mother tongue to create reality or on 
cultural relativism - may be questioned, but the idea of the interdependence of 
past and present, of memory as a sine qua non of culture seems as valid as ever in 
the self-perception of nations. 
The oppositions between exterior and interior, surface and depth, short-term 
and long-term processes suggest that the past is always rewritten by the ever-
changing present and raise the thorny question how influence or success is related 
to value. 
A disciple of both the Enlightenment and Romanticism, Kölcsey was aware of 
what lay outside the domain of national traditions. He saw Christianity and sci-
ence as supranational fields. Literature he thought to be their antidote. The idea of 
this duality of human culture continued to be influential in the twentieth century. 
In a book written in defence of small states, published in neutral Switzerland 
during World War II, Jan Huizinga described the humanist of Christianity and 
science as cosmopolitan: "Die Teilung in Nationen mußte ihm als ein die wahre 
Kultur störendes Hindernis vorkommen."10 
Today a similar gap exists between the international terminology of science 
and the language of the historians of national literatures. Generic concepts and 
periods differ according to linguistic areas and literary texts are still read as mani-
festations of national spirit. 
2. National Character 
In contrast to a view widely held, this concept was not born with Herder or the 
reaction against the wars fought by the French revolutionary army. The origins of 
counter-images can be traced back to earlier times. In Britain, for instance, a great 
number of articles were published with the aim of discrediting the Italian opera in 
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the early 18th century. One could also refer to the self-contradictions of the En-
lightenment, more specifically to some works of the author of Essai sur l'origine 
des languages and Considérations sur le gouvernement de Pologne (1772). The 
first among Jean-Jacques Rousseau's texts on national character dates from 1752. 
The comparison of organic and inorganic, familiar and alien, autonomous and 
imitative - closely reminiscent of Kölcsey 's oppositions - is followed by the fol-
lowing observation: 
Si j'étais chef de quelqu'un des peuples de la Nigritie, je déclare que 
je ferais élever sur la frontière du pays une potence où je ferais pendre 
sans rémission le premier Européen qui oserait y pénétrer, et le pre-
mier citoyen qui tenterait d'en sortir." 
Another relevant passage occurs in Du contrat social, published a decade later. 
Peter the Great is dismissed for imitating foreign models instead of letting na-
tional culture develop: 
Pierre avait le génie imitatif; il n'avait pas le vrai génie, celui qui 
crée et fait tout de rien. (...) Il a d'abord voulu de faire des Allemands, 
des Anglais, quand il fallait commencer par faire des Russes; il a 
empêché ses sujets de jamais devenir ce qu'ils pourraient être, en les 
persuadant qu'ils étaient ce qu'ils ne sont pas.12 
Rousseau's and Kölcsey's meditations on cultural universalism versus relativ-
ism have to be examined against the background of a wide-spread debate. No 
significant thinker was prone to extremist position. Universalists were not neces-
sarily conservative; Utopias were often based on the monolithic idea of one 
"Weltgeschichte." Relativism, on the other hand, frequently implied the preserva-
tion of existing values. 
Rousseau's relativism may have been inspired by his reading of Montaigne 
and Montesquieu. It is also possible that the Swiss thinker formulated his ideas in 
reaction against the essay Of National Characters, published in 1748, in which 
David Hume considered "the Negroes to be naturally inferior to the Whites," on 
the ground that they did not display "any symptom of ingenuity,"13 in other words, 
they could not develop a culture of their own. 
Although in most cases national character was created in texts, it would be a 
mistake to ignore other factors. The evidence offered by the history of visual arts 
is summarized by a recent work in the following manner: "The growing numbers 
of accessible international collections and the availability of prints from all over 
Europe allowed eighteenth-century artists of even the most mediocre fortunes to 
build up a cosmopolitan visual imagination. This, combined with the decline of 
the tradition of regional workshop training, established a social environment which, 
in general terms, did not favour the natural production of idiosyncratic regional 
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styles of production. Increasingly, therefore, national and regional artistic charac-
ter had actively to be invented or re-established in the wake of vigorous political 
campaigns to assert national identity. Being the artist of a certain locality or nation 
increasingly became a matter of choice rather than accident of birth."14 In his 
Treatise on Ancient Painting (1740) George Turnbull argued that "the general 
and national Character of a People may be conjectured from the State of the Arts 
amongst them: and reciprocally".15 From Jacques-Louis David's early The Oath 
of the Horatii (1784-5, Musée du Louvre) to Caspar David Friedrich's painting 
known as The Stages of Life or The Three Ages of Man (1834-5, Museum der 
Bildenden Künste, Leipzig) many works of art can be seen as the visual illustra-
tions of the parallel between the cycle of the life of an individual and that of a 
nation. The belief that culture developed cyclically from a state of youthfulness 
towards maturity, old age, and death was supported by the cult of ruins. 
Kölcsey was well-versed in the philosophy of the French Enlightenment, so 
the opening words of his essay have to be read in the context of the ideas on 
cultural universalism and realitivism formulated by such authors as Montesquieu, 
Voltaire, Buffon, Rousseau, Diderot, Condillac, Helvétius, and Condorcet: 
Nations have the same phases in their life as individuals. Their child-
hood is followed first by the promises of youth and later by the strength 
of maturity, which, in turn, is replaced by the decline of old age.16 
This old topos, inherited from Classical Antiquity, gained special significance 
in the late eighteenth and early nineteenth century. Széchenyi used it inconsist-
ently, which today may appear more acceptable than Kölcsey's blunt statement, 
although it has to be admitted than many national literary histories seem to com-
ply with an explicit teleology similar to the one underlying Kölcsey's work. 
In marked contrast to Kölcsey and many others, Széchenyi often toyed with the 
idea that national character has to be created in writing. Innumerable fragments 
from his works were given a proverbial status by later generations and the closing 
sentence of Credit (1830), his most influential book- "Many think: Hungary h a s 
been ; I like to believe she w i 11 b e"17 - served as a slogan in what is still called 
the Age of Reform, the period between Waterloo and the revolutions of 1848. 
As a diary entry dated 7 April 1819 indicates, the source of Széchenyi's ideas 
on national character was A Classical Tour Through Italy in 1802 by John 
Chetwoode Eustace, published in four volumes in London, in 1815. The quotation 
from this work starts with the following words: 
National character, though it may be influenced both by the will and 
the climate, is not the effect of either. Government and education, are 
the grand and efficient causes in the formation of character both pub-
lic and private.18 
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A month later Széchenyi made the following remark: 
Eine Nation entstehet ebenso wie ein Kind geboren wird - gehet 
durch die Jahre der Adolescens, der Jugend, der Mannheit, und des 
Alters - und stirbt endlich ab - der einzige Unterschied nach der 
Tode einer Nation und eines Menschen ist nur, dass der Leichnahm 
eines Menschen von Würmern gefressen wird, und zu sein gänzlich 
aufhört, indessen der verlebte Körper einer Nation - lange Jahre noch 
fortvegetirt - . Ob eine Nation gross werden oder unbedeutend bleiben 
soll, hengt von dem Zufall eben so sehr ab, als von der Erziehung die 
es in seinen Kinder Jahren bekommen hat.19 
Since Széchenyi's diaries were not published until much later, it is not likely 
that Kölcsey had access to them. Széchenyi, however, could rely on the poet's 
essay when later he blamed Hungarians for the preservation of the outmoded and 
for superficial imitation: "We have no national habits; our existence and knowl-
edge depend on imitation. Unlike other nations, we stick to the old and are super-
ficial in imitating others."20 
Are the characteristics of the Hungarian nation to be preserved or to be cre-
ated? The main reason for Széchenyi's great influence on both conservatives and 
liberals is his inconsistency in answering that question. "Hungary is an old for-
tress that needs restoration." One page after this statement quite a different tone is 
set by the following remark: "The Hungarian is but a child. He has not achieved 
anything yet but the psychic and physical energy hidden in his young soul may 
enable him to do great things."21 When defining the character the Hungarian na-
tion should acquire in the future, he resorts to the figure of speech known as 
oxymoron: "Our country needs an old head attached to young shoulders".22 The 
paradoxical nature of the combination of tradition and innovation suggests not 
only a compulsion to fuse contradictory experience into a unity but also the possi-
ble disappearance of national character. His declaration made in the Upper House, 
on 2 October 1844, refers to the second alternative: 
It may be possible that those who will replace us will be more honest 
and intelligent, but I take it for certain that they will not be Hungar-
ians.23 
Throughout his life Széchenyi viewed national character as the product of lit-
erature. Here is a passage of a work entitled Dust and Mud, written on 13 June 
1858: 
Ifin youth an individual or nation had nothing similar to what mortals 
could never express but Schiller, Alfieri, Moore, Berzsenyi, 
Vörösmarty, and others suggested, that nation would sink to the level 
of a machine and may achieve material but no spiritual prosperity.24 
FROM ENLIGHTENMENT UNI VERS ALISM TO ROMANTIC NATIONALISM 187 
A similar contrast of organic and inorganic, coupled with the idea of the differ-
ent ages of nations, can be found in the works of numerous French authors. Sev-
eral texts by Taine, L'avenir de la science (written in 1848) and De l'origine du 
langage (written between 1848 and 1858) by Renan, or Gobineau's notorious 
Essai sur l'inégalité des races humaines (written between 1853 and 1855) could 
be mentioned in this context.25 
The last of these works may illustrate the damage theories about the diversity 
of human communities have done to human culture. Yet it cannot be denied that 
the preconception concerning the ages of nations sometimes went together with 
tolerance toward alterity- as the examples of Spengler, Toynbee, Berdyaev, Valéry, 
and Wittgenstein indicate. The traces of the same conception can also be found in 
the debates over the explanation of the end of the Habsburg Monarchy or in the 
revival that makes Spengler an early critic of Eurocentrism.26 
In view of the international survival of the organicist interpretation of history, 
it cannot be called anachronistic that the questions raised by Kölcsey and Széchenyi 
continued to tempt Hungarian writers until the present day. Here I have no space 
for a summary of these later developments.27 In the rest of this essay my intention 
is to focus on an issue that preoccupied virtually all the interpreters of Kölcsey 's 
text: to what extent have texts to be evaluated on the basis of their contribution to 
the shaping of national character. 
3. The Driving Forces of Development: 
Originality, Language, and the Future 
"In the age of public education the brilliance of individual greatness is more 
sporadic and less spectacular."28 This statement may echo Emile and Über naive 
und sentimentalische Dichtung. It also reveals the ambiguity of Kölcsey's ap-
proach to progress: on the one hand, it seems an organic process, on the other, it 
leads from the natural to the artificial. 
The duality of imagination and learning was a cliché throughout the nineteenth 
century. The double meaning of "original" implied that the specificity of a culture 
has to be discovered in early history. The fundamental question for Kölcsey was 
whether the early legacy of the Hungarian people was sufficient for the survival of 
their culture. He clearly saw that distance was a source of alienation. At the same 
time, the Greek example convinced him that the greatness of a culture consisted in 
its capacity to recognize itself in the other. No culture could do without foreign 
influence, yet imitation was a sign of the weakness of native traditions. 
The language reform supported by Kölcsey represented a compromise between 
the legacy of the Enlightenment and the Romantic approach to language: it as-
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sérted the claims of the vernacular, yet it aimed at creating a standard "polished" 
idiom, purged of all signs of local dialect. 
One of the reasons why Kölcsey's essay National Traditions could serve as a 
starting-point for so many and so different interpretations is that its message is 
rather ambivalent. Culture is both influence and self-reliance. On the one hand, it 
seems to suggest that the significance of a culture depends on its ability to make 
an impact on others; on the other hand, it draws a distinction between two rela-
tions between self and other: imitation and appropriation. Not all foreign occupa-
tions are viewed in the same way: the Arab settlers of Spain are said to have 
created a culture of their own, whereas the Ottoman Turks are harshly criticized 
for destroying the civilization of the peoples they conquered. A similar duality is 
ascribed to the oppressed: appropriation is contrasted with servile imitation. 
The ideal of Greek Antiquity is upheld to exclude one extreme, that of unlim-
ited cultural relativism. The other extreme would be the utópia of one mankind 
and one history. In recent years a similar critique of these two attitudes was for-
mulated by Paul Ricoeur, who condemned both the racist interpretation of history 
and the belief in the unity of Weltgeschichte, the globalizing force of the Ameri-
can way of life that leaves no room for a dialogue with the histories of the differ-
ent parts of the world.29 
One of the possible readings of Kölcsey's essay was given by Mihály Babits 
(1883-1941), an outstanding poet and the author of two seminal discursive works, 
the long essay Hungarian Literature (1913) and its counterparts History of Euro-
pean Literature (published in Hungarian in 1934-35 and in German translation in 
1949). If Kölcsey's essay is viewed from the perspective outlined in these two 
works, its message is that the development of a culture depends not only on its 
unity but also on the multiplicity of the tasks it can handle, so that the main goal a 
nation has to reach is dialogue with other cultures. To preserve one's identity is 
linked to tolerance towards others. Kölcsey's emphasis on "influence" implies 
that a familiarity with the other is a precondition of culture. "I am another" also 
means "the other is myself." Culture is mediation and so depends on our ability to 
keep a distance from our own community and assimilate the alien. The duality of 
self and other need not cause schizophrenia, although it may not exclude opposi-
tion or conflict. 
If read from the perspective of Romanticism, National Traditions marks a shift 
from the preconception that a) traditional rural culture was a barbarity to be for-
gotten, and b) the primary task for the national community was to absorb the 
culture of the other parts of Europe. After the universalist teleology of some En-
lightenment thinkers committed to the task of dragging Hungarians out of a bar-
barous rustic dark age and towards a bright cosmopolitan future had been re-
jected, artists and writers created an ideology based on the notion that Hungary 
represented a unique cultural entity that had grown out of a distinctive landscape. 
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In the 1840s, in the works of Petőfi and others, the untrammelled plainland, the 
"puszta" became an icon of national identity. Such long epic poems as The Flight 
of Zalán (1825) by Vörösmarty or The Death of Buda (1863) by János Arany 
expressed a deep, consecrating sense of belonging to one's own land and folk. It 
was at least partly due to Kölcsey's influence that in the nineteenth century some 
Hungarian writers regarded literature as a moral force to preserve the decorum of 
a national community threatened by cosmopolitan positivists. 
Undeniably, it is also possible to make a more destructive interpretation of 
Kölcsey's essay. "What is national character? Bad habits." This categorical con­
demnation by Imre Madách (1823-1864), the author of The Tragedy of Man,30 -
a 4117-line-long dramatic poem on the history of mankind that contains no more 
than a single reference to Hungarian history - foreshadows Nietsche's association 
of decline with parochialism and the ossification of national character: 
Wenn nämlich ein Volk vorwärts geht und wächst, so sprengt es 
jedesmal den Gürtel, der ihm bis dahin sein nationales Ansehen gab; 
bleibt es stehen, verkümmert es, so schließt sich ein neuer Gürtel um 
seine Seele; die immer härter werdende Kruste baut gleichsam ein 
Gefängnis herum, dessen Mauern immer wachsen. Hat ein Volk also 
sehr viel Festes, so ist dies ein Beweis, daß es versteinern will und 
ganz und gar Monument werden möchte: wie es von einem bestimmten 
Zeitpunkte an das Ägyptertum war.31 
If the identity of a nation becomes easily recognizable, the next stage is the loss 
of that identity. 
Ein historisches Phänomen, rein und vollständig erkannt und in ein 
Erkenntnisphenomän aufgelöst, ist für den, der es erkannt hat, tot.32 
Although Kölcsey's essay contains no such explicit prediction, it does not ex­
clude the disappearance of nations in a more distant future. More than a century 
after the publication of National Traditions, in 1939 a collection of essays ap­
peared with the title What Is Hungarian? Edited by the historian Gyula Szekfïï, 
this book was meant to suggest that the concept of national character had lost its 
validity by the twentieth century. As in so many other cases, the counter-identity 
of Germans supplied the background. What counted as a brave dismissal of racist 
theories at the time of the threat of Nazi Germany may be interpreted in a some-
what different way in 2000. It seems rather paradoxical that a historian made the 
following sweeping generalization: 
People are everywhere, in every period, season, and climate the same; 
the same laws of life make them weep, laugh, relax, join groups, and 
kill each other.33 
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While such a statement resembles the clichés of rationalistic universalism pro­
pounded by rather ahistorical representatives of the Enlightenment, the claims 
made by the poet Babits and the composer Kodály, suggesting that Hungarians 
take no interest in metaphysics and "labirinthine" complexity in art, appear of 
rather doubtful value. More relevant might be the point made by the Protestant 
bishop László Ravasz that 
there is no objetctive feature that could be considered to be a canoni­
cal measuring rod, an unambiguously Hungarian characteristic in lit­
erature or in the arts.34 
Such a negative definition is compatible with the view that a national commu­
nity can be defined only in linguistic terms. The idea that being Hungarian means 
using the conceptual map constituted by the Hungarian language is by no means 
absent from Kölcsey's essay. "Hungarians can achieve originality by the use of 
their language,"35 the poet writes, lamenting that in the age of the rise of poetry 
composed in the vernacular, Janus Pannonius (1434-1472) "used a Roman lute 
when singing fine, yet foreign songs."36 The opposition between the written lan­
guage of the Latin Antiquity and Middle Ages on the one hand and the constantly 
changing, spoken vernacular tradition handed down by word of mouth on the 
other, is related to the debate mentioned earlier: "the defenders of writing were 
inclined to universalism, whereas the adherents of orality preferred relativism."37 
Put another way, it is possible to read National Traditions with the eyes of 
Dezső Kosztolányi (1885-1936), the most important exponent of a language-based 
cultural relativism in twentieth-century Hungarian literature. Understandably, this 
poet relied on Széchenyi's numerous works rather than on Kölcsey 's essay. The 
idea than human consciousness is inseparable from language, implicit in Kölcsey's 
line of argument, was more consistently expressed by Széchenyi, who was con­
vinced that the disappearance of even the tiniest linguistic community was an 
irreparable loss to mankind. "I have received my language from God and I will 
return it to Him upon my death." This declaration, made in the Upper House on 30 
November 1835,38 is symptomatic of the attitude Kosztolányi attributed to 
Széchenyi in his To Be or Not to Be (1930). This long essay is a counterpart of 
Hungarian Literature by Babits. Babits urged his reader to look at his/her culture 
with the eyes of an outsider. Kosztolányi's point is that a native reader can never 
keep that distance from his/her own literature. In that sense the gap between the 
self and the other cannot be bridged. 
The idea that speaking a mother tongue means having preconceptions is more 
explicitly stated by Széchenyi but can also be detected in Kölcsey's text. Hunga­
rian literature is the legacy of the language, taking language in a rather broad 
sense as the historical memory, belief system, and way of life of an imagined 
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community. Irrespective of the possible disappearance of nations as imagined com­
munities in the future, this language-based conception may be the most obvious 
manifestation of the role of texts in shaping national identity. 
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THE AUSTRO-HUNGARIAN COMPROMISE OF 1867 
AND ITS CONTEMPORARY CRITICS 
TIBOR FRANK 
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Hungary 
Though the revolutions of 1848-1849 were ultimately put down by the 
Habsburgs and their Russian allies, Austria came out of this Pyrrhic victory as a 
much weakened power. 
A series of international conflicts such as the Italian wars of 1859 and 1866 
and, particularly, the Prussian war of 1866 clearly demonstrated that Austria was 
no longer the major military power that it had been during the long decades when 
Prince Metternich's Holy Alliance system was at work. The international status of 
the empire was increasingly dependent upon its unavoidable internal, structural 
reorganization which was destined to recreate the economic and social energies of 
this vast East-Central European realm. The Austro-Hungarian Compromise was 
the last, and perhaps the most fundamental reorganization of the Habsburg Em-
pire before it went down in history after World War I. 
As Hungary had been part of that Empire since 1526, the Compromise re-
shaped the constitutional status and political standing of Hungary in a major way. 
From a pseudo-colonial province the country invented itself as a semi-autono-
mous part of the Habsburg Empire which was reconstituted as the dualist structure 
of the Austro-Hungarian Monarchy. In many ways, this transformation was made 
possible by the revolution and war of independence of 1848-1849 which, among 
other results, helped reshape the international position and image of Hungary.1 
What were the essential features of the dualist Monarchy? To what extent was 
it indeed based on the principle of "dualism" and how much did it retain from the 
absolutist legacy of the Habsburg Empire? The debate about these questions is 
almost older than the newly established system itself, as discussions were started 
right during the formative years of the Dual Monarchy. 
Theoretically, the Monarchy became divided into two legally equal parts with 
their relations based on parity. The two parts were internally sovereign, with their 
own legislative, legal, and law enforcing mechanisms. It was the common mon-
arch who regulated their relationship at the topmost level, while the three most 
important "common" affairs were managed jointly.2 Some of these "common" 
affairs such as foreign policy, defense and finances related to those two were de-
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duced from the Pragmatica Sanctio of the Emperor Charles III in the early 18th 
century.3 
The highest (and perhaps best documented) executive body of the dual mon-
archy was the Common Council of Ministers. If presided over by the monarch, it 
was called the Crown Council. Out of the "joint" ministers, the role of the minis-
ter for foreign affairs was particularly crucial: not only was he responsible for 
foreign affairs, but he was a leading policy maker for the whole empire, in terms 
of the basic political guidelines. The dual Monarchy had two parliaments which 
never met but communicated through the institution of the "delegations" only. 
They were designed to guarantee the constitutionality of foreign and military af-
fairs. Soon, however, they turned out to be unfit for fulfilling their parliamentary 
functions, and thus helped maintain some of the unconstitutional powers of the 
monarch. The common ministries were also allowed to function essentially with-
out constitutional control. Foreign affairs, however, were influenced by "the min-
istries of both halves," including of course the Hungarian government and parlia-
ment.4 
After the unification of Buda, Pest, and Old-Buda into one municipality in 
1873, the newly constituted Monarchy had two capital cities: Vienna and Buda-
pest. While Vienna was the old imperial capital city of the Habsburgs, Budapest 
emerged astonishingly quickly, basically by the end of the 19th century, as a beau-
tiful, modern city to serve as the administrative and economic center of the Hun-
garian part of the Monarchy. In some ways it was designed to impress the many 
different ethnic minorities of the country by the visible ability of the Magyar 
ruling élite to govern their land. Overlooking the Danube across the Royal Palace, 
the building of Parliament dominated the landscape as a symbol of constitutional-
ism and political power. 
Considering its legal status and structure, the newly established Monarchy was 
different from all the major powers of Europe. It differed from the centralized 
model of the French or the Russians, but it was also different from the Swiss 
model that recognized the equal rights of the constituent elements, or from the 
German model built on the preponderance of the Prussian element. To some ex-
tent it showed some resemblance to the Swedish-Norwegian arrangement of 1814 
though it had particular qualities that made it special.5 
Despite the obvious and major changes in 1867, the Austro-Hungarian Monar-
chy became a curious mixture of constitutionalism and absolutism. The personal 
power of the monarch remained very strong throughout the life of Emperor-King 
Francis Joseph I (1830-1916) who maintained his personal influence in his in-
creasingly constitutional monarchy. The chief adversary of the system, the revo-
lutionary leader of 1848-49 Lajos Kossuth (1802-1894) spent much of his long 
exile harshly criticizing the unconstitutional elements of the new arrangement. 
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There is no dualism here, dreadfully no dualism. But there is a com-
mon Austro-Hungarian ministry; is this dualism? 
There are common ambassadors, diplomatic representatives, even 
common consuls; is that dualism? 
There is an Austrian and a Hungarian delegation, which [together] 
are more united a body than the two houses of the Hungarian Parlia-
ment because those do not vote together while the Austrian and Hun-
garian delegations do so; is that dualism? 
Who decide the military budget, this most serious item of the pub-
lic purse, quite independently from the control of both the Hungarian 
as well as of the Austrian legislative bodies? The two delegations 
together! Is that dualism? 
And if these two bodies that meet in two rooms but vote together 
... can't come up with a majority vote...? 
[Then] the unified ruler of the unified Österreich-Ungarn takes a 
decision, without asking the nations, without their participation, with 
absolute power; is this dualism?6 
Apart from foreign affairs, for Kossuth it was particularly the right of 
preapproval, an imperial-royal prerogative kept for the Monarch as well as the 
unified German language of the army that suggested danger for the constitutional 
future of the Monarchy. 
Kossuth made his criticism internationally known not only later as this docu-
ment showed, but also in his open letter addressed to Ferenc Deák, chief architect 
of the Compromise of 1867, as early as May 22,1867. Published in Magyar Újság, 
this much quoted Paris letter reminded Kossuth's former political friend and fel-
low minister in the revolutionary government of 1848 of the legacy of the revolu-
tion and warned the compromising statesman "not to drag the country to the point 
where it cannot be master of its own destiny."7 
Kossuth continued to shower his criticism on his former friend and political 
ally attacking the new laws of 1867 which for him 
run against the state life conditions of Hungary, clash with the politi-
cal tendencies to which our nation, in good and bad fortune had al-
ways and steadfastly adhered to for three centuries and a half, and to 
the loyalty to which our nation can thank its existence; counteract the 
age in which we live, its direction, the suggestions of the European 
trends; are so dangerous in their power and lack the motivation of 
need, of constraint, of the status of the Austrian House, or of the 
necessities of the simplest political arithmetic ...8 
Deák answered Kossuth's open letter in the Pesti Napló of May 30. He stated 
that it was his conviction 
that in our position it is better to make a peaceful settlement than to 
let our future depend on policies that are founded on vague promises, 
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that would cause further delays and suffering, and that would prob-
ably depend on happenstance, on revolution and the dissolution of 
the empire, on foreign aid (for which our interests would certainly 
not be the main motive), or on new foreign alliances, the form, pur-
poses and advantages of which cannot yet be known. I have also 
stated that the means I have proposed for settlement does not jeop-
ardize our constitutional freedoms and, in many respects, is advanta-
geous to the country. These statements of mine, which were never 
addressed to passions but rather to calm common sense, have always 
been made openly.9 
Equally serious contemporary criticism came from Prague. Though Francis 
Joseph made some symbolic gestures to his Czech sovereigns, these proved to be 
far from enough to appease Czech nationalists. For the Czech the constitutional 
settlement which left them out of the new arrangement seemed to be directed 
against their own national interests. Frantisek Palacky, the most influential advo-
cate of a federal reconstruction of the Habsburg Empire, deplored the hegemony 
of the Germans and Hungarians in a reconstituted Monarchy and declared: 
The day dualism is proclaimed ... will also be the birthday of 
Panslavism in its least desirable form, and the godparents of the lat-
ter will be the parents of the former. What will follow every reader 
can divine for himself. We Slavs will look forward to that with sin-
cere grief, but without fear. We existed before Austria; we shall still 
exist when it is gone.10 
The Poles of Galicia also requested their full administrative, judicial, and edu-
cational autonomy which the Austro-Hungarian settlement refused to grant out of 
deference to Russian sensibilities.11 
More compassion was shown towards the restructuring of the Monarchy out-
side the Habsburg realm. German Chancellor Otto von Bismarck repeatedly praised 
the idea in his conversations with illustrious visitors from the Monarchy. To the 
famous Hungarian author Mór Jókai he declared his views concerning the neces-
sity of maintaining the Dual Monarchy. Only the German and the Hungarian ele-
ment can govern, he said, they alone possess statesmanlike qualities and know-
ledge. It would be impossible to maintain the system of small nation-states in 
East-Central Europe. Vienna and Budapest have the mission to become the rich 
centers of Eastern civilization and commerce. This seemed to be the very essence 
of the Central European policy of Bismarck also in a broader sense.12 Almost a 
decade later Bismarck reiterated his views to Crownprince Rudolf von Habsburg 
and emphasized the importance of the Hungarian participation in the Monarchy. 
There alone can the Hungarians gain their security amidst the sea of Slavic peo-
ples, he suggested. Bismarck explicitly attacked the oppositional stance of Kossuth 
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when declaring to the Crownprince that in critical moments Hungarians demon-
strate the overbearing "self-confidence of the hussar and the lawyer."13 
In Britain, the new political structure attracted great interest for its obvious 
implications for Ireland. The First Lord of the Treasury, W. E. Gladstone sounded 
most appreciative in the Government of Ireland debate of 1886. He was con-
vinced by the very existence of two parliaments in the Monarchy. "In Austria and 
Hungary there is a complete duality of power," he argued on April 8, 1886. 
I will not enter upon the general condition of the Austrian Empire, or 
upon the other divisions or diversities which it includes, but I will 
take simply this case. At Vienna sits the Parliament of the Austrian 
Monarchy; at Budapesth sits the Parliament of the Hungarian Crown; 
and that is the state of things which was established, I think, nearly 
20 years ago. I ask all those who hear me whether there is one among 
them who doubts? Whether or not the condition of Austria be at this 
moment, or be not, perfectly solid, secure, and harmonious, after the 
enormous difficulties she has had to confront, on account of the bound-
less diversity of race, whether or not that condition be perfectly nor-
mal in every minute particular, this at least, cannot be questioned, 
that it is a condition of solidity and of safety compared with the time 
when Hungary made war on her — war which she was unable to 
quell when she owed the cohesion of the body politic to the interfer-
ence of Russian arms; or in the interval that followed, when there 
existed a perfect Legislative Union and a supreme Imperial Council 
sat in Vienna?14 
British critics of the Compromise, however, seemed to echo Kossuth's stern 
warnings. Members of Parliament such as G. J. Goschen pointed out that "Aus-
tria-Hungary ... is bound together by the power of the Crown and by the authority 
of the three Common Ministers, who are responsible to no Parliament at all."15 As 
if to repeat Lajos Kossuth, Sir John Lubbock, MP quoted Sir Henry Elliot, British 
Ambassador to Vienna, who in a letter to The Times "had expressed far from 
favourable opinion as to the result [of the Austro-Hungarian Monarchy], and ifit 
worked at all it was greatly due to the large powers possessed by the Emperor."16 
Towards the end of the 19th century a new, radicalized generation of Irish na-
tionalists fighting for their Ireland also praised the Austro-Hungarian arrange-
ment of 1867 conceiving it as 'A Parallel for Ireland.'17 In an article for The 
United Irishman of January 2, 1904, Arthur Griffith went out to declare: 
You may be old enough yourself to remember when Hungary fell 
and 'Freedom shrieked aloud' — when Kossuth was a fugitive, with 
the bloodhounds of Austria on his track, when the Austrian dragoon 
was the Law from Buda-Pesth to the Carpathians, when day after 
day Hungarian patriots were shot or hanged like dogs by the victori-
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ous soldiery of Francis Josef, when in fact 'Peace reigned in War-
saw', and men said — 'Hungary was'. Therefore, when you look 
around today and see Hungary freer and stronger and more prosper-
ous than Austria, when you know that if Hungary declared herself a 
republic tomorrow — which she intends to do when the sad old man 
who reigns in Vienna dies — Austria would not fight, because she 
could not — you may well rub your eyes, reflecting that Hungary 
never once sent a Parliamentary Party to Vienna to 'fight on the floor 
of the House' for Home Rule, never once admitted the right of Aus-
tria to rule over her, never once pretended to be 'loyal' to the Power 
that had smitten her, never once held monster indignation meetings 
and résolutioned, and fired strong adjectives — and yet, notwith-
standing, forced Austria to her knees and wrung from her unwilling 
hands the free Constitution which has made Hungary the Power she 
is to-day...18 
Critics of Griffith observe that he misunderstood the nature of the Austro-
Hungarian Compromise. In his Modern Ireland 1600-1972, Professor Roy Foster 
described "the Irish Ausgleich" as "the withdrawal of support for British institu-
tions, from Parliament down. The corollary, that such a policy would have to be 
backed up by violence and intimidation, was ignored."19 To boot, it was also pointed 
out more recently that "in the compromise of 1867 Hungary did not wrest free-
dom from Austria...[its] conservative-liberal elements, rather than its revolution-
aries, struck a deal..."20 
The official French response to the Compromise of 1867 was extremely posi-
tive. The French Ambassador to Vienna, the Duc de Gramont (whose devastating 
policies as French Foreign Minister in 1870 were to facilitate the outbreak of the 
Franco-Prussian War), suggested that the Hungarians need the other parts of Aus-
tria just as Austria needs the Hungarians, as they can only exist if combined in a 
major empire. He expressed his hope that constitutional developments will end 
the tensions among the individual parts of the realm. Responding to the Ambassa-
dor, French Foreign Minister Lionel Marquis de Moustier declared how important 
the consolidation of the Monarchy will be for the maintenance of the European 
equilibrium.21 
Later commentators in France were much less enthusiastic for the Austro-Hun-
garian Compromise. French public opinion was divided: most people would have 
favored federalism, and even those who accepted the new structure intended to 
give the other ethnic groups of the Monarchy gradually more rights. French con-
cern for the ethnic minorities of the Monarchy led to disillusionment in Austria-
Hungary and ultimately brought about an anti-Austro-Hungarian and anti-Hun-
garian French foreign policy with fatal consequences after World War I.22 
The Austro-Hungarian Compromise made a tremendous impact on Central 
European history in the fifty years before World War I. It was remarkably well 
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received by the European powers, but was rejected by the many ethnic groups 
inside the Monarchy. Its failure to create a stable and livable political system for 
the major ethnic groups of the Monarchy was not compensated by the economic 
and cultural success it produced. It started capitalist development in Hungary, for 
which it secured a semi-great-power status. It recognized the emancipation of the 
Jews, and helped create an aura of liberalism in the Monarchy. In many ways, 
however, it paved the way toward the one-sided Austro-Hungarian-German ori-
entation and military alliance which directly contributed to the dissolution of the 
Monarchy and the tragic Peace Treaties of 1919-1920. It did not guarantee the 
same rights to the ethnic minorities that Hungarians and Germans were to enjoy 
themselves. It preserved the agricultural bias of Hungarian economy within an 
imperial division of labor. It created a capital city for Hungary which was over-
developed vis-à-vis rural Hungary. 
To this day, international historiography has made repeated efforts to compre-
hend the significance and legacy of the Compromise, without ever solving its 
major dilemma signaled already by the contemporaries: was it a success or a fail-
ure? The question often assumed political and even symbolic significance. In the 
last few decades some of the most important books on Hungarian history were in 
fact written on issues related to the Compromise and functioned like political 
arguments in an era, particularly after 1956, when opposition views had to be 
voiced through doublespeak.23 Generations of modern Hungarian historians have 
been coping with the issue of the Compromise which became one of the central 
pivots of historical thought in Hungary.24 
Contemporary criticism, as is so often the case, continues to survive in the 
form of historiographical arguments, sometimes highly charged by the heated aura 
of daily politics. 
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SCAPEGOATS IN POST-WORLD WAR I 
HUNGARIAN POLITICAL THOUGHT 
ATTILA PÓK 
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Hungary 
Studying the history of twentieth-century Eastern and Central European politi-
cal thought, one often comes across a basic stereotype that is common to both 
liberals and conservatives, communists and Fascists, nationalists and cosmopoli-
tans, as well as to the ideologists of ruling and oppositional parties of Poles, Czechs, 
Slovaks, Hungarians, Romanians, Bulgarians, Croats, Serbs, and Slovenians. When 
they are trying to explain the defeats, losses, failures, and sufferings of their re-
spective nations in the course of the centuries, they often make an attempt at blaming 
influential personalities, smaller or larger social groups (layers, classes) or even 
non-personal factors (such as ideologies, traditions, or prejudices). Whether these 
explanations take the form of detailed analyses, or very superficial argumenta-
tion, or even merely occasional cursory remarks, the result is often the same: the 
identification of a scapegoat. This paper will make an attempt at examining the 
peculiarities of Eastern and Central European scapegoating on the basis of a case 
study of one of the greatest national tragedies in Hungarian history: the collapse 
of the Hungarian state in the aftermath of World War I, which entailed the loss of 
two thirds of the country's territory and about forty percent of the Hungarian 
ethnic population. The justification for the choice of this topic lies not only in my 
own historical interests but also in several more current experiences. Since the 
"annus mirabilis" of 1989 and for the first time after many decades (or even cen-
turies) most of the peoples of the region can indeed try to enjoy self-determination 
and sovereignty. However, the scope of action for these small nations is limited by 
numerous external and internal factors, and they will experience many more fail-
ures than they might have expected. Declining living standards, widespread cor-
ruption, the lack of substantial economic and political (or sometimes even moral, 
not to speak of military) aid from the "West" and the lack of a true, promising 
vision of the future make one ponder about the causes of these problems. All too 
often clear-cut, monocausal explanations are being demanded. Furthermore, so-
cial cohesion must also be strengthened and, as we shall see in a minute, both 
needs can be satisfied with the help of scapegoats. In difficult, critical situations 
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scapegoating has become a recurring motive in Eastern and Central European 
political thought. This trend toward finding scapegoats first fully emerged after 
World War I. 
The Conceptual Framework of the Research 
In describing the "Day of Atonement" the Old Testament presents a story in the 
Book of Leviticus. In the story the Lord tells Moses to make Aaron "come into the 
holy place: with a young bull for a sin offering and a ram for a burnt offering ... 
Aaron shall present the bull as a sin offering for himself and for his house ... And 
when he has made an act of atoning, for the holy place and the tent of meeting and 
the altar, he shall present the live goat and Aaron shall lay both his hands upon the 
head of the live goat and confess over him all the iniquities of the people of Israel, 
and send him away into the wilderness... The goat shall bear all their iniquities 
upon him to a solitary land... " ! It is obvious here that there can be no scapegoat 
without a sense of guilt, and guilt means breaking the law. If being tortured by 
remorse, feeling qualms of conscience, a handy way out of this uncomfortable 
situation is to transfer the guilt onto someone else. 
These ideas, however, are already the terrain of modern social psychology. It 
was mainly Allport, Heider and most recently Tom Douglas, who in their works 
on group-dynamics and prejudices extensively dwelt on this issue.2 The analysis 
of the behavior of smaller and larger groups shows that whenever tensions of any 
kind accumulate, there also appears a demand for finding a scapegoat (one or 
several individuals or a group, category of people), who can be presented as the 
ultimate cause of all the troubles. Within the group the prevailing attitude toward 
the scapegoat is one of violence, and this violent attitude is often encouraged. The 
deeper-lying, social-psychological motives of this process seem to be two-fold: 
enforced attribution and the mobilizing-recruiting functions. 
Enforced attribution refers to the socio-psychological need for calling for clear, 
monocausal explanations in the case of very complex events. As historians know, 
such explanations are in most cases impossible, and finding a scapegoat (be it an 
individual, or a smaller, or a larger group of people) is a comfortable way of 
satisfying this need. Responsibility is thus transferred onto the scapegoat. Re-
sponsibility, however, can be defined in at least three forms: legal, moral, and 
historical-political. The most fertile ground for creating scapegoats is the situa-
tion when these three types of responsibilities do not overlap: what is fair accord-
ing to the current penal code can not always be tolerated by the standards of the 
Ten Commandments or on the basis of historical-political considerations. 
The major element of the scapegoating process is the mobilizing-recruiting 
function, or the "prospective" creation of scapegoats. Scapegoats in the original, 
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Biblical sense of the word are not necessarily hated — one can even feel a little 
sympathy or sorrow for them. Most "mobilizing" scapegoats are substantially dif­
ferent. Their creation is part of the birth and emergence of every modern totalitar­
ian movement. This scapegoat (be it "exploiters" or the Jews or the "others" -
whoever they are) is the object of a common, collective hatred, and this feeling of 
hatred generally includes a certain amount of guilt as well. This might result in 
what E. H. Erikson called "pseudo speciation,"3 where the scapegoat is consid­
ered to be a part of a "different species" such as an "inferior" race or class. There­
fore the otherwise valid prohibition of aggression against members of one's "own 
species" does not apply when dealing with them. 
Szekfű and Jászi 
With the help of this conceptual framework I should like to focus on three 
different analyses of Hungary's post-World War I situation. 
The most important and most influential book in twentieth-century Hungarian 
political literature was published in 19204 and aimed at pointing out the deeper-
lying causes of Hungary's post World War I tragedy. The author, Gyula Szekfíí 
was 37 years old at that time and a well known archivist and historian. A few 
years earlier Szekfű had risen to prominence with a book on Ferenc Rákóczi, the 
leader of an important early eighteenth-century Hungarian anti-Habsburg upris­
ing. Dispensing with the glorification typical of the previous Hungarian second­
ary literature, he gave a most realistic picture of Ferenc Rákóczi during his years 
of exile after the defeat of his anti-Habsburg war for the independence of Hun­
gary. This led to widespread accusations leveled at Szekfű as a "traitor" to the 
sacred Hungarian national traditions. The accusations were further inflamed by 
the circumstance that Szekfű had worked for several years in Viennese archives. 
Szekfű was shocked by these reactions; and in his monumental historical essay 
written in the tragic mood of the aftermath of Hungary's disintegration after World 
War I, he found the main causes of Hungary's tragedy in the series of the futile 
attempts at the liberal transformation of Hungary. "Three generations" (that is 
also the title of his book) were misled by the illusions of Western liberalism, which 
could not take root in Hungary. The book reads as a medical constat and therapy. 
The patient, which is Hungarian society, has become infected by the disease of 
liberalism. Szekfïï's argumentation can be interpreted as a peculiar case of en-
forced attribution, where the liberal generation that adopted alien political institu-
tions, that might apply in England but not in Hungary, are being blamed. As a 
consequence, Szekfű argues, the backbone of the Hungarian nation, the Hungar­
ian nobility, turned out to be a loser in the emerging liberal market economy, no 
indigenous Hungarian bourgeoisie could develop, and the economic and cultural 
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gap was filled by the alien Jewish middle and upper class. Thus, Szekfu put the 
main responsibility for the national tragedy on the liberal nobility. Nevertheless, 
quite a number of his readers interpreted the chapters on the rule of the Jewry as 
the presentation of a mobilizing-recruiting scapegoat. Szekfű's very self-critical 
approach appealed little to the wider public; and the alien Eastern Jews seemed to 
be a much more proper scapegoat for the Hungarian society. 
In his book Szekfu devoted a special chapter to those tendencies in later nine­
teenth- and early twentieth-century Hungarian political and intellectual life that 
one way or another were in opposition to the dominant liberalism. In it he analyzed 
the so-called bourgeois radicals, who from a leftist platform had systematically 
criticized the pre-World War I Hungarian political regimes. The members of this 
group had consisted mainly of Jewish middle class intellectuals; most of whom 
had been born between 1875 and 1885. Among their ranks we can find some of 
the best, most widely traveled, and most widely read Hungarian writers of the 
time. They studied modern French, English and American sociology and wanted 
to apply their newly acquired intellectual arsenal in order to work out a plan for 
the modernization of Hungarian society. They concentrated their attacks on the 
antiquated feudal structure of Hungarian agricultural society the "reactionary" 
(their favorite term was always contrasted with "progressive") economic, social 
and political role of large feudal holdings. They had also called their contempo­
raries' attention to the possible fateful consequences of the maltreatment of the 
ethnic minorities living in Hungary. In 1918-1919 Jászi and some of his comrades 
found themselves in prominent political positions. From 1 November 1918 to 19 
January 1919 Jászi served as minister in charge of negotiating with the politicians 
of the minorities. Thus, during that time he was in a position to try to put his ideas 
concerning the territorial autonomy of the national minorities into practice. Under 
the given circumstances Jászi's efforts in this area were obviously doomed to 
failure. Afterwards Jászi and a number of his friends had to go into exile. 
In 1920, same year that Szekfű published his book on the failures of liberalism 
in Hungary, Jászi also summarized his views concerning the responsibility for 
Hungary's post-World War I tragedy. His book5 argued that the deepest root of 
problems was the fact that true liberalism could not gain ground in Hungary: 
"... all serious intellectuals were subsided into silence during the last quarter of 
century; all cultural and liberal aspirations were trampled down by drunken patri­
ots, plundering gang-leaders and ... adventurers ..."6 This revealed the total and 
the final failure of historical Hungary because it demonstrated that the noble-
plutocratic class-rule had not been able to do any organizational and creative work.1 
Despite their conflicting premises Jászi then arrived at a conclusion that was sur­
prisingly close to that of Szekfu. "The Hungarian soul turned out to be sterile and 
the thinning ranks of the cultural elite were increasingly filled by aliens, first of all 
Jews ..." which in turn led to a disgusting mixture of "feudalism and usury." 7 
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If we now interpret Jászi's argumentation in terms of enforced attribution, he 
also came up with a scapegoat that had lurked within Hungarian society: the "feu­
dal-clerical" reactionary groups. Szekfu had blamed a rootless liberalism for the 
misfortunes of Hungary, whereas Jászi had explained the national tragedy by con­
centrating on the lack of true liberalism. Still, Jászi's conclusion could also be 
understood as pointing to the responsibility of the infiltrating, alien Jews as mobi-
lizing-recruiting scapegoats. 
These two typical and - to say the least - conflicting views thus seem to share 
a peculiar feature. Their conclusions concerning the role of Hungarian Jewry, most 
likely contrary to the two very different authors' intentions, both emerged in the 
eyes of numerous contemporaries as advocates of mobilizing-recruiting scape­
goats. The primary subject of this paper is not, however, the tracing the history of 
anti-Semitism in Hungary, and so I would like to emphasize a different point. 
What I should like to call the reader's attention to is that different as these two 
analyses of the causes of Hungary's post-World War I tragedy might be, they 
share the convention that pre-World War I Hungary was fatally sick and the flawed, 
cruel and poorly prepared decisions of the victorious Great Powers only gave the 
final blow to a society that was already in agony. Thus, the deepest roots of the 
collapse were to be found within the state and society of Hungary. 
Negotiations in Paris 
During approximately the same months, when Jászi and Szekfű were working 
on their books, the "official" Hungarian analysis was also being prepared. Albert 
Apponyi, head of the Hungarian delegation sent to the Paris peace talks, delivered 
an excellent summation of his views in a speech on 10 January 1920;8 and his 
explanation also echoed the main points of his previously developed line of argu­
mentation. In Apponyi's version the emphasis was on the external factors of the 
national tragedy. He went back to the time of the wars against Ottoman expansion. 
Hungary had taken a lion's share in defending the Christian West from barbarism. 
This sacrifice in the service of European interests had at least two fateful and 
disastrous consequences in the long run. On the one hand, Hungary had lost the 
dominantly Hungarian character of its population, and on the other hand it had 
become dependent on the Habsburgs. Even the Compromise of 1867 had only 
been a formal restitution of independence. Responsibility for the participation in 
the war thus solely lay with the Habsburgs; it had been contrary to the will of the 
Hungarians. When, however, the final decision to start the war was made, the 
traditionally loyal Hungarians had no choice left but to fight on the side of their 
old allies. The relationship between Hungarians and the national minorities in 
Hungary had always been fraternal and the conflicts had been due to Viennese 
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intrigues. Hungarian tolerance and liberalism were well reflected by the 1868 law 
on the status of nationalities in Hungary. 
The redrawing of borders in Eastern and Central Europe cannot be based on the 
ethnic principle, Apponyi argued. This would be contrary to economic rational-
ism and will only result in the upsurge of intolerant nationalism in the region. 
Consequently, the responsibility for the open conflicts, which may arise, rests 
entirely with the victorious great powers, which were dictating the conditions of 
the peace settlement. The "official" scapegoats are thus the Habsburgs, the victo-
rious great powers, and the misled national minorities. In effect these constituted 
external, not internal, factors. 
Let me now conclude by referring back to my introductory remarks about the 
topicality of scapegoating in post-1989 Hungary in particular and in Eastern and 
Central Europe in general. There is a desperate need in these societies to find 
explanations for past and current failures. As a result, both the leading politicians 
and the average citizens frequently think in terms of simplifying stereotypes. We 
can only hope that the newly established democratic institutions guarantee that 
realistic and sober self-criticism, combined with the representation of Hungarian 
interests in the international political arena will not give way to scapegoating with 
all its possible fateful consequences. 
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RESTORATION, NOT RENEWAL: 
FROM NAZI TO FOUR-POWER OCCUPATION -
THE DIFFICULT TRANSITION TO DEMOCRACY 
IN AUSTRIA AFTER 1945 
GÜNTER BISCHOF 
University of New Orleans, New Orleans, LA, 
USA 
"[T]he Austrian tragedy ... consisted in the fact that the democrats 
weren 't sufficiently patriotic Austrians, while the Austrian patriots 
in their turn weren't democratic enough. "' 
Introduction 
It is notoriously difficult to measure the rootedness of democracy in a nation. 
What ought to be our yardstick for success in democratic governance - the depth 
of civil society? the liveliness of grass roots politics in political culture? voter 
participation in campaigns and the electorate's turn-out in elections? adherence to 
human rights and tolerance in political discourse? What are our models - an ab-
stract theoretical paragon of a model democracy constructed by philosopher kings, 
or American and British democracy, the oldest and most successful practicing 
democracies in the world? 
Reestablishing democratic governance after long periods of totalitarian repres-
sion represents a particularly daunting task. In 1945 Austria after five years of 
Austro-Fascism and seven years of Nazi dictatorship was not so different from 
Hungary in 1990 after more than 40 years of communist totalitarianism. The long 
dark period of repression and intimidation and enforced non-participation in the 
political process made people's instincts to practice grass roots politics and civil 
society whither. Sheer survival forced people to levels of collaboration with to-
talitarian regimes, which dulled their will for political action and hobbled their 
respect for the arena of contentious democracy. Both denazificiation in Austria 
after 1945 and, for want of a better word "decommunization" ("lustrace" in Czecho-
slovakia, uncovering the Stasi regimes in the former German Democratic Repub-
lic and Poland, etc.) after 1989 were, widely resented by the implicated populations 
and produced new "victims myths." How to purge a body politic of the ghosts of 
the past?2 
Looking at the case study of the Republic of Austria and its difficult transition 
from National Socialist ("Nazi") dictatorship to democracy after 1945 we need an 
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analytical tool that allows us to observe the process of democracy successfully 
taking roots after World War II. I propose to do this introducing some compari-
sons to the West German transition after 1945.3 As far as suitable comparisons go, 
these two Central European neighbors offer similar trajectories of transitions from 
totalitarian rule to democratic governance under the tutelage of four-power occu-
pation regimes. There are major differences in the history, political culture and 
traditions of these two countries, but we cannot dwell on these. 
We will introduce some analytical tools of the German scholars Hermann-Josef 
Rupieper and Anselm Doering-Manteuffel about the genesis of postwar West 
German democracy to an analysis of the Austrian transition.4 Rupieper has looked 
at the process of restoration and/or reform in the reestablishment of West German 
democracy and uses the inclusion of German emigres and resistance fighters in 
the reconstruction of the Federal Republic of Germany - they were the conscience 
of their nation and provide a yardstick to observe an open mind for reform; Rupieper 
has also investigated the seriousness of denazification and reeducation as a meas-
ure of purging the old regime - the popular acceptance of liberal democracy indi-
cated the willingness to welcome a radical new beginning. Behind all of this looms 
the question of continuities and discontinuities with the pre-World War II era after 
1945. Was there a new beginning in 1945 - a "zero hour" ("Stunde Null")! While 
Rupieper has closely studied the emergence of the Federal Republic in the years 
1946 to 1952, Doering-Manteuffel takes a longer perspective and makes a crucial 
distinction between the establishment of "formal democracy" in the 1950s and the 
more important growth of liberal democracy ("inner democracy") in the 1960s.5 
The Genesis of the Second Austrian Republic 
after World War II 
1. Restoration, Not Reform: No "Stunde Null" 
In 1945 the defeated Germany experienced total control by the four-power 
occupation of the Soviet Union, United States, Great Britain, and France. The 
noted constitutional scholar Carl J. Friedrich called Allied control a "constitu-
tional dictatorship." The emergence of party life and a free press was heavily 
circumscribed. Grass roots local control emerged slowly in 1946; in 1947 West 
Germans began to participate more directly in building democracy and public life. 
In 1948 West Germans began drafting a constitution, and in the fall of 1949 they 
elected their first national government.6 
The trajectory of (re)building a new republic in Austria was very different. The 
Allies gave the "liberated" Austrians much more political leverage than the de-
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feated Germans to reconstitute their democratic institutions. The basic American 
planning document from 1944 stated that Austria would be accorded "different 
treatment from that applied to Germany" and the Austrian people would be per-
mitted "a voice in the determination of their future status."7 This preferred treat-
ment of liberated Austria had the consequence that the formal institutions of demo-
cratic governance emerged in 1945, much more quickly than in defeated Ger-
many. This gave the Austrians a huge jump start in reestablishing their state and 
nation (scholars have called it Austria's "Vorsprung an Staatlichkeit"). 
Considerable continuity prevailed among the political elites of the First and the 
Second Republic.8 Even before the liberation of Austria from Nazi Germany was 
completed and the war ended, the Provisional Government led by Karl Renner 
proclaimed a new Austrian Republic from the Ballhausplatz on 27 April 1945. 
Renner's "declaration of independence" informed the world about the 
reestablishment of the democratic Republic of Austria and the reinstitution of the 
Constitution of 1920.9 This Provisional Renner Government operated as a broad 
"national unity" Conservative-Socialist-Communists three-party coalition. While 
the liberation of Vienna by the Red Army was still afoot, the conservative Chris-
tian People's Party and the Socialist Party had emerged in the early days of April 
1945 largely through efforts of elder statesmen such as Karl Renner and Leopold 
Kunschak (ÖVP) and a younger generation of party hacks from the entrenched 
prewar political camps. Renner as a founder and first Chancellor of the First Aus-
trian Republic was the prime example of the restoration of some of the prewar 
political elites as patres patriae. Next to Renner, Julius Raab and Leopold Figl in 
the ÖVP, as well as Adolf Schärfand Oskar Helmer in the SPÖ, had been politi-
cally active before the war. Raab, for example, had been a member of the last 
Schuschnigg Cabinet in 1938. The conservative-Christian People's Party (ÖVP) 
harbored many politicians like Felix Hurdes and Heinrich Drimmel who had sup-
ported the Austro-fascist regime and never explicitly renounced this anti-demo-
cratic heritage of the prewar Christian Social Party. Leopold Figl was one of the 
few prominent members of the Renner government to have spent most of the war 
in Nazi concentration camps, Schärf sat the war out in his Vienna "inner exile." 
Karl Gruber (ÖVP) was the only prominent resistance fighter against Nazism to 
join the Renner government when it came to govern all of Austria in the fall of 
1945. Communist leaders such as Ernst Fischer were directly flown in from Mos-
cow to reconstitute the Communist Party - the third party in the provisional Renner 
coalition. There was a strict prohibition for a party to be formed in 1945 from the 
old nationalist pro-German camp since Austria's most prominent Nazis hailed 
from this "third" camp, which in 1949 would start its own "fourth" party. The 
Western Allies considered the Renner Government a "Soviet puppet regime," simi-
lar to other such regimes established by the Red Army in Eastern Europe after 
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liberation. They only recognized it in late October 1945. Until then the Renner 
government had no authority beyond the Soviet zone of occupation and was to-
tally isolated from the Western occupation zones.10 
A strong sense of a new beginning prevailed in these political elites, who cre-
ated the myth of the " Wiederaufoaugeneration. " The founding fathers' myth of a 
"new beginning" ("zero hour") - Austrians single-handedly and without outside 
support rebuilding both their polity and economy from the rubble of World War II 
- prevailed until the 1970s.11 The reality is much more complex than this found-
ing myth of the Second Austrian Republic. Most historians today agree that there 
was no "Stunde null" in Austria!12 The Austrian diplomat Josef Schöner called 
Austria's beginning in April/May 1945 a return to the First Republic ("Rück-
bruch"). Schöner was an archetypal representative of his colleagues in the For-
eign Ministry and much of the higher federal bureaucracy. Many had served under 
the Dollfuss and Schuschnigg regimes and lost their job in 1938 (or worse, went 
to concentration camps), yet considered the "elimination" of democracy neces-
sary in 1933/4 "to prevent worse things to happen."13 Some of the higher officials 
who had "done their duty" and served the Nazi regime may have briefly lost their 
jobs in 1945 but the majority were smoothly reintegrated by getting party mem-
berships in the ÖVP and SPÖ.14 Many of those who had supported the authoritar-
ian Dollfuss and Schuschnigg and the totalitarian Hitler regimes did not pay a 
price after 1945.15 
Statism, the "long shadow of the Austrian state " so deeply-rooted in Austrian 
political consciousness, prevailed after World War II. So did the political symbol-
ism with the revival of the prewar constitution, coat-of-arms and flag (only a new 
hymn was written).16 Renner ruled his Cabinet like a mini-Metternich. He domi-
nated decision-making in the "Staatsrat" with the principal party leaders. His full 
Cabinet then discussed these decisions but ultimately had to endorse them. He 
single-handedly nipped any basic constitutional debate in the bud by pressuring 
his Cabinet to reinstitute the Constitution of 1920, which was amended in 1929. 
Naturally, by perceiving the enemy in the Austro-Fascist regime rather than in 
National Socialism, which he had endorsed in 1938, Renner did not want to return 
to the authoritarian constitution of 1934. But neither did he desire to unleash a 
lengthy constitutional debate. Renner found all the support he needed in his coali-
tion, when the Communists demanded a new constitution that would be "more 
democratic" like those in the "people's democracies" established in Eastern Eu-
rope. Obviously, the Austrian model for democratic government would not the 
"people's democracies." The Communists and their Soviet patrons criticized the 
Austrian government as late as 1950 for their failure to rewrite the constitution. 
The American planners actually had envisioned a similar process that had been 
used in southern reconstruction after the American Civil War (1861-65). After 
the setting up of an interim provisional government they wanted the election of a 
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constituent assembly that could (presumably draft and) promulgate a new consti-
tution. While the process of the reconstitution of the new Austria was going on, 
the occupation authorities could rely on the provisions of the 1920 Constitution, 
amended in 1929. The provisional government emerging in Vienna in the late 
days of April 1945, of course, was not to the liking of the Anglo-American pow-
ers. Renner most likely had no inkling of such American plans. Relying on his 
practical experience of 1919, the shrewd opportunist Renner followed his healthy 
instincts as nation builder and nipped, in the bud, any lengthy constitutional de-
bate, which might revive the old party strife by reinstituting the 1920/1929 consti-
tution.17 
Renner operated on the ago-old Austrian political culture of enlightened au-
thoritarianism, where patronizing small political elites made the crucial decisions 
in the style of Emperor Joseph in the best interest of the people.18 Such 
"Josephinism" did not need public opinion or allow for contentious political de-
bates.19 The patronizing style of Austria's political elites prevailed in the grand 
coalition long after Renner. Take Austria's secret rearmament in the early 1950s 
as an example. The Communist strike of October 1950 (frequently exaggerated to 
have been a "putsch attempt") precipitated the building of the nucleus of an Aus-
trian army. It was driven and financed by the Americans in close cooperation with 
some Austrian military planners and the top Austrian leadership (Figl, Gruber, 
Schärf and Helmer). Given the high level of secrecy, parliament was not con-
sulted, let alone the public informed. But then, much of Austria's postwar legisla-
tion was generated in a similar fashion from the "top down." Draft bills were 
written by senior experts in the ministerial bureaucracy, then passed by the coali-
tion leadership in Cabinet sessions, before they were rubberstamped by parlia-
ment to become laws. The public was denied any input - it had to swallow and 
live with the results.20 
The great fear in the Second Republic was a return to the confrontational poli-
tics of the First Republic. The sea change in the Second Republic amounted to 
creation of political consensus across the principal political camps. This amounted 
to a reinvention of Austrian political culture. This basic acceptance of political 
cooperation and the spirit of bipartisan consensus across the jagged old ideologi-
cal divides, born from the trauma of prewar party stride between the camps, marked 
the principal difference to the First Republic.21 While the political leaders of the 
First Republic such as Otto Bauer and Ignaz Seipel had been intellectual heavy-
weights beyond the narrow Austrian confines, the leadership of the Second Re-
public (not counting Renner and Bruno Kreisky), with their narrow-minded prag-
matism, was a better fit for small Austria.22 
Proporz - the unique postwar Austrian system of massive patronage - became 
the principal tool to build this cherished consensus (its pendant in the arena of 
political economy was the Austrocorporatist "Sozialpartnerschaft "). The Ameri-
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can planners had anticipated the most important problem of future Austrian politi-
cal tranquility: "success of democracy in Austria will depend on an adjustment of 
the political differences between the two sections of the population formerly or-
ganized in the Christian Social and Social Democratic parties" (emphasis added).23 
To guarantee postwar political stability the Western occupation powers forced 
these two principal camps dominating Austrian political life to cooperating through-
out the occupation period. At the slightest hint of tensions in the fragile coalition 
(and they were frequent), the Americans and British called on party leaders and 
reminded them that the grand coalition was the best recipe for political stability in 
Austria, as well as maintaining the anti-communist consensus (the enemy image 
of postwar anti-communism glued the ÖVP and SPÖ together and amounted to a 
quasi-constitutional political force24). In 1946 the British Labor government even 
considered using the Pope as mediator to remind the People's Party not to threaten 
the coalition with their constant backbiting and bickering. One American observer 
noted that only a shared "distaste for communism" held the coalition together, 
otherwise they remained "steadfast in their disagreements on most other issues." 
Indeed, during the emerging Cold War East-West conflict, rabid anti-communism 
("red fascism") became the new postwar ideology uniting the two dominant Aus-
trian political camps and replacing their old ideological baggage that had disu-
nited them so profoundly before the war.25 Like in West Germany later, 
"Entideologisierung" was the basic prerequisite for political comity. Both camps 
had to abandon much of the heritage of their traditional Catholic and Marxist 
ideologies respectively. 
"Lustrace" Austrian-style was agreeing on taboo zones ("Tabuisierung") about 
Austria's homegrown Fascist and National Socialist past (1933-1945). The con-
spiracy of silence about Austria's recent past was the other crucial precondition 
for fostering cooperation in the grand coalition governments after 1945. The So-
cialists had to forget that many in the People's Party had served the Austro-Fascist 
regime, which in 1934 had thrown them into jail and drove them into exile. The 
People's Party had to suppress the anticlerical tradition in the Socialist Party. Af-
ter the Anschluss many Socialists (including Renner) had allied themselves with 
the NS regime and helped deport the likes of Figl and Hurdes into concentration 
camps. Under the tutelage of the Western occupation powers an implicit agree-
ment was reached that the new enemy was neither the prewar ideological foe nor 
the Fascist/Nazi threat from the past, but the "red peril" on Austria's (and West 
Germany's) borders. 
Constructing and agreeing on a new common master narrative of history was 
mandatory for the strange bedfellows in the Austrian coalition to stay in bed to-
gether. The postwar consensus was built on this "coalition history."26 It was built 
on taboos and repressed memory of the Austrofascist and Nazi pasts and the pow-
erful myth of Austria as first victim of Nazism. With their ambiguous Moscow 
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Declaration of 1943 the occupation powers provided the basic tool for construct-
ing this postwar myth. Anglo-American planning had been based on the premise -
now called a "half-truth" by historians - of Austria as a "victim of Nazi aggres-
sion rather than integral part of Germany." Peter Pulzer is correct in averring that 
such "reconciliation meant a conspiracy of silence about the past." By 1955 the 
People's Party and the Socialists had made coalition governments and the rich 
patronage of Proporz the mainstays of Austria's new political culture of consen-
sus politics. In spite of habitual disagreement and tensions over most important 
political issues, the "grand coalition" survived until 1966 and revived again dur-
ing the past fourteen years (1986-2000). Peter Pulzer's judgement is again on the 
mark when he charges that the coalition practiced "suffocating avoidance of con-
troversy." It also stifled "the types of conflicts that are inherent in a modern, ma-
ture society" and the lifeblood of settled democracies.27 
2. Preempting Reform: 
The Exclusion of Emigrés and the Resistance 
from Political Reconstruction 
One of the prime lessons from twentieth century totalitarianism has been that 
resistance fighters and dissidents have to be considered as the conscience of their 
nations. Active defiance of totalitarian repression takes courage and deserves the 
highest respect. The Scholl siblings and Martin Niemöller (or Franz Jägerstätter 
in the Ostmark) did not bring down Nazism. But their noble deeds helped postwar 
Germany appreciate the survival of a tiny core of decent humanity - civilization 
had not entirely been uprooted under Hitler. Similarly, Andrei Shakarov, Vaclav 
Havel and Lech Walesa did not bring down communism but helped preserve a 
sense of decent humanity under the long dark night of Communist oppression. 
The Czech people showed extraordinary gratitude towards Havel for the courage 
of his convictions by honoring him with the highest office in their land. No such 
Havels as the postwar Austrian George Washington! 
It became both hallmark and yardstick of the character of postwar political 
regimes in Germany and Austria whether the postwar political elites dared in-
clude those who had actively resisted National Socialism and invite the emigrants 
from Nazi oppression back. In Germany emigres were welcomed back and resist-
ance fighters included in the new political elites. Both contributed to rejunvenating 
the democratic climate and actively confronting the past. In Austria emigrants 
were generally not invited back; the new regime also failed to include resistance 
fighters. Why were the Austrians so ungenerous towards those who single-handedly 
preserved the continuity of the Austrian nation abroad or in the underground at 
home under most difficult circumstances? 
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With his two volumes on the "Vertriebene Vernunft, " Friedrich Stadler has 
documented the massive exodus of artistic talent and intellect from Austria in 
1938 and in previous years.28 In the course of World War II some 130,000 Austri-
ans ended up in exile in 90 different countries around the globe. It is rare in the 
annals of history for a nation to suffer such a massive self-inflicted brain drain. 
The personal serendipitous journeys towards physical survival and safety of those 
expelled were harrowing, as Egon Schwarz has recently reminded us.29 Admis-
sion and assimilation to new cultures was always painful and difficult. Given the 
intellect and education backgrounds of a Paul Lazarsfeld, Marie Jahoda, Ernst 
Badian, Raul Hilberg, Karl Popper, Friedrich von Hayek, Ludwig von Mises, 
Gottfried Haberler, Victor Weisskopf, Billy Wilder, Hilde Spiel, Stefan Zweig, 
Oskar Kokoschka, Joseph Roth, Henry Grunwald and the endless list of gifted 
Viennese Jews who were often brutally expelled after the Anschluss, they would 
go on to brilliant careers in academia, science and the arts in exile and soon fill the 
Who's Who of Anglo-American arts and letters. Their gain was Austria's loss. 
They helped make American universities the intellectual hub of the world. Their 
absence cast Austrian universities into a long postwar twilight of provinciality 
and mediocrity.30 
Ironically, these cosmopolitan exiles were also the most profound Austrian 
patriots. More than the numerous Nazi fellow travelers and Mitläufer, who sat the 
war out in the Ostmark, these emigres kept the idea of Austria alive. They formed 
the "Free Austrian Movement" in London and defied Hitler's attempt to erase the 
idea of Austria. As Edward Timms has demonstrated, London became Austria's 
intellectual and cultural capital during the war with regular lectures, art shows and 
exhibits being organized by the gifted Austrian exile community. While the exiled 
Socialist and Christian Social politicians carried on with their interminable pre-
war ideological feuds in Prague, Paris, London and New York, the intellectual and 
artistic emigre community preserved and breathed life into the idea of Austria.31 
Uninspiring university professors in the 1940s and 1950s and 1960s, who often 
had served the Nazi regime, created dull and lazy minds who failed to absorb new 
ideas from abroad and favored tradition and restoration and failed to question 
authority. Only in the 1960s did a younger generation, born during or soon after 
the war, start to question such dull-witted authority, when their protests forced the 
resignation of the unreconstructed Nazi and outspokenly racist anti-Semite with 
the unlikely German name of Taras Borodajkewicz from the Economics Univer-
sity in Vienna.32 An intellectually unquestioning climate in the universities, of 
course, provided the ambiance to cement the postwar consensus that petrified the 
coalition for so long and made reform and democratic renewal so difficult. Who 
could question that the political apathy of the wartime/postwar generation was 
related to this? Austria was too poor for an American-style "GI-Bill of Rights" to 
educate and democratize in the marketplace of ideas the veterans that had been 
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politically socialized in the Hitler Youth and then "did their duty" in the deadly 
and aggressive German Wehrmacht. The failure to bring back the "best and the 
brightest" expelled in 1938 amounted to the raising of an iron curtain vis-à-vis 
democratic renewal and lively intellectual discourse; the fostering of a vibrant 
civil society was nipped in the bud early. Here too patronizing Josephinian resto-
ration generally prevailed over reform. 
Most of these talented emigres were not invited back because they were Jews. 
Most refugees that had been politically active before the war had been Socialists. 
Anti-semitism after the war was no longer as vile and brutally open as in had been 
inl938. It flowered more subtly behind the scenes. The postwar Socialist Party set 
out to liberate itself of the brilliant Jewish leadership that had dominated the party 
before the war. The SPÖ consequently moved from the Austro-Marxism left to 
the tame middle of the political spectrum. The postwar leaders of the SPÖ came 
from the prewar moderate right wing like Renner, or were younger party hacks 
such as Schärfand Oskar Helmer. People like Helmer and Heinrich Schneidmandl 
from rural Lower Austria were intimidated by the sharp intellect of the urban 
Viennese Jews and did not want them back. It would have threatened their ascend-
ancy to positions of power in the party. Having sat out the war at home supposedly 
entitled them to enjoy the rich postwar party patronage. Their mild anti-semitism 
and rabid anti-communism not only helped build the coalition consensus in the 
"shotgun marriage" with their reluctant old ideological enemies in the ÖVP, but 
also endeared them to the Western occupation powers in the emerging Cold War. 
These new Socialists were even more pro-American than their hidebound ÖVP 
counterparts.33 
Only few emigres returned after 1945. Oskar Pollak came back from London 
to edit the Arbeiterzeitung. A small group of a younger generation of Jewish So-
cialists like Bruno Kreisky, Walter Wodak, and Hans Thalberg returned from exile 
to go into the diplomatic service; they became the leading impresarios of formu-
lating Austrian foreign policy in the 1960's and 1970's. Kreisky is the best exam-
ple to demonstrate how valuable the return and reintegration of talented Jewish 
Socialist refugees was for the SPÖ. He put his dominant imprint on the Socialist 
Party and Austrian politics during a time of belated democratic renewal in the 
1970s and single-handedly kept the Socialists in power for an entire generation. 
Otto Leichter's attempt to come back and assume the intellectual leadership of the 
SPÖ as the postwar Otto Bauer failed. Schärf apparently would have welcomed 
the return of theoreticians like Benedikt Kautsky and Adolf Sturmthal, but his 
party was not exited about the prospect of reintegrating such serious intellectu-
als.34 
Hilde Spiel returned for a few weeks in the spring of 1946 under the auspices 
of the British Army and left with a devastating account of the intellectual climate 
prevailing in Vienna: 
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Here everything is delightful apart from the attitude of the Viennese, 
who are either Nazis (whose sting has admittedly been drawn), or 
charming, politically absurd members of the Volkspartei, or prosaic 
bourgeois Social Democrats, or doctrinaire Communists, or charm-
ing but absurd Communists. That is roughly the extent of it. They are 
either corrupt or exhausted or politically obtuse or fanatical, but one 
thing does speak in their favour: their great love of art... I am con-
vinced that the only chance for the Austrians lies in their enormous 
talent for all art forms, their exceptionally good taste and their artis-
tic sensitivity. If they learn to restrain themselves and to leave poli-
tics to others, they will have a future in Europe. 
The culture that reawakened was very traditional and the politics hidebound. In 
his fine essay on Spiel, Timms concludes that "those who did return found little 
scope for realizing their dream of a 'Free Austria' - radical socialist democracy in 
which they would themselves have been welcomed back to provide a new style of 
intellectual leadership."35 
While the exiles, who had personally experienced vibrant but confrontational 
democracies at work in England and the U.S., were not welcomed back, the fel-
low traveling Nazis were on the rise again and were quickly reintegrated into 
Austrian life. The Mitläufer did not want to be reminded by the exiles, who had 
cultivated the idea of the Austrian nation during the war, that they had abandoned 
not only their conscience but also bet on the wrong horse and lost. The fellow 
travelers felt comfortable living in a hidebound Austria now almost without Jews.36 
The restored Austria also unceremoniously rejected the participation of resist-
ance fighters in positions of political leadership in its postwar political reconstruc-
tion. Austria's resistance movement during the war operated under extraordinary 
difficult circumstances and never took off. The majority of dedicated and coura-
geous resistance fighters were Catholics and Communists. Most of them went to 
concentration camps or the execution blocks early in the war. Laissez-faire 
Austrians seem to be better followers than resisters. In a country where regimes 
have changed frequently in the twentieth century switching party allegiance be-
comes a way of survival for the hangers-on. It had happened in 1938 and would 
happen again in 1945. This also means that political convictions cannot be run-
ning very deep, let alone fighting for one's persuasions. Most Austrians 
("Ostmärkers ") were lethargic during the war and not prepared "to sacrifice their 
lives in a somewhat forlorn cause," reported the OSS. The typical Viennese was 
an indifferent grumbler ("Raunzer"). The OSS reported a representative Vien-
nese as noting: "I do not care how the war ends. All I want is to be able to get my 
motor car back." When the war ended they joined their old political camps again 
- some even took a secret Communist Party membership as an insurance policy 
for worse to come.37 
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Austrians after the war did not want to be reminded by resistance fighters that 
most of them had failed in providing aid to bring down the Nazi regime. By not 
including them in leadership roles they could not agitate as the conscience of the 
nation and possibly even demand reparations for the suffering of the true victims 
of the Nazi regime. Most Austrians preferred constructing the myth that they all 
had been victims of the war and therefore deserved reintegration into society and 
possibly even reparations or welfare (eg. crippled veterans) rather than grant Jews, 
euthanasia victims and resistance fighters a special status of victimhood. 
The only resistance fighter from the "0-5" organization to make it into the 
Provisional Renner Government as an Under State Secretary in the Communist 
controlled Interior Ministry was the colorful maverick Raoul Bumballa. Renner 
presumably included him only upon communist pressure to have at least one re-
sistance fighter in the coalition. Operating within the People's Party in the sum-
mer of 1945 Bumballa tried to form a liberal wing to make it "a new party and 
more democratic party with a definite middle class and international orientation." 
But the peasant and clerical reaction in the ÖVP feared that such a liberal wing 
might split the party and rejected Bumballa's attempts at democratic moderniza-
tion. Oliver Rathkolb is on the mark in concluding that only "experienced party 
hacks with good contacts in Austria managed to launch political careers after 
1945."38 The return of these obtuse prewar party warriors effectively contained 
both wartime dissidents and emigres from playing prominent political roles. 
Karl Gruber was the exception to the rule. The young man from the Tyrol had 
somehow managed to sit the war out in Berlin. In the final weeks of the war he 
joined the resistance movement in the Tyrol and emerged as a leader and prov-
ince's first postwar provisional governor, in part due also to his knowledge of 
English and his maverick daredevil character. Once the Western powers had es-
tablished their presence in Vienna by September 1945, Renner called a conference 
with representatives from all the states ("Länderkonferenz") to broaden his Provi-
sional Government and make it acceptable to the West. The 37-year old Gruber 
received the Foreign Ministry probably more for reasons of including some poli-
ticians from the Western provinces than to have a resistance fighter in the govern-
ment. His diplomacy was also expected to accomplish the return of the South 
Tyrol for Austria. Gruber's record as resistance fighter came in very handily in 
persuading the world that Austria had been a nation of victims during World War II. 
Incidentally, the diplomatic leadership returning to the Foreign Office in April/ 
May 1945 already had been serving in the Dollfuss and Schuschnigg Foreign 
Ministry and was either fired in 1938, gone into exile (some into "inner" exile), or 
were shipped to concentration camps. The profile of such opposition to the Nazi 
regime, along with a younger generation of Socialist exiles who returned from 
England, France and Sweden made the Foreign Ministry bureaucracy an unusual 
exception in its discontinuity with the Nationals Socialist regime.39 
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The unmistakable trend in postwar Austrian politics, then, was not to call upon 
the expelled Jews or the wartime resistance fighters as the noble conscience to 
reconstitute the nation in democratic renewal; instead the entrenched old party 
hacks began to practice consensus, Proporz and Sozialpartnerschaft. 
3. Reemergence of the Fellow Travelers 
and Political Apathy: 
Denazification and Public Opinion 
The reestablishment of a viable Austrian polity after the war required the purge 
of the Fascist/Nazi mindset just like viable democracy in the post-Communist 
regimes in Eastern Europe called for the purge of the totalitarian mindset through 
investigations into the "Stasi-regimes" and/or "lustrace" measures. Central Euro-
pean transitions after 1945 and 1989 have demonstrated that such radical breaks 
with the past are fraught with difficulties. The huge segments of population that 
had aligned themselves with the totalitarian regimes made wholesale purges im-
possible and called for amnesties as well as forgiving and forgetting. 
Denazification can be seen as a from-the-top-down bureaucratic approach to 
purge Nazi ideology from the body politic and reeducate a mindset that had been 
steeped in totalitarian doctrine, in the case of Austria for twelve years (1933-45). 
It can also be perceived as a great chance for democratic renewal. The half-hearted 
attempt to purge the 'Nazi-mentalité constitutes a missed opportunity for demo-
cratic renewal and building a framework for civil society to prosper (in the former 
Soviet satellites the concept of civil society was a much stronger model for nation 
building after 1989 than it had been in postwar Austria). After 1945 democracy in 
postwar Austria was implanted from above in the usual paternalistic Austrian fash-
ion. It was accompanied on the one hand by a mild tutelage from the Western 
occupation powers and on the other hand constant charges from the Soviet occu-
piers of both failed denazification and "democratization" . It did not provide for 
grass roots democracy to sprout on the local level and grow into genuine self-
government.40 
The Ostmark had some 537,000 registered party members (about 12 percent of 
the population). It had produced the likes of Adolf Eichmann, Odilo Globocnik 
and Friedrich Rainer and other infamous Nazi butchers and bureaucrats, who had 
contributed inordinately to the implementation of the Holocaust and Nazi atroci-
ties all over occupied Europe. Austrians served in the police and SS units, which 
implemented the early stages of the final solution in Eastern and Southern Eu-
rope. Moreover, almost 1.3 million Austrians served in the Wehrmacht,41 which 
more recently has been singled out by historians as having played a prominent 
role in the implementation of the Holocaust. What to do with this mass of more or 
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less implicated "Nazis," fellow travelers and "doing-their duty" fellow travelers 
("Pflichthengste")?42 
In order to build a new spirit of political comity and consensus between the 
camps in postwar Austria, not all NS-party members could be sent to jail. Until 
1949 they suffered disenfranchisement and political (not social!) isolation. Very 
soon after Austria's liberation and until the end of 1945 two denazification re-
gimes emerged; an Allied one and an Austrian one. The four occupation powers 
initiated their own denazification regimes in the course of 1945, based on their 
more or less complete planning efforts during the war to eradicate Nazism and 
punish the implicated Nazis. The Americans came to Austria intent on severe 
denazification. Initially they even planned to go after the Austro-fascists. They 
quickly realized that this would have rendered the People Party non-viable. When 
they instituted their elaborate questionnaires to be filled out by former Nazis, their 
efforts soon bogged down in bureaucratic inertia. The British half-heartedly fol-
lowed the American model but were more interested in building democracy than 
alienating the huge stock of Nazi fellow travelers along with their families. The 
French had learned before they came to Austria that wholesale purges produced 
chaotic situations and entered Austria more skeptical about the chances of denazi-
fication. The Soviets wanted to punish the worst-case offenders quickly and at-
tract the "little Nazis" into their ranks by exercising forgiveness. When the Austri-
ans elected their own government in November 1945, the Allies handed their 
bogged-down and ambivalent denazification efforts over to the Austrians. Start-
ing in 1946 they merely supervised Austrian denazification. It quickly bogged 
down in the Cold War when the West considered an anti-Communist Austria a 
higher priority than a thorough Nazi purge.43 
Vigorous Austrian denazification efforts had begun right after the war but quickly 
eased with the alleviating of Allied pressure for a thorough purge. In its first few 
weeks in office, the very productive Provisional Renner Government debated and 
passed two tough denazification laws - one criminalizing all Nazi organizations 
(Verbotsgesetz), the other defining and beginning to persecute the worst war crimi-
nals (Kriegsverbrechergesetz). During these early Cabinet discussions the very 
peculiar Austrian species of a "good Nazi " emerged - the perennial fellow traveler 
("Mitläufer"), who joins each and every political movement coming to power as 
a survival strategy. The argument went that one could not possibly exercise tough 
punishment on the Mitläufer, since they had never been very serious about their 
Nazi party affiliation. They had passively joined to keep their jobs, or only run 
with the Nazi crowd under pressure. They were supposed to be screened, atone for 
their errors and permitted to redeem themselves. "To outlaw them and make pari-
ahs out of them," argued the Communist Minister of Education Ernst Fischer who 
had just returned from Moscow, "would not only be unwise but also unjust."44 
One wonders how all those people, who had welcomed the German Army en-
220 GÜNTER BISCHOF 
thusiastically on March 12, 1938, managed to return to the woodwork? From day 
one of the Second Republic, the political camps competed for the vote of these 
fellow-traveling "good Nazis." The Communists right away after liberation, the 
People Party close second, and the Socialists last. When in 1948 the 480,000 
"good Nazis" were amnestied, the competition for their votes became fierce and 
ended in the creation of a "fourth party." The new "League of Independents" 
captured many of their votes but so did the SPÖ and ÖVP. Austrian denazification 
efforts were most vigorous as long as the occupation powers kept the pressure on 
in 1946/47. With the Cold War came the great amnesties of 1948. Denazification 
increasingly became a political football in the growing propaganda battles of the 
Cold War. Austria did punish some 40,000 Nazis ("Belastete") through disfran-
chisement and loss of political rights, exclusion from the workplace and loss of 
jobs, fines and even jail sentences and internment camps. Fourty-two of the worst 
case offenders were executed. As soon as the occupation powers left, most of the 
Nazis still in jail were amnestied. By 1957 the Austrian effort had petered out. 
There were few riveting trials of Nazis in Austria like the Eichman trial in Jerusa-
lem or the Auschwitz trials in West Germany, which also turned into effective 
contemporary history and civics lessons about the depravity of the Nazi regime 
for an entire nation. The lack of Nazi trials in Austria in the 1960s, in fact, aided 
the Austrians in their skillful art of forgetting and historical amnesia.45 
Most Austrian Mitläufer soon came to see themselves as "victims of denazifi-
cation" and griped about the impertinence of being branded as "Nazis." In another 
one of those peculiar postwar Austrian inversions of reality, "the harshness of de-
Nazification laws was termed 'undemocratic ' [emphasis added]."46 The Mitläufer 
and the returning soldiers argued that they had only "done their duty" and did not 
feel responsible for Hitlerite war crimes. 71 percent of Austrians felt that "the 
Austrian people do not share in the guilt for World War II and only 15 percent 
thought Austrians were partly to blame." The Austrian-born American diplomat 
Martin F. Herz correctly concluded from this polling evidence: "It stands to rea-
son that the emphasis on Austria's separateness from Germany results in corre-
sponding feeling of guiltlessness [emphasis added]."47 It seems like a major moral 
failure aided and abetted by the church that in deeply Catholic Austria no record 
of remorse ever surfaced over Austrians' major contributions to the implementa-
tion of the Holocaust and brutal and destructive Hitlerite expansionism, occupa-
tion and exploitation. Instead, a strange inversion of "victims" emerged in post-
war Austria, where Jews and resistance fighters had no special claim to victim 
status. By 1950 all of Austria perceived of itself as a "nation of victims." The 
veteran organizations got busy commemorating their "Kriegsopfer. " Denazifica-
tion and exclusion from both politics and the civic arena before 1949 bred politi-
cal apathy. So did the continued foreign occupation. The Austrian government 
was more serious in instilling the idea of a non-German "Austrian nation" than in 
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purging the Nazi mindset and reeducating the population in a liberal democratic 
value system. With the coming of the Cold War, the Western occupation powers 
withdrew their pressure to cleanse the body politic from the mental baggage of 
Nazi racism and aggression. Until the 1980s forgetting became the Austrian tra-
jectory of postwar remembrance.48 
The high bureaucracy led the charge. Austrian schools concentrated on teach-
ing the new doctrines of "Austrian identity" constructed in the Education Ministry 
after 1945 by bureaucrats, who had faithfully served the prewar authoritarian re-
gimes. They evoked Austria's great historical pre-World War I past and stressed 
its separateness from Germany. The World War II war crimes had been imported 
from Germany. Austrians had had no part in them. The reactionary Ministry of 
Education officials missed the opportunity to instill liberal democratic values. 
The Foreign Ministry officials set out on their mission to persuade the world of 
the basic postwar Austrian doctrines: Austria's victim's status and sterling resist-
ance record during the war. Official government publications such as the Red-
White-Red book spread these historical half-truths. These doctrines also had to be 
popularized in the domestic arena. State sponsored propaganda exhibitions such 
Niemals Vergessen did the trick. Hundreds of thousands of Austrians saw this 
show in Vienna in the fall of 1946.49 
The school curricula pushed this indoctrination via the school curricula. Nazi 
atrocities were generally mentioned only in tandem with Allied atrocities like the 
bombing of Dresden. In this peculiar moral equivalency the Hiroshima bombing 
was on the same level as the Nazi Holocaust. Once the "final solution" started 
entering the schoolbooks in the 1960s and 1970s, the specific role of Austrians 
went unnoticed. Loyalty to the new Austrian state (i.e. reinforcing the "long shadow 
of the state") had a much higher priority than a liberal democratic value system 
and the ideal of autonomous political responsibility. The Josephinian ideal of 
Austrian citizenship prevailed - to be loyal subjects to the authority of an all 
enlightened state. Simple patriotism prevailed over a democratic and anti-fascist 
agenda.50 
Parallel to this curricular policy of instilling the sense of separate Austrian 
nationhood in the youth, the hidebound Ministry of Education pushed a "postfascist" 
(R. Fleck) agenda rather than a clean sweep with the past. Writers like Heimito 
von Doderer were favored and coddled with state prizes. Von Doderer had thrown 
in his lot with the Nazi regime and after the war became a propagandist of the 
Austrian idea by creating the Habsburg myth of Austria's great historical past. No 
Thomas Manns appeared on the scene. Mann returned to Germany as the great 
representative of "the integrity of a better Germany in exile" (A. Bushell). Fa-
mous Austrian exile writers like Stefan Zweig and Joseph Roth had committed 
suicide in exile or drank themselves to death. Young writers who had been ex-
pelled like Hilde Spiel returned only with the occupation forces as observers of 
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postwar Austria. The University of Vienna refused to give Hermann Broch, who 
had fled Nazi Germany, an honorary doctorate. Like ordinary Austrians, the obse-
quious writers survived the regime changes. Those who acted as conscience to 
their nation and took the hard road to exile lost their homeland permanently.51 
A similar restoration of the prewar aesthetic occurred in the Austrian art and 
literary scene. In postwar Austria the Nazi idea of "degenerate art" died a slow 
death. Young artists had a hard time getting access to the new aesthetic of radical 
modernism and abstract expressionism unless they went to Paris or New York, 
which few of them could afford. In the Academies of Art the professors who had 
taught during the war kept their jobs and continued with their hidebound pathetical 
aesthetic after the war. Radical abstractionism came to Austria late. The highly 
experimental "Viennese action group" of the Sixties was a reaction against this 
postwar restoration, just like Gemot Wolfsgruber's and Franz Innerhofer's at-
tacks on Austria's feudal society and the crypto-serfdom of its people were re-
sponses to the continuity in Austrian literature after the war.52 
The cultural milieu in Austria after 1945 was as distinctively anti-modernist as 
it had been before the war. As Dieter Binder has persuasively argued, Austrian 
cultural elites continued to see creative individualism as a destructive force threat-
ening the imagined national unity. The same generation was in charge that domi-
nated cultural debates before and during the war and rejected experiments. In the 
prevailing Cold War mindset intellectuals such as Friedrich Torberg and Hans 
Weigel practised Austrian-style anti-communist McCarthy ism. The postwar re-
turn of hidebound backward-looking pride in everything "Heimat " was only chal-
lenged by a new generation in the 1960s.53 
The survival of this postfascist mentalité produced widespread political apa-
thy. It resulted in both distance and ambiguity vis-a-vis liberal democratic values 
as the first public opinion surveys demonstrated. The American occupiers brought 
their obsession with public opinion polling to postwar Austria. From 1946 on-
wards they regularly polled the Austrian population about the idea whether "Na-
tional Socialism was a bad idea, or a good idea badly executed?" Between a third 
and half of the population consistently answered that it "was a good idea badly 
executed." When polled about their favorite form of government, only about 40 
percent favored democracy, 24 percent a Socialist Republic, still 16 percent mon-
archy and only 3 percent outright dictatorship. 46 percent of the young Austrians 
in their twenties favored democracy, but only some 31 percent of their elders over 
60. Austria's postfascist mindest was coupled with rabid anti-communism. This 
can be gathered from 1948 polls where in Vienna 36 percent preferred National 
Socialism, while 6 percent preferred Communism (in Salzburg 43 percent and 3 
percent respectively). About 50 percent preferred neither and can be considered 
democrats. Oliver Rathkolb is correct in concluding that democracy had not yet 
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taken firm roots in Austria and the authoritarian fascist potential was still strong in 
postwar Austria.54 
In 1951 the State Department sent the well-known political scientist as a con-
sultant to Austria to assess the country's state of mind. After his many interviews 
with Austria's political elites Morgenthau wrote a long report about Austrian po-
litical culture. He observed the consensus democracy emanating from the "shot 
gun marriage" of the ÖVP-SPÖ coalition; he also observed the shallow roots of 
democratic institutions in political and economic life. He saw deep political apa-
thy in the population and disinterest in politics among the youth. In another report 
a pupil from the 1950s is reported as saying: "I am not concerned with the politi-
cal situation, or only as much as it is befitting an Austrian citizen."55 
Given this long postwar history of official soft-pedaling of National Socialism 
it should not come as a surprise in the late 19 80's that the Austrians generally 
harbored much more positive views of National Socialism than the West Germans 
with their much more strict postwar reeducation policies did. While 16 percent of 
the Austrian population thought that National Socialism featured "only bad sides," 
almost twice as many (29 percent) of the West Germans thought so (43 percent of 
the Austrians felt National Socialism had "bad and good sides," while 35 percent 
of the West Germans agreed with this proposition). Small wonder that the populist 
Jörg Haider's positive references to National Socialism produced so much politi-
cal support rather than profound disgust.56 
This postfascist mindest runs concurrent with the low prestige of democratic 
government in postwar Austria. Given the general political apathy dating back to 
the Nazi period, as well as the above mentioned quasi-authoritarian approach to 
politics by a patronizing and small political elite, the average Austrian citizen 
took little interest in politics and less in the rejuvenation of democracy. Austrians 
regarded democracy as "the antithesis of repression and dictatorship." Austrians 
desired democracy "as a political atmosphere," argued Martin F. Herz, but dis-
trusted it "as a method for getting things done." Parliament as an institution had 
little prestige because "it seems incapable of reaching quick decisions." The grand 
coalition agenda of uncompromising consensus democracy had proffered a view 
that saw "discord between political parties not as evidence of the of the vitality of 
Austrian democracy, but as a dangerous deviation from it." In 1945 and thereafter 
Austrians were in general very tired of political parties. Political campaigning 
reminded them of Nazi party propaganda. Austrians associated party competition 
with the strife and struggle of the prewar party system, the give and take of con-
tentious democratic discourse with a general disturbance of the political consen-
sus. Austrians were ignorant of the fact, argued Herz, "that a democracy without 
active, virile parties is doomed."57 
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Conclusion 
The Vienna-born American diplomat Martin F. Herz was a keen observer of 
postwar Austrian politics and political culture. He interviewed most of the Aus-
trian political leaders after he entered Vienna late in July 1945. He recognized 
early on the deep-seated suspicion between the People's Party and the Socialists, 
papered over by superficial consensus politics and desire for unity after the trauma 
of prewar party strife between the camps. He recognized that Austrian ignorance 
about the essence of democracy was deeply rooted in the contentiousness of con-
stant prewar clashes between political opinions and parties. Herz's subtle skills as 
political observer also gathered the deep roots of mutual historical recriminations 
in both political camps. The Socialists gave the purging of "Heimwehr-Fascism" 
in the People Party higher priority than the eradication of Nazism, while the Peo-
ple's Party constantly dwelt on the Socialists' unpatriotic pro-German Anschluss 
orientation before the war.58 
Were there any alternative paths available in 1945? As early as October 1945 
Herz suggested one. He advised the Allies to interfere in the domestic Austrian 
battle over the country's past and the future of its democracy by truthfully ad-
dressing their parties' historical mistakes in the prewar period. "To avoid the fatal 
handicap of Austrian democracy," Herz averred, the Socialists should be forced to 
openly renounce the Anschluss idea as a mistake and the People Party should "be 
made to dissociate itself clearly and publicly from the anti-democratic heritage of 
the Christian Social party" (Herz's emphasis). He also suggested that the Allied 
Council should issue a historical review of the prewar period in which "the perni-
cious elements of the totalitarian state is clearly exposed." When the Allies were 
ready to end their occupation, Herz suggested, they should leave behind a sol-
emnly worded "Charter for Austrian Democracy. " Therein a review of Austrian 
democracy should be attempted and the two principal camps be admonished not 
to resuscitate their past ideological struggles. This authoritative Charter could be 
a quasi "Declaration of Austrian Independence" - a postwar Austrian magna carta 
serving as the "basis for study in Austrian schools and for public display for a long 
period of time to come." Herz added: "It might, equally fittingly, contain brief 
discussions of the rights of man, of civil liberties, the treatment of minorities, and 
the benefits of the parliamentary system."59 
The trajectory of postwar Austrian democracy might have been quite different 
had the occupation powers interfered more strongly after the war to remind the 
Austrians to face their historical failures squarely in order to start mastering their 
own past. Such an Austrian "bill of rights" might also have reeducated the Austri-
ans more deeply about the nature of democratic government, human rights and 
civil society. But the occupation powers did not do so and thus permitted the 
historical untruths or half-truths expressed in Renner's Declaration of Independ-
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ence from April 27, 1945, and subsequent official pronouncements such as the 
Red-White-Red book to stand. Austria, after all, was a liberated country where the 
Allies generally allowed Austrians to take matters of domestic governance into 
their own hands. They did not control Austria like defeated Germany, were Allied 
control of domestic politics was total until 1947/48. 
This allowed Austria to revive democratic government in their age-old way of 
paternalistic enlightened authoritarianism. No enlightened electorate was needed 
and one actively participating in governance not desired. The complex historical 
truth was papered over with the myth of Austrian victimhood during World War 
II, possibly a necessary historical fiction designed to build a truce between the 
two camps and consign their ideological antagonism to the past. The Western 
powers went along with and supported this historical fiction, both to build much 
needed political stability for the economic reconstruction of the country and keep 
the strongly anti-communist Austria in the Western fold during the Cold War strug-
gle against the Soviet Union. 
Ultimately, the massive postwar American economic aid proved to be the strong-
est nostrum for Austria's postwar political reconstruction. After 1945 Austrian 
democracy survived on a steady diet of U.S. Army and UNRRA food aid and the 
Marshall Plan. The spectacular success of the reconstruction of the Austrian 
economy in the 1950s allowed the grand coalition to paper over their deep-seated 
mutual suspicions and firmly rooted ideological disagreements. Economic revival 
and growing prosperity fostered cooperation across the camps and reinforced con-
sensus politics. The prewar myth of Austria's non-viable economy was proven to 
be a myth only. The Marshall Plan helped give Austrians their cars back and in-
jected broad prosperity into the country. This postwar economic prosperity - along 
with the Western pressure to work out their mutual hostility - gave the grand 
coalition sufficient time to stay together, reluctantly respect each other, and gradu-
ally begin the strengthening of formal democratic governance in the next genera-
tion.60 
It seems that the Austrian population instinctively recognized this crucial nexus 
between economic prosperity and political stability. Austrians were polled in 1995 
on what they considered the most crucial factors for Austria's reconstruction in 
1945.37 percent answered the reconstruction of the economy, 33 percent rebuild-
ing of democracy; again it does not come as a surprise that a meager 6 percent 
considered denazification as the top priority.61 
"Inner democracy" along the lines of a "liberal consensus" began to sprout in 
Western Germany in the 1960s. Authoritarian patterns of behavior, long consid-
ered national traditions and deeply rooted in German society receded slowly. In 
his anatomy of postwar Austrian democracy the German historian Anselm Doering-
Manteuffel has shown how the long shadow of the state in Germany began to pale 
over a long period of time. The old patterns of a political culture that priced loy-
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alty to the state above all else were replaced in the new West Germany by a new 
political culture of "discussion, participation, and reconciliation." The German 
baby boomers helped unleash this new political culture by forcing an active dis-
course about the crimes of Nazi Germany and the German guilt emanating from 
the Holocaust upon their fathers' generation. The new Socialist German Chancel-
lor Willi Brandt posited the new paradigm: "We will dare more democracy." De-
mocracy became the cornerstone of both state and society in West Germany.62 It 
was much aided by strict American reeducation policies that helped unleash the 
astounding Westernization and Americanization of West Germany. This also in-
cluded the planting of deep roots of liberal democracy - what Jürgen Habermas in 
the much different context of the 1980s "Historikerstreit" has called a new West 
German "constitutionalpatriotism." 
The hypothesis here is that in the Austrian transition such "inner democracy " 
(Western-style liberal democracy) has been different from West Germany's and 
came about considerably later. In Austria the Socialist government of Bruno Kreisky 
began to "dare more democracy" in the 1970s. Kreisky presumably followed the 
experiment in democratic renewal by his friend Willi Brandt closely. The Aus-
trian 1968'ers (among them Kreisky's own son Peter), led by artists and writers, 
demanded more democratic transparency in the political institutions; they also 
called for the long overdue confrontation with the past. Yet for pragmatic political 
reasons, Kreisky did not dare to question the prevailing political consensus of the 
"victim's myth." In Austria the debate about the country's World War II taboos 
did not break open until the 1980s. 
"The infusion of democracy" in the universities through Kreisky's reform 
movements did open up a new spirit of discourse about the past the only came to 
fruition in the 1980s. The myth of Austria's World War II past were questioned in 
a wholesale fashion. The old "coalition history" was exposed as a tissue of half-
truths and myths that had long ago ceased to serve its purpose of building postwar 
consensus. The "Waldheim debate" of 1986, as well as pressure from abroad, 
helped speed up the process of "mastering the past." But confronting the World 
War II past had started earlier in the intellectual community.63 
When he had to confront it in the Zwentendorf plebiscite, Kreisky did not like 
the outcome of the participatory democracy he had unleashed. The close result of 
this plebiscite forced him to stop a finished and very expensive nuclear power 
plant from going on line. Such successful civic action encouraged an incipient and 
rapidly growing environmental movement in Austria to protest government plans 
to build a Danube river hydroelectric power plant. Success in that highly confron-
tational civic campaign made "citizens movements," especially in the environ-
mental arena, more commonplace. In the mid-1980s such participatory grass roots 
democracy finally had arrived in Austria and became viable and entrenched. At 
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last, "inner democracy" was emerging and the long shadow of the state was begin-
ning to recede in Austria in the 1980's as it had done in West Germany in the 
1960s.64 
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REVOLUTION RECONSIDERED: 
INSTITUTION-BUILDING IN A MORAL VOID 
RUDOLF L. TŐKÉS 
University of Connecticut, CT, 
USA 
The series of events that began in early 1989 and culminated in the free elec­
tions in March 1990 have been characterized as "revolution" of one of four kinds. 
According to the British journalist T. G. Ash, it was a "resolution" suggesting 
that what happened in Hungary was more than reform but less than a revolution.1 
Though intended as a clever oxymoron, the term is grossly misleading as it ob­
scures and trivializes the qualitative difference between the point of departure and 
the point of arrival, that is, the difference between dictatorship and democracy 
Acccording to the former democratic oppositionist ideologue János Kis and 
several others who chose this formulation, the Hungarian events amounted to a 
"lawful revolution."2 The term stresses the notion of legal continuity and the non­
violent and non-confrontational nature of events. In my view, it is a misnomer as 
it deliberately overlooks the essentially politics- and power-driven substance of 
the process and, by design, fails to make any kind of moral distinction between 
the "before" and "after" spirit and normative content of laws and institutions. 
"Constitutional revolution" was the label chosen by András Bozóki and his 
fellow editors and contributors to an 8-volume documentary collection and ana­
lytical commentary to characterize the outcome of the National Roundtable talks 
of the summer of 1989 which paved the way to free elections and the change of 
the political regime in March-April 1990.3 The formulation is attractive, yet it is 
still an oxymoron which fails to reconcile, in terms legitimacy and cognitive con­
sonance, the yawning gap between the means, that is, an improvised legal artifact 
in the form of a modified constitution, and the ends, that is, revolution and the 
customary epistemological connotations of this term. 
"Negotiated revolution," is my formulation, that depicts the events as a series 
of elite pacts which culminated in public endorsement of the outcome by free 
elections in March-April 1990. Such pacts, by the nature of the enterprise, tend to 
incorporate the negotiators short-term political and economic interests and hide 
their personal beliefs, ethical choices, and moral preferences.4 The point is that 
real revolutions are meant to be fought and won on the barricades rather than 
behind closed doors at the negotiating table. Moreover, real revolutions are ex-
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pected to yield moral and cognitive sea change, thus provide for a shared cathartic 
experience and, with it, the opening of a new page in the community's history. 
Therefore, the modifier "negotiated" is crucial to an understanding of what did 
and did not happen in 1989-1990. It is also the master key to comprehending how 
the people feel about political institutions, political processes and political actors 
today. 
The main issue is the legacy of these events in terms of institutional outcomes, 
operating principles and political precedents and the way in which over the years 
these have been accepted, ignored or rejected by the Hungarian public. 
Ten years after the fact, we are confronted with a paradox. On the one hand, 
Hungary strikes most foreign observers as a consolidated and outwardly stable 
parliamentary democracy; an arguably regional model of successful economic 
transformation; and, as the tourist posters claim, "the new spirit of old Europe." 
On the other hand, the citizens of this new democracy, when asked about the 
great men of the past millenium, picked János Kádár as third behind St. Stephen 
and István Széchenyi, thus the top statesman of 20th century Hungary. Something 
is amiss here. 
To make my case, I would like to submit three propositions. 
(a) In the tenth year of an "existing democracy" a decisive majority of the 
Hungarian people have yet to come to terms with their nation's recent history and 
have yet to find their personal space in a democratic polity and market economy. 
(b) Civil society, the traditional shelter for the nurturing of the citizens' com­
munity spirit is still more of the old and the new local elites' normless political 
playground than a safe haven for the affirmation of personal values and civic 
virtues. 
(c) Therefore, as demonstrated by countless surveys on citizen attitudes toward 
politics and political institutions, the non-elites still perceive their personal effi­
cacy in public affairs in terms of voicelessness and powerlessness and are reluc­
tant to attribute moral authority to political institutions. 
Social psychologists speak of "deferred catharsis," "self-imposed amnesia" 
and a chronic sense of malaise. In my view, these labels, however accurate, are 
simplistic pathologies of complex cognitive processes that have been spawned by 
Hungary's rapid transformation from one type of political regime to another. 
Institutions and Moral Values 
The subject of this brief paper is institution-building and moral values and the 
way in which these are promoted or thwarted by Hungary's political class and the 
general public. 
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By moral values I understand complex sets of privately held beliefs that have 
been shaped by personal and family histories, religious and secular norms, politi-
cal exigencies, social and economic conditions and other extraneous circumstances. 
Hungary's troubled history that included a half dozen drastic political changes in 
the 20th century, tended to aggregate individual life experiences into generational 
clusters. The latter tend to penetrate and reshape personal judgments about right 
and wrong, fair and unfair, just and unjust, moral and immoral and, in the realm of 
public affairs, legitimate or illegitimate. 
What are institutions? They are man-made legal artifacts whose purposes are 
specified in constitutions, laws and statutes which define the framework within 
which interactions between the citizens and the state take place. Traditionally, 
political institutions set norms, structure behavior, and regulate outcomes of inter-
actions not only between the citizens and the government, but among key institu-
tional actors, such as Parliament, the head of state, the courts, political parties, and 
local governments.The main point is that political institutions are elite-made in-
struments that embody the "architects" and, in the context of Hungary's negoti-
ated revolution, the "founding fathers" material interests, personal values, and 
their vision of the public good. 
Postcommunist Hungary's political institutions were crafted by two elites, each 
with clashing, as well as compatible values and interests. Both elites were prod-
ucts of the country's survivalist political culture which put premium on pragmatic 
compromise on the institutional-legal essentials and on the rolling over of intrac-
table moral-ideological issues to be resolved by future generations. Accordingly, 
the National Roundtable negotiators of 1989 chose to set aside their ideological 
differences and, on the basis of shared short-term political interests, they sought 
the semblance of consensus, rather than agreements "carved in marble," for the 
sake of peaceful transition between two very different political systems. 
Peaceful transition saves lives and property. Therefore, as a political strategy 
of choice, it must be seen as a morally and ethically superior alternative to vio-
lence or a civil war. On the other hand, institutions built on elite political com-
promises tend to be deficient with respect to legitimacy, that is, the public's 
moral and value identification with the process and its outcomes. Elite-orches-
trated mass public participation in 1989, such as that on June 16 (for the ceremo-
nial reburial of Imre Nagy and fellow victims of communist repression) and the 
"four question" referendum of September-November of that year (to deny the 
presidency to reform communist Imre Pozsgay) were preemptive moves to keep 
the masses off the streets to prevent the reenactement of the "people's (real) revo-
lution" of 1956. 
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The House of Democracy and its Moral Guardians 
The institutional products of elite negotiations were components of an archi­
tectural blueprint for the nation's democratic political home. The building had a 
foundation of sorts in the form of a vague consensus on the ground rules of the 
democratic political game. The house was propped up by five institutional pillars: 
Parliament, the president of the Republic, the cabinet government, the party and 
the electoral system, and the Constitutional Court. The revised constitution served 
as the roof of the house, as well as a legal-ideological shelter for the protection of 
its inhabitants.5 
Whereas four of the pillars were designed to serve as pragmatic instruments of 
policymaking and policy implementation, the Constitutional Court was the desig­
nated guardian of a law-governed state, that is, of public and private norms of 
lawful behavior. 
This is how László Sólyom, the first President of the Court described the activ­
ist majority's constitutional philosophy: 
The Constitutional Court's main objective was to develop the Con­
stitution into a coherent system. It is questionable whether it is a 
moral principle. The Constitutional Court never stated that the basic 
law presupposes some kind of moral structure. Quite deliberately we 
did not wish to follow the German model which, particularly until 
the mid-1960s, generally spoke of a moral structure and other natural 
rights-derived antecedents. We also stressed that the Constitution, 
particularly since its modification in 1990 which eliminated all ideo­
logical language, is a neutral legal text. At the same time, it is quite 
clear that human rights are legal formulations for moral categories. 
The Constitutional Court perceived and extracted moral content, or 
with Dworkin's phrase, "moral reading," of each basic right accord­
ing to the peculiarities of each of these rights. In doing so, it became 
unnecessary to cite generalities, such as the "value structure of the 
Constitution," thus moral principles became instrumentalized. We 
translated each moral right into the language of constitutional law, so 
that the Court could reasonably claim to have rendered judgment not 
on moral, but legal principles.6 
Political Rights as Welfare Entitlements 
The Hungarian constitution lists and protects two kinds of "human rights." The 
first is a cluster of the so-called "second generation" of negative rights, such as 
freedom of speech, of assembly, of religion and so on. The second is a cluster of 
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the so-called "third generation" of positive rights, such as the right to work, to 
social security, health, education, welfare, and a clean environment. 
Now it is our turn to translate Sólyom's legal pieties into the language of poli-
tics. 
Whereas the state's delivery on the citizens' negative rights is a relatively cost-
free proposition, in a market economy the satisfaction of public expectations as-
sociated with the citizens' social-welfare entitlements is a vastly different matter. 
These rights, and some new ones, were lifted, under the smoke screen of "legal 
continuity," intact from the old, communist-era constitution and became the pub-
lic's, de facto socialist-era, moral yardstick by which to judge the performance of 
democratic institutions. 
In my reading, the Court's "instrumentalization" of human rights was a key 
element of the "Founding Fathers'" reform socialist and left-liberal jurists' com-
mitment to legal continuity. This, in turn, led to the relegitimation of the old re-
gime's politically relatively uncompromised institutions, such as the state's tech-
nocracy and the judiciary. With respect to "positive rights," the same notion en-
tailed the reaffirmation of the market-preemptive policies of state redistribution 
and, with it, the resuscitation of the much cherished, but economically unsustain-
able, socialist welfare package. 
A brief detour. For understandable reasons, Kádár had been a vehement oppo-
nent of moral introspection. He used to say "we don't need soul-searching" (or in 
Hungarian, "nem kell nekünk lelkizés. ") Instead, he defined the public good in 
consumerist terms with respect to access to food, shelter, welfare entitlements and 
restricted personal autonomy. 
Much of this gave birth to the amoral rent-seeking world of the Homo Kádáricus. 
Under the old regime values of self-realization, civic probity, interpersonal trust 
and social solidarity were replaced by a Hobbesian world of unregulated pursuit 
of private interests (or érdekérvényesítés in Hungarian) at the expense of the pub-
lic good. In this world, ethical standards, altruism, and personal decency, let alone 
public profession of religious faith, became counterproductive to survival and 
success. 
From the early 1970s on, Kádár's rule became a kind of 'soft dictatorship' and 
a normless iive-and-let-live' pragmatic survival pact between the regime and the 
people, particularly the intellectuals. All but a handful of these one-time champi-
ons of liberty and national identity became coopted (and economically well-com-
pensated) tools in the service of a coerced 'all-people's consensus' behind the 
regime's political objectives. In the age of 'soft dictatorship' Julien Benda's no-
tion of the betrayal of the intellectuals was realized in Hungary in a massive and 
statistically demonstrable fashion. Alone in the Soviet bloc, Hungary had the du-
bious distinction of 40 percent of its ruling communist party's membership com-
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prised of intellectuals and holders of university degrees. The courageous few -
democratic, populist and reform socialist - dissident intellectuals tried to take the 
moral high road by staking a claim for the leadership of an alternative "second" 
society - albeit for and by the intellectuals, rather than for and by the people. 
Their definiton of the public good was, and could not be anything else, but a tribal 
affair rather than an agenda of moral emancipation of the unenlightened masses. 
Toward an Uncivil Society? 
Within the context of Hungary's negotiated revolution the accumulated moral 
deficit of the past could have been overcome by the public's extensive participa­
tion in various phases of systemic change. Instead, the elite negotiators kept the 
masses demobilized and dispensed what might be called 'catharsis by the spoon­
ful.' 
The pact-makers sought to legitimate their stance by targeting vaguely defined 
scapegoats, such as the "old regime," "lawless behavior by certain groups," and, 
of course, "Soviet rule," as the main culprits responsible for forty-five years of 
state-sponsored terrorism against the Hungarian people. Kádár somehow escaped 
criticism and during the 1990s became a nostalgic symbol of the normalcy of the 
"golden 1970s": that of limited political freedoms, attenuated morality, and se­
verely eroded standards of civic probity. The elites' shared objective was to de­
flate the public's potentially revolutionary expectations. At the end, it was not a 
public referendum, but the outgoing Parliament's approval which gave birth to 
the constitution and the renaming of the state from a People's Republic to a (par­
liamentary) Republic. The bottom line: democracy "for the people" but definitely 
not "by the people." 
According to Adam Przeworski, "Democratic institutions that fail to provide 
moral leadership cannot cope with conflicts arising from economic inequality and 
deprivation... Consent to democracy is contingent... on the congruence between 
the moral content of institutions and the basic values of society."7 
In the past ten years, hundreds of laws, several political parties, three govern­
ments, three Parliaments, the head of state, and two Constitutional Courts have 
been trying to fill the moral void with old and new values. 
Of the three cabinet governments since 1990, József Antall's Christian demo­
cratic coalition had by far the most difficult task of simultaneously building demo­
cratic institutions and of trying to gain acceptance of traditional values (or indeed 
values of any kind) by the postcommunist public. It was a futile undertaking from 
the outset. Antall's proposed "value package" consisting of Populism, Christian 
democracy and national liberalism struck the intended recipients, particularly the 
predominantly leftist intellectuals, as a hidden agenda for the restoration of the 
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prewar Horthy regime's values and political style. Competing ideological para-
digms, such as those offered by the left-liberal intellectuals, though helpful for 
discrediting the government's moral posturing, also failed to resonate with the 
disenchanted public. 
The socialist-liberal government of 1994-1998 had no moral agenda of any 
kind. Instead, the regime stressed notions of expertise, modernization, and 
"Euroconformity." On the whole, it was a schizophrenic proposition: the old re-
gime's third-echelon time-servers reinvented themselves as social democrats pur-
suing a value-free neoliberal agenda of marketization, while their liberal partners 
- most likely as a compensatory tactic to cover up for their mesaliance with their 
former political adversaries - extolled postmodern virtues by paying lip service to 
minority rights, gender equality and, above all, patronage/welfare for the intelli-
gentsia. Terms, such as "nation," "patriotism," and citizen-Burgher (polgár) were 
expunged from the regime's official vocabulary. 
It can be argued that the center-right Fidesz-Citizen's Party-led electoral coali-
tion's victory in 1998 was due in equal measure to the voters' perception of wide-
spread corruption by incumbent government party officials and to the spontane-
ous emergence of public yearning for the restoration of traditional civic values. 
The new regime promised to turn a new leaf by calling the electoral outcome a 
mandate not only for changing the government, but also hinted at measures with 
which to complete the unfinished process of political transformation from a 
postcommunist to a democratic regime. 
As it may be inferred from the Orbán government's record after two years in 
office, there is still a wide gap between rhetoric and acccomplishment. Manipula-
tion of symbols, such as the transfer of St. Stephen's crown to the Parliament 
building and lip service to national identity and moral rectitude represent the plus 
side of the balance sheet. Widespread corruption - offical and private - brazen 
nepotism and continuing verbal warfare over ideological trivia are some of the 
key items on the debit side. Some of these liabilities may be dismissed as growing 
pains of a new democracy. However, the problem is that at the onset of the new 
millenium with the Fidesz regime the political class exhausted its diminishing 
supply of morally untainted politicians. The voters of 1998 expected youthful 
vigor and clean government, but got a brilliant, but willful and unpredictable prime 
minister and his disciplined team of earnest-looking young political piranhas bent 
on maximizing their grip on political, economic and cultural power. 
In sum, throughout the 1990s the politicians' and their constitutional guard-
ians' attempts at staking out the high ground of moral leadership has been consid-
ered and promptly rejected by a small army of media intellectuals and upheld by 
assorted party- or government-hired pens posing as authentic advocates of public 
interest. As it may be inferred from public opinion polls, people believe neither 
the politicians, nor the self-appointed intelligentsia spokesmen of moral virtue 
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and political correctness. Their message simply does not resonate with the pub­
lic's core beliefs. 
The Hungarian public's core beliefs are similar to those of its Central Euro­
pean postcommunist neighbors. These consist of a strong sense of national iden­
tity; deep frustrations over deferred social and political justice; ambivalent-to-
hostile attitudes toward market economy and capitalism in general: fear and trepi­
dation toward globalization and European integration; and, above all, distrust of 
authority of any kind, especially the state. A decade's worth of democratic institu­
tion building has yet to yield the acceptance and internalization of implicit beliefs 
in law and order and the primacy of the public good over greed, distrust and 
unbridled individualism. It is not a pretty picture. 
What is missing from the cognitive equation is a new kind of political culture 
and a new consensus on the public good. These call for civil courage to come to 
terms with the past, the embracing of a new democratic identity, the acceptance of 
the new rules of the political game and of the giving the benefit of doubt to freely 
elected politicians, lawful insitutions, and fellow citizens alike. None of this is 
going to happen anytime soon. The house of democracy is still under construction 
in Hungary today. 
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Introductory Remarks 
In East Central Europe the Poles began the first transition to democracy, and 
therefore the Polish opposition had to behave in a most cautious manner. Origi-
nally the Polish roundtable talks were not so much about paving the way for a full 
democracy, rather they were meant to produce an agreement. This agreement was 
designed first to legalize Solidarity and second to set up semi-democratic and 
partially fixed elections.1 As a result the June 1989 elections in Poland could not 
be evaluated as fully democratic ones. 
In historical perspective, on the other hand, one can safely say that the Polish 
negotiations had already started in August 1980. Polish dissidents became the 
pioneers in inventing negotiations with the communists in the region.2 The self-
limiting revolution of Solidarity in 1980-1981 set a pattern of behavior for other 
opposition groups in East Central Europe. For Poland 1989 meant simply the last 
chapter of a long historical process, which had been a decade-long transition first 
from communism to an authoritarian military regime and then to democracy. 
Viewed from a narrower perspective, between February and April 1989 the Poles 
closed an era of military dictatorship. The first task was to restore legality and the 
granting of legalization to Solidarity. The governing bloc, not the opposition, had 
initiated these steps after the failure of the 1988 referendum. By late 1988 even 
the communists had to realize that there was no other option for them. 
While the Polish and the Hungarian roundtable talks represented efforts at 
extrications from dictatorships, the German and Czechoslovakian roundtable talks 
only came after the actual revolutionary changes had occurred. In Germany and 
Czechoslovakia the discussions were about the establishment of the institutional 
structures for the new regimes, because the extrications from the dictatorships had 
already been accomplished. Poland was the first to undertake the transition but 
ended up with semi-free elections. The intention of the Hungarian negotiators, 
who started after the Poles, was to start down the Polish path but to achieve more 
than the Poles had. 
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In Hungary the roundtable talks actually mattered in both senses. The negotia-
tions were meant to be the extrication from the old regime and also the creation of 
an institutional order for a democratic government.3 
There were overt references to Poland by the Hungarian negotiators.4 Many 
people openly held the view that the Polish opposition could agree with the com-
munists on a semi-free election as a compromise because it was much stronger 
than the Hungarian opposition. In effect the Poles could afford to accept substan-
tial compromises because they were strong enough to mobilize masses of people 
on the streets and could thereby hope to change the results of the round table talks 
later.5 According to this argument, the Polish negotiators could accept a compro-
mise without damaging their political credibility. 
The Hungarian National Roundtable negotiations occurred after the Polish elec-
tions. Therefore in many respects the task of the Hungarians proved to be easier 
than that of the path-breaking Poles. The negotiations took place between the 
oppression of the student demonstrations at Tienanmen Square in China in June 
1989 and the formation to the first non-communist Polish government after four 
decades in September 1989. Between June and September of that year, between 
the Polish elections in early June and the beginning of Leipzig's Monday demon-
strations in mid-September, only Hungary was on the road to democratization. 
The Hungarian negotiations occurred with the participation of three sides: the 
MSZMP [the communist party], the Opposition Roundtable, and the so-called 
"Third Side" (which included the satellite organizations of the communist party 
and had been invited tojóin the talks by the MSZMP). Despite some suggestions 
to the contrary from reformist circles the Opposition Roundtable refused to nego-
tiate with the incumbent cabinet and insisted on the idea of bilateral talks only 
with the communist party. The opposition wanted to draw a symbolic line be-
tween "us" and "them." Had the change of regimes already taken place, the oppo-
sition would then have negotiated the policy issues with the cabinet. But in the 
early summer of 1989 that was not yet the case. The Hungarian Constitution still 
declared that "the leading force of our society is the Hungarian Socialist Worker's 
Party." 
In such a situation the opposition had to negotiate with the real holder of power: 
the communist party. The cabinet was not against the transition; it was the com-
munist party that symbolized the old regime and stood to be the obstacle of change. 
As a compromise, however, the Opposition Roundtable accepted the representa-
tives of some of the satellite organizations of the Party as participants. Therefore, 
the negotiations became trilateral discussions. 
In formal terms the negotiations were designed to occur on three levels (ple-
nary sessions, middle-level sessions and working sessions) between three negoti-
ating parties, and included the participation of sixteen organizations represented 
by altogether 573 individuals. (For the structure of the National Roundtable talks, 
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see Appendix 1.) During these three summer months of 1989 Hungary captured 
the attention of the international press. During that summer the democratization 
process in Hungary was not yet completed; it was just in the making. Although the 
negotiators were divided in their tactical and strategic considerations, and some of 
them were "ultra-moderates," they did not have to compromise on the outcome of 
the talks. Their compromises concerned only the modes of the transition. 
Among the members of the Opposition Roundtable some political parties, the 
ultra-moderates, were ready to offer strategic concessions. Nevertheless, those 
parties that differed primarily in their tactical rather than their strategic considera-
tions kept the ultra-moderates in the background. The moderates controlled the 
ultra-moderates by engaging in tactical compromises, while the radicals played 
within the rules of the game by following self-limiting political behavior and urg-
ing the moderates to limit their tactical concessions. This delicate balance was 
characteristic of the internally fragile Opposition Roundtable, which despite its 
internal fragility was able to stay together until the agreement of September 1989. 
(For the internal divisions of the Opposition Roundtable and the National 
Roundtable talks see Appendix 2.) 
Transitions are usually pictured in the literature as elite games.6 True, it is hard 
to form a democracy without the existence of an elite/counter-elite, which are 
both willing to commit themselves to negotiating frames for a democratic proc-
ess. Since Schumpeter it has been commonly held that elites and democracy are 
not incompatible concepts, both are important.7 Still, I would not subscribe com-
pletely to the idea that the Hungarian transition was only a game of the elite groups. 
It was an elite-driven process, but it was not fully an elitist exchange. There was 
interplay between the masses and the elite; and the elite and non-elite linkages 
were observable on many different occasions.8 On March 15, 1989, for instance, 
there was a huge mass demonstration in Budapest, where speakers openly called 
for a unification of the opposition because they recognized the danger that the 
communist party might divide the opposition by negotiating with its representa-
tives one by one.9 On May 1 there was a huge demonstration in a Budapest park. 
It had been organized by independent trade unions and attended by tens of thou-
sands. And finally, of course, on June 16 the reburial of former Prime Minister 
Imre Nagy and his fellow martyrs from the 1956 revolution drew 250,000 partici-
pants and revealed massive popular support for the opponents of the communist 
regime.10 
The negotiators could feel the support of ordinary men and women even after 
the agreement of September 18, 1989, when some parties from the Opposition 
Roundtable started a petition campaign for a referendum to settle the unresolved 
questions of the talks by popular decision. In a matter of three weeks, they were 
able to collect more than 200,000 signatures on the streets. So the negotiated revo-
lution in Hungary went well beyond the scope of small, well-organized elite groups. 
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The negotiations were supported by large masses and led to the first post-commu-
nist free elections in 1990. 
International factors also played a role: most notably the visit of U.S. President 
George Bush and the support of Soviet party chief Mikhail Gorbachev.11 Internal 
pressures from below as well as external pressure from the Western democratic 
communities both proved to be important. The by-elections in late July reinforced 
the notion that the opposition had gained strength. It is true that until March 1990 
none of the negotiating parties' positions had been legitimized by democratic elec-
tions. Still, the emerging political society clearly supported the self-appointed in-
tellectual groups' struggle for democracy. 
The Participants 
in the National Roundtable Talks 
The participants of the negotiated revolution of 1989 had arrived from many 
different places and with very different biographies. Then one day they found 
themselves sitting next to each other and discussing the issues of democratic tran-
sition.12 Depending on their degree of involvement, they spent weeks or months 
together debating the future of their country. And after the historic moment had 
passed, they all went their own way. Some became professional politicians in the 
different party elites; others went into business; still others returned to their previ-
ous careers. For some the experience proved to be a crucial turning point in their 
lives, while for others it was just a short excursion into the world of politics and 
left no lasting effects. 
Although by now most of the data is available, no exhaustive analysis has been 
made of the social and political backgrounds of the 573 participants of the 
roundtable talks. From our former and still unfinished investigations I can sum-
marize some major findings on the comparison of the participants according to 
their age, gender, profession and places of origin. Those who were bora between 
1944 and 1953 made up more than one-third of the participants. This generation 
was strongly influenced by the opening up of the Hungarian regime in 1968 and 
by the reform period from 1968 to 1972. They had also been impressed by certain 
Western cultural and political tendencies of the late sixties. The second largest age 
group was composed of the youngest participants. One-fourth of the participants 
was born after 1954; consequently they were age thirty-five or younger in 1989. 
As a whole those under forty-five composed 64% of the negotiators. The relative 
youth of the negotiators is remarkable because until the second half of the 1980s 
the old regime was led by a gérontocratie oligarchy of first generation commu-
nists, who tended to regard even fifty-year-old cadres as youngsters. These data 
suggest that those members of the MSZMP who were willing to negotiate and 
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therefore participated in the roundtable talks mainly came from the less ideologi-
cal, more pragmatic, second generation. Although the MSZMP negotiators were 
still on average a bit older than the other participants, they were already signifi-
cantly younger than the first communist generation. One of the "secrets" of the 
smoothness of the transition was that a generational change in the lower and mid-
dle level ranks of the MSZMP had preceded the regime change. 
The MSZMP negotiators came basically from three different groups. Some 
came from the headquarters of the Party and represented a relatively more "hard-
line" position. Others came from different secretariates in and around the Németh 
cabinet. These included people such as advisors to Imre Pozsgay, Péter Medgyessy 
and the like, who were strongly in favor of reforms. Finally, a number of MSZMP 
negotiators came from various ministries and different executive bodies of the 
state administration. These included lawyers, economic experts and bureaucrats, 
who often did not consider themselves to be "political animals," and some of 
whom were not even members of the communist party. 
The Opposition Roundtable was a mix of generations covering everybody from 
the oldest (BZSBT, FKGP, KDNP, MNP, MSZDP) to the youngest (Fidesz). The 
historical experiences of the oldest and the youngest members of the opposition 
differed a great deal. While the elderly representatives of the former groups were 
the most cautious in the negotiations, the young Fidesz representatives, who had 
not personally experienced the full rigidity of the regime behaved most radically. 
As far as the Third Side was concerned, there was no over-represented age group 
among its members. 
Of the participants 87% were men and only 13% were women. The proportion 
of women was only 8% among the representatives of the Opposition Roundtable, 
while their proportion reached 21% among the negotiators of the Third Side. Part 
of the explanation for the relatively high percentage of women in this group is that 
the representatives of the Alliance of Hungarian Women were included in the 
Third Side. At the same time the Third Side was the most politically weightless 
party in the negotiations. It seems that there was a negative correlation between 
the importance of a political organization and the participation of women in that 
organization. One can form a hypothesis by saying that first, the more "historic" 
the organization, the less representation was given to women; and two, the closer 
a party stood to power, the fewer opportunities were offered to women in its ranks. 
The data concerning the educational and professional background of the par-
ticipants makes clear that almost exclusively intellectuals, or professionals, par-
ticipated in the negotiations. Their proportion reached 90% among the partici-
pants. Most of them - one-third of all participants - came from "freelance intel-
lectuals," while others came most commonly from the legal-administrative sphere 
and from the state-owned companies. Among the MSZMP delegates, the propor-
tion of administrative-govemmental professions was 75%. Most of the MSZMP 
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delegates preferred to define themselves as "experts" rather than as "party cad-
res." Independent intellectuals were far over-represented in the organizations of 
the Opposition Roundtable, where their proportion reached 70%. (Due to Fidesz, 
there were more than a dozen university students as well.) The parents of half of 
the intellectuals had also been intellectuals. Multiple generation intellectuals were 
characteristic in the ranks of MDF, SZDSZ and the League of Independent Trade 
Unions (FSZDL). First generation intellectuals dominated the MSZMP, and these 
were also notable in the ranks of FKGP and Fidesz. 
If we look at the twelve Working Committees, we will not be surprised to find 
that people with degrees in economics dominated the committees concerned with 
the economy. Following Hungarian traditions that reached back centuries, law-
yers took the lead in the debates of the political committees. The lawyers formed 
the majority in all but one political committee. People with degrees in the arts and 
the humanities ruled the committee that discussed the reform of the media; and 
people born in Budapest constituted 50% of the participants. The rest came in 
roughly equal proportions from other cities, towns, and villages. But in the actual 
negotiations, however, the inhabitants of Budapest were far over-represented, due 
to the simple fact that the talks took place in the Parliament building in the capital, 
and people living in the countryside could not afford to travel to Budapest two or 
three times a week. 
Only 10% of the participants did anything before 1989 that could be judged as 
even moderate oppositionist activity. By oppositionist activity we mean signing a 
petition, disseminating samizdat journals in friendly circles, or participating in an 
opposition meeting (in Monor, Szarvas, or Lakitelek), or in movements (such as 
the independent peace or environmentalist groups). Just as most of the members 
of Hungarian society, 90% of the participants had remained silent during the Kádár 
era. Only one-third of the participants in the negotiations ran for office in the first 
free elections in March-April 1990, and only one-fifth of them did so during the 
second elections in 1994.13 
To sum up, the "regime changing elite" of the negotiators was younger and 
better educated than the members of the previous elite. Many negotiators held 
degrees in economics, law, or one of the humanities. These people were over-
whelmingly males from Budapest. Many belonged to the "freelance" intellectual 
circles, while others can be associated with various government bureaucracies. 
Although this new, or transitory, elite was much better educated and more innova-
tive than the leadership circles of the Kádár regime, in terms of male/female rep-
resentation it remained just as segregated as the old elite had been. 
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Political Values and Visions 
Among the most important political values of 1989,1 would like to discuss the 
following: freedom, non-violence, sovereignty, representative government, con-
sensual democracy, and civil society. The most important vision of the future con-
cerned a democratic society, which "returns to Europe" and enjoys widespread 
social welfare, a market economy, representative government, and an internation-
ally neutral military. 
Among the political values expressed by the participants of the roundtable talks 
one should above all mention the idea of freedom, which was understood both as 
a liberal and as a democratic value. Freedom as a liberal value meant the possibil-
ity that people finally could exercise their human rights and civil liberties. They 
could freely talk to each other, both privately and publicly. The press was declared 
to be free. The rights to associate and form political parties were also considered 
to be the inevitable rights of all citizens. Freedom was understood negatively rather 
than positively. This meant that the state (the Party, the police, the military, in 
short the government) should stay away from individual citizens and should not 
harass, disturb or control them. This constituted a freedom from something, free-
dom from the intervention of the state. Such an understanding of freedom clearly 
resulted from an aggregation of two major political influences. First, the roundtable 
participants' idea of freedom derived from the legacy of dissent in East Central 
Europe. This dissent placed a high value on human rights and an equally high 
value on human dignity (see the writings of Benda, Bibó, Havel, Konrád, Kundera, 
Kuron, Michnik, Patocka, and others). On the other hand, this concept of freedom 
also owed a debt to the then dominant Western neo-liberal and neo-conservative 
ideologies represented by theorists such as Hayek and Friedman, as well as by 
politicians such as Thatcher and Reagan. 
The democratic conception of freedom was understood as a popular sover-
eignty, recovered after decades of Soviet occupation, during which the presence 
of the Soviets and the Red Army always strongly influenced the political calcula-
tions. Interestingly, democracy was understood as a representative form of gov-
ernance, where people exercise their constitutional powers not so much directly, 
but rather through the activities of their elected representatives. If democracy, as 
Robert Dahl emphasized, consists of three major elements: competition, partici-
pation and civil liberties, it is interesting to note that the Hungarians emphasized 
the first and the third components and did not speak much about the second. Since 
communism based itself on the forced, involuntary participation of the masses, 
people were not eager to insist on the value of political mobilization from the top 
to the bottom. In a way they preferred a liberal, "non-participatory" democracy. 
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One of the reasons why the Hungarian regime change was so smooth lies in its 
cautiously defended peacefulness. Non-violence was highly valued and taken se-
riously by all sides. I would even say that non-violence was viewed as almost as 
important as freedom and remains among the central legacies of 1989. The nego-
tiators desired non-violence, accompanied by negotiations, and a tended to strive 
for a consensus. Ordinary people did not want to repeat the revolution of 1956. 
But their behavior was also influenced by the evolutionist strategy of the opposi-
tion. Nor did the communist holders of power want to initiate violence. Both sides 
were waiting for each other to respond with violence; but fortunately no one did. 
The determination for non-violent conflict resolution was accompanied by the 
then still vital legacy of self-limiting political behavior. Even the so-called radical 
opposition was, in fact, quite moderate in comparison with other radical demo-
cratic oppositions, especially those of Latin America. This value came from the 
decade-long co-operation of the democratic oppositions of Poland, Hungary, and 
Czechoslovakia. The high moral value of non-violence, among other political 
values, was just recently hotly debated and re-evaluated in relation to the NATO 
air strikes in Yugoslavia. In the spring of 1999 there was a split in Hungarian 
public opinion on how to evaluate the NATO intervention, which followed the 
crisis in Kosovo. Members of one camp felt that the intervention went against the 
legacy of 1989, while people in the other camp felt that, after all, freedom was 
more important than non-violence. People had to re-think whether non-violence 
should be evaluated as highly as freedom. 
The reason why non-violence was so important lies in the violent legacy of 
1956. Everybody wanted to avoid another bloody revolution. Just as in the case of 
Poland, the legacy of 1980-81 constituted the starting point for the negotiation 
process all over East Central Europe. In Hungary learning the lessons of non-
violence proved to be a long process. Nevertheless, this peaceful, consensus-build-
ing, deliberative process formed democracy through negotiations and in a non-
violent way. The ideal form of democracy was therefore seen as a consensual 
democracy. The participants in the negotiations agreed that transitory institutions 
might survive the period of transition. Later they will be re-established as insepa-
rable parts of the new democracy. This consensualism was later harshly criticized 
by the radical Right, which wanted a more sweeping change in the power relations 
of the elite. Prime Minister József Antall, the leader of the MDF government, had 
a famous reply to these claims. He said that the radicals should have made a revo-
lution ("tetszettek volna forradalmat csinálni"), if they wanted a complete change 
of the elite. This is not to suggest that overarching consensualism is the ideal form 
of democracy, but this attitude reflected perhaps a more naive approach to democ-
racy, which had been current during the transition. The consensualist views had 
been influenced by many different thinkers, from Rousseau to Lijphart, and the 
theorists of civil society. 
THE ROUNDTABLE TALKS OF 1989 249 
Up until 1989 the victory of democracy was imagined as a victory of civil 
society over the state. A strong state was understood as a sign of a weak democ-
racy and vice versa. One interesting feature of the Opposition Roundtable was 
that it transformed wishes concerning a united front, an umbrella organization of 
opposition, into the reality of a newly emerging political elite. This new political 
elite could be characterized as internally divided and conflict ridden, but also as 
the co-operative, consensus oriented body of the opposition. 
Democracy is about conflicts, conflicting values, and interests. Decisions should 
be made on the democratic principle of majority rule and the liberal principles of 
equal human rights and civil liberties. As Hirschman and others have pointed out, 
conflicts are not dysfunctional in a democracy. Indeed, they are the very essence 
of it. The point is not to eliminate conflicts in the name of consensualism, but to 
channel the conflicts through the functioning democratic institutions. Political vi-
sions were based on the idea of a "return to Europe" and the new Hungarian 
politicians took it almost for granted that "the West" would be eager to embrace 
the newcomers and accept them into the world of democracy. Ten years later we 
can safely say that this has not proven to be the case. The MDF first advocated the 
idea of a "third way" but then in order to promote a safer and less painful transi-
tion abandoned it and started to emphasize Konrád Adenauer's "social market 
economy." The liberal parties, on the other hand, influenced by contemporary 
neo-liberalism, spoke of a "liberal market economy," based on a non-interven-
tionist state.14 For a while Finlandization served as a model for Hungary, and the 
development of Austria was repeatedly mentioned as well. Both cases suggested a 
militarily neutral status for the country. At that time such neutrality constituted the 
best that could be hoped for. Only beginning in 1990 did some politicians start to 
speak of joining NATO. At that time the European Community (later Union) was 
still far more popular than NATO because it was identified with welfare, and peo-
ple did not feel any external fear that might induce them to think of joining NATO. 
This public attitude only started to change after the coup in Moscow in August 
1991 and, most visibly, after the war in the former Yugoslavia. 
Historical References 
I have already mentioned the legacy of the 1956 revolution as a pattern that 
most of participants in the regime hoped to avoid. The only exception was the 
Hungarian October Party, led by György Krassó, which did not participate in the 
Roundtable Talks and opted for a revolutionary strategy. But this party remained 
on the margins of political life. The Hungarian October Party criticized the nego-
tiating partners as different elite groups talking over the people's heads and sug-
gested that the parties at the roundtable talks were only interested in following 
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their own self interests and not the common good. All other parties insisted on 
taking a peaceful path from dictatorship to democracy and thus refused to take a 
revolutionary road. Nevertheless, all of the parties had to deal with the legacy of 
1956. They could not possibly ignore it. The revolution crushed by the Soviets 
and the execution of Imre Nagy, the revolutionary prime minister, made the politi-
cal position of those who supported János Kádár and associated themselves with 
his policies morally unacceptable. To remind the public that Kádárism had been 
born in the state of an "original sin" was the best tool for the opposition to de-
legitimize the communist regime. The events of 1956 were important as long as 
they served the opposition's goal of distinguishing itself from the Kádár regime 
and proved useful for denouncing the Kádár system on moral grounds. While for 
some speakers at the reburial of Imre Nagy and his fellow martyrs Nagy consti-
tuted a role model in politics, for the young radical Viktor Orbán, Nagy was an 
honorable person only because he had been able to rid himself of his communist 
beliefs. Nobody from the opposition wanted to follow either Nagy's ideas of a 
"democratic socialism," or the revolutionary practice of 1956. After June 16,1989, 
the moment when communism was morally sentenced to death publicly in Buda-
pest, the legacy of 1956 as the first anti-totalitarian and anti-communist revolu-
tion, faded away as well. 
Thus the participants of the Roundtable Talks had to search for other usable 
historical references. As it turned out, Hungarian history had produced some similar 
patterns of change, which offered some symbolic rediscovery for 1989. First and 
foremost, during the "lawful revolution of 1848" the lower noble strata had initi-
ated a bloodless transition, a "glorious revolution,"15 which was supposed to have 
led from a more traditional to a more civic and liberal regime. In 1848 the old 
parliament had passed the bills necessary for the change that made the famous 
Batthyány cabinet possible. This government had included ministers such as 
Kossuth, Széchenyi, and Eötvös. Historians at the roundtable, including György 
Szabad, József Antall and András Gergely, often referred to the example of 1848 
as a model worthy of being followed. 
The re-start of political life after World War II constituted yet another reference 
point. The bill 1946:1 on the legal status of the president of the republic was often 
quoted as the "little constitution" of those times.16 It contained legislation on the 
procedure for electing the president, and by adopting that bill, the opposition wanted 
to follow the parliamentary traditions of Hungarian politics. They did not favor a 
presidential system. Politically, 1848 provided the idea of national liberalism that 
demonstrated the harmony of the values of "homeland" and "progress." On the 
other hand 1945 supplied a legacy of a peacefully established democratically ori-
ented regime based on a center-right umbrella party, which was at that time the 
Independent Smallholders' Party. Both legacies were seen as focusing on institu-
tional rearrangement rather than on revolutionary upheaval. The establishment of 
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the historic link of 1848-1945-1989 was an important achievement by the Oppo-
sition Roundtable.17 This connection allowed the Opposition Roundtable to present 
itself as the heir to the peaceful and radical democratic traditions of Hungarian 
history. 
As far as the foreign historical and political references were concerned, ex-
plicit references were made to the Spanish way to democracy in the 1970s. Both 
government and opposition studied the Spanish transition quite thoroughly. But 
the most important foreign reference point was obviously Poland. The idea of an 
"ethical civil society,"18 and the new political evolutionary theories were taken 
from the experiences of the Polish opposition. Moreover, frequent personal con-
tacts were developed between the members of the Polish and the Hungarian oppo-
sitions. Members of the Hungarian democratic opposition had long ago estab-
lished friendships in Poland with Michnik, Kuron, Smolar and others, while the 
activists of the new Hungarian trade unions were eager to establish links with 
Solidarity in order to learn about the Poles' negotiating experiences. 
1989 Revisited: On the Costs and Benefits 
of the Smooth Change 
The roundtable negotiations of 1989 created an unprecedented historical situa-
tion in which a political elite was able to craft the constitution and the institutional 
framework of a democracy. Nevertheless, in many countries, it was not seen as 
"clean" process. The "original sin" of the negotiations of 1989 was that those talks 
had included the communists, as the MSZMP leaders also participated in this 
crafting process. Although the communists were sitting on the other side of the 
table, they were undeniably there. The uneasiness of the former opposition forces 
with this situation was accurately represented recently in a statement by the cur-
rent Hungarian Prime Minister Viktor Orbán. Although Orbán had been an active 
and even an enthusiastic participant in the 1989 negotiations, he later changed his 
mind and observed that the costs of the negotiations were actually higher than 
their benefits. In June 1999 he gave a speech in Vienna, at another conference on 
the roundtable talks. Orbán said: 
I ask myself, is there anything that should have remained from 1989. 
In a vague sense many people think that it was the first year of lib-
erty. Others, and I include myself, believe that 1989 was the last year 
of dictatorship. Consequently, I think the less that has remained from 
1989, the better.19 
Once again this is the question of the bottle that can be seen as half-full, or as 
half-empty, at the same time. Obviously 1989 was the last year of the dictatorship 
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because it was also the year of the collapse of the dictatorship. Orbán's statement 
served to fulfil some ideological purposes. He wanted to emphasize the need for a 
sharper discontinuity, and by so doing he distinguished between the 1989-ers and 
the 1990-ers. And he added that the '89ers are the people of continuity because 
they were sitting there and negotiating with the communists. On top of that, he 
basically claimed that the '89ers were only interested in slow changes and partial 
changes. They were interested in modifying the institutional order but did not 
want to change the personnel in the media. Moreover, they were not in favor of a 
fair privatization or a fair economic transformation. On the other hand, as op-
posed to the '89ers, for Orbán, the '90ers are the people of a radical break. They 
are the people of free elections, and they are not going to enter into the mish-
mashing of things in the way the '89ers were doing. 
Orbán continued by describing some of the costs of 1989: namely that former 
communists remain in the forefront in the public and commercial media, and that 
during the privatization process the former communists could transfer public money 
into their own private hands. This is an interesting argument; for it attempts to 
portray the roundtable talks as the safest way for communists to preserve them-
selves for the future. If we study the round table process in the light of this criti-
cism, we may note that the discussions had a formal structure that covered, at least 
theoretically, both political and economic issues. And the political negotiations 
proved to be far more important than the talks on the economy. Why was this so? 
Because the Opposition Roundtable, which favored negotiations, claimed that they 
were there to legislate new bills. So, for those people, who were at the Opposition 
Roundtable, the major goal was to achieve popular sovereignty, or pluralistic de-
mocracy, and they were against all of those organizations that had allied them-
selves with organizations having monopolistic powers. So, they were interested in 
designing the fundamental institutional changes necessary for a new democracy. 
They were not so much involved in discussions about privatization and the issues 
of economic transformation. Why was this so? Were they not interested in the 
economic matters at all? No. They simply did not feel entitled and legitimized by 
the people to discuss issues of economic policy. Even at the beginning of the talks, 
the Opposition Roundtable resisted re-writing the constitution. The participants 
argued that the discussions over economic matters should be carried out in the 
future by the freely elected parliament and the new government. 
In order to achieve economic change one can set up a new institutional order in 
a matter of months but it is much more difficult to control a privatization proc-
esses and design an economic transformation in practice. And, after all, these 
people on the opposition side of the roundtable talks were uncertain whether they 
should control privatization at all. Although rhetorically they were always against 
it, the negotiators finally accepted a spontaneous transformation. They thought 
that they had started to build a democratic/market society in order to build capital-
THE ROUNDTABLE TALKS OF 1989 253 
ism. So, if they were in favor of capitalism, they could not oppose spontaneous 
privatization, which was understood as original capital accumulation, as the "hard-
ware" of capitalism. The participants argued that in terms of history it is not par-
ticularly important who is going to be the new owner. The important thing was not 
so much to put good or reliable guys into positions of ownership but to change 
fundamentally the economic and political relationships. They thought in this way 
perhaps because of their ideological foundations, but also because the outgoing 
technocratic communist elite had already secured the necessary privatization bills 
before the trilateral talks began in June 1989. The laws on the companies and the 
economic transformation had been already enacted in 1988 or early 1989. So, 
there was not much talk on this issue at the roundtable talks. The economic com-
mittees in the roundtable talks found themselves in a vacuum. Members of these 
committees were sitting together, speaking about privatization and agrarian poli-
cies, but they did not conclude with any decisions. Finally, these questions were 
left to the Blue Ribbon committee and the Bridge committee, which were to be 
formed by late 1989. 
While political change and institutional change were under the more or less 
strict oversight of the public, or at least those processes were more visible, the 
games of economic transformation proceeded largely unnoticed. The legislation 
of the outgoing government and the installation of expert committees for discuss-
ing the strategy of economic transformation were much closer to the elitist design 
of economic change than was the case in the political negotiations. 
Some of the anger expressed by those who only came to power late, or only in 
the post-privatization phase, may be understandable. Still, I think, it is their mis-
fortune, and I do not think that a "second revolution" needs to be implemented. I 
think, those radicals who would like to re-start the revolution cannot win elec-
tions. Those who are playing with revolutionary rhetoric in order to stimulate 
another "regime change" can only lose. The change of regimes has been accom-
plished, and another democratic regime change is not on the agenda of the major-
ity of society. However, these critics wanted to expand the meaning of transition 
from one of narrow institutional political change to an overarching concept that 
included broad cultural, economic, and political transformation. Post-1989 radi-
calism has its democratic limits, and this was recognized recently by Prime Min-
ister Orbán, who has claimed that the change of regimes is finally over. 
If we enter a discussion of the cost/benefit analysis of the roundtable discus-
sion, then I believe that the benefits will prove to be far more significant than the 
costs. The costs are mainly observable in the collective mentality. Many people 
feel that the economic transformation and the redistribution of economic power 
did not proceed democratically. People feel that they have somehow been robbed 
by the "Big Business" that has emerged. The managers, the technocratic elite - all 
those who were already co-opted by the old Kádárist elite - are viewed as the 
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ultimate winners of the transformation. Ordinary people tend to think that they 
were the victims of communism before the change of regimes, and now they are 
the victims of globalization. 
In terms of the narrower political change, there was a clear elite settlement, a 
rapid re-negotiation of the political and institutional-legal situation.20 In terms of 
economic change, however, it was a mixture of elite settlement, co-optation, and 
convergence. These were parallel processes. There were no competing elite groups 
for the new technocracy. The "new entrepreneurs" of the late Kádár era won the 
battle. Being still close to the circles of power, the economic elite of the late Kádár 
era could not be excluded from the benefits of the economic transformation.21 
Like it or not, they were a part of the game. Their success was part of the price to 
be paid to avoid revolutionary methods and to accomplish a peaceful transition. 
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Appendix 1 
THE STRUCTURE OF THE NATIONAL ROUNDTABLE TALKS 
IN HUNGARY, 1989 
Plenary Session 
(Agreements, political declarations) 
(3 delegates from each participating organizations) 
Middle-level Sessions 
Political coordinating committee Economic and social committee 
(Defining the rules and principles (Strategic issues in combating 
of the democratic transition.) economic and social crisis.) 
(2 delegates from each organizations) (2 delegates from each organizations) 
Working Committees 
1. Political committees 2. Economic committees 
(5-5 delegates from the three sides) (5-5 delegates from the three sides) 
1.1 Constitution drafting 2.1 Debt problem, structural change, 
(President, constitutional court) inflation 
1.2 Legal regulation of political parties 2.2 The social consequences of the 
(Party finance, party assets) economic crisis 
1.3 Electoral law 2.3 Property reform, privatization 
1.4 Remaking of the penal code and the 2.4 Land reform. (The problem of 
Rules of criminal procedural law agricultural co-operatives.) 
1.5 Liberation and regulation of the mass 
media. (Public TV, newspapers) 
2.5 Principles of the budget regulation 
1.6 Legal guarantees for the completion of the 2.6 Anti-monopoly regulations, 
non-violent transition to democracy protection. 
Goodwill Committee 
(To solve problems in the negotiating process, operating every level.) 
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PARTICIPANTS AND THEIR POSITION 
AT THE NATIONAL ROUNDTABLE TALKS 
(in fact trilateral talks) 
1. MSZMP - Hungarian Socialist Worker's Party (Communist Party) 
Internally divided, but increasingly dominated by reformist elements, willing to negotiate and 
compromise. 
2. Opposition roundtable (9 organizations) 
"Ultra-moderates " 
Bajcsy-Zsilinszky Society (BZSBT) 
Christian Democratic Party 
Hungarian People's Party (MNP) 
"Moderates " 
Hungarian Democratic Forum (MDF) 
Independent Smallholders Party (FKGP) 
League of Free Trade Unions (FSZDL) 
Social Democrats (MSZDP) 
"Self-limiting Radicals " 
Alliance of Free Democrats (SZDSZ) 
Federation of Young Democrats (Fidesz) 
3. Third side (7 organizations) 
National Council of Trade Unions (SZOT) 
Patriotic People's Front (HNF) 
Democratic Youth Alliance (Demisz) 
Women's Alliance (MNSZ) 
Ferenc Münnich Society (MFT) 
Alliance of Resistance Fighters and 
Anti-fascists (MEASZ) 
Left Alternative 
(Center-right, cultural-political association) 
("Historic" party, center-right, Christian/social) 
("Historic" party, center-left, third way) 
(New; centrist, national/liberal/conservative, mixed) 
("Historic" party, agrarian/traditionalist) 
(New; union led by urban intellectuals) 
("Historic" party, internally divided) 
(New; social/economic liberal, former dissidents) 
(New; liberal/radical/alternative, students etc.) 
(official unions, puppet organization of the CP) 
(reform-minded; umbrella organization) 
(formerly: Communist Youth League) 
(puppet organization of the CP) 
(hard-liner, Cold War-communists) 
(WWII communists, former partisans) 
(intellectuals in the humanities) 

POLAND'S TRANSITION AS POLITICAL 
REPOLARIZATION 
JACKBIELASIAK 
Indiana University, Bloomington, IN, 
USA 
Poland's development since the collapse of communism reveals a contradic-
tion. On the one hand, Poland is often represented as the paradigmatic success 
story of the postcommunist economic and political transformation.1 On the eco-
nomic front, the country has demonstrated the fastest growth rate and recovery in 
the region, despite the fact that it was perceived as an economic basket case on the 
eve of the transition.2 On the political front, Poland is solidly in the forefront of 
the consolidated democracies, with firm institutional and constitutional founda-
tions and strong popular support for the values of democracy.3 There is no doubt 
that Poland has joined the family of democratic states. 
On the other hand, these accomplishments occurred in the context of an "ex-
tremely unstable political landscape."4 Electoral politics and party systems have 
been highly volatile, whether judged by voting preferences, party fragmentation, 
or cabinet instability. Contestation over basic institutions and rules, such as the 
1997 Constitution, has been vociferous and extreme. Collective action beyond the 
bounds of legitimate "normal" political behavior, in the form of strikes or street 
protests, has been a continuing feature of post-1998 Poland. The process of poli-
tics, in short, has often been chaotic and contentious. In this regard, the Polish 
scene is often contrasted with the evolution of its East Central European neighbors. 
The Czech Republic and Hungary in particular are imputed to have solved the 
issue of political stability and institutional sustainability, with the deployment of 
mature party systems and civic political norms.5 
What, then, accounts for the Polish paradox: success and instability? The an-
swer lies in the nature of the political transformation in Poland over the past dec-
ade, which has evolved along two distinct tracks: that of the politics of identity 
and the politics of interest.6 The first centers around a normative world infused 
with values and moral judgements as benchmarks of political communities. In 
this context, politics is built around substantive understandings and goals rather 
than the procedural tenets of democracy. Politics of identity form around norms of 
belonging to particular groups, whether Christian or Moslem in Bosnia, or Catho-
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lie or secular in Poland. The constituencies defined by identity politics are at-
tached to entrenched values build around consensus movements that use a norma-
tive discourse to advance their cause.7 The attachment to identity politics in 
postcommunist Poland is a reflection of the old divide between "we" the people, 
Solidarity and "they" the communist regime. Indeed, it is the persistence of this 
old division in Polish society that has enabled its renewed political uses and the 
return to prior values as the language of contemporary politics. The difficulty with 
such an approach is that identity politics are essentially "indivisible," for norma-
tive and moral judgements cannot be easily compromised and resolved through 
bargaining. The tendency of identity politics, as a result, is to contribute to con-
flict and instability. 
The second track in contemporary Polish politics evolves around the politics of 
interest. In contrast to the previous identity construct, interests are formed around 
economic and social policy issues that are primarily distributive in nature. For that 
very reason, the politics of interest are "divisible," so that differences can be split, 
bargained over, and resolved through compromise. Interest based constituencies 
are specific groups with defined policy preferences over the allocation of social 
and economic goods.8 Rather than restrained by moral and value commitments, 
these groups operate in a political world attuned to the give and take of interests 
and policies. The trend on this track favors political negotiation, compromise, and 
hence stability. 
The Nature of Poland's Transition 
In Poland it is the interfacing between the politics of interest and the politics of 
identity that has contributed to the instability of its democratic pluralism. During 
the initial years of the transition, the attempt to institute a political space defined 
primarily by group interests was thwarted by the persistence of strong values and 
ethical codes associated with the former division between Solidarity and the re-
gime. This produced a dual system, by superimposing identity, value politics upon 
the emergent political process built around interests and policy bargaining. The 
effect was the continued intrusion of norms derived from the past on contempo-
rary politics. Furthermore, the appeal to values favored the recreation of commu-
nities built around identities rather than interests. This was so since the interests of 
many groups associated with the former Solidarity camp were too dispersed and 
too underrepresented to have a meaningful voice in the country's transformation. 
Since many groups were blocked from effective participation in the policy proc-
ess, the temptation to return to the political contestation of ethical positions in-
creased significantly. Thus during the latter part of the decade, the voice of nor-
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mative, identity politics became ever more pronounced in the discourse of Polish 
political life. In turn, the renewed emphasis on identity politics destabilized the 
political process. 
The Politics of Interests 
The collapse of communism throughout the Soviet bloc ushered in a new type 
of politics. The single voice of a dominant ideology and ruling party gave way to 
multiple demands and new political actors. In the emergent democratization, one 
of the primary questions was which issues were the most significant dividing line 
of postcommunism. The adaptation of market oriented programs rapidly altered 
the socioeconomic landscape, particularly in a country like Poland, which em-
barked immediately on a strategy of shock therapy. This policy increasing differ-
entiation around income, job, or welfare distinctions. The interests of diverse so-
cial groups were being shaped, even created, by the rapid economic transforma-
tion. The question, however, was how these interests were to be represented in 
politics and engaged in policy deliberations. The emergence of socioeconomic 
differences was not sufficient, what was also necessary was the translation of 
these divisions into salient political cleavages.9 
In the context of postcommunism, this was not a simple task, precisely because 
of the rapidly changing economic and political environment.10 On the one hand, 
this is due to the highly fluid sociological picture associated with the transition. 
The movement from a command to a market economy, from a monopolistic to a 
pluralistic polity, involves many simultaneous, complex tasks that encompass eco-
nomic, social, historical, and cultural issues. Individuals and social groups have 
difficulty discerning priorities among the multiplicity of transformations; and re-
main disoriented by the apparent chaos of the transition. The confusion is en-
hanced by uncertainty, for many people cannot determine how the processes of 
marketization and democratization will affect their standing in society. They thus 
defer the expression of political preferences. In political terms, this signifies that 
interest groups tend to be weak in terms of identification, coherence, and organi-
zation. 
One consequence is difficulty in channeling interests into political remedies by 
finding appropriate channels for representation. The political side of the transi-
tion, i.e. the propensity for the emergence of numerous political entrepreneurs 
forming new parties to capture a share of the electorate, further exacerbates the 
problem. The removal of the communist monopoly opens up the opportunity for 
competition, but one that is largely unrestrained by past commitments or linkages. 
Politics becomes an open arena, where many ambitions are expressed through a 
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variety of political programs, ideologies, and interests. Precisely because there are 
so many competitors in the political arena, the ability of the voters to distinguish 
among them is blurred and confusing. In such conditions, voters find problematic 
selection and attachment to specific political parties and programs. This political 
chaos reinforces the already complex sociological picture of the postcommunist 
transition, reinforcing the fragility of democratization. Interests tend to be too 
weak and politics too fluid to assure the stability of political development. 
Political and institutional factors combined to reinforce this tendency in Po-
land, and fracture the political scene at the dawn of democratization.11 On the 
political side, the solidarity exemplified by the movement ofthat name and built 
previously on opposition to communist power, splintered into a variety of groups, 
interests, and personal ambitions. As a political force, Solidarnosc was no longer 
an "umbrella" movement bringing together various tendencies but an expression 
of rival political opinions. This disintegration reinforced the already confusing 
socioeconomic conditions associated with the turn to a market economy. The 
multiplicity of interests was exacerbated by institutional choices for the new de-
mocracy. In particular, an election system based on full proportional representa-
tion for the Sejm contributed to the ambitions of political actors, who were not 
restrained by barriers to electoral success, such as a minimum legal threshold for 
representation in parliament. The result was an extreme fragmentation of the Polish 
political space around the October 1991 elections.12 At the time, for example, 111 
electoral lists competed for voter support, and 29 different political lists gained 
representation in the Sejm. The vote was splintered among numerous parties, with 
no single one attaining more than 14% of the vote. The fragmentation of the po-
litical landscape revealed the existence of multiple axes of competition around 
several different dimensions: left-right economic issues, tradition-modernity con-
cerns, religious-secular differences, Europeanist-nationalist sentiments, were all 
part of the mix. It became difficult to translate the diversity political cleavages 
into effective governance, since many different political parties laid claim to rep-
resentation of these interests. Governing coalitions were fragile, and contributed 
to the instability of the political scene through successive cabinet turnovers. 
The fragmentation and volatility of the political process during the early phase 
of Polish democratization needed to be redressed to produce a more stable politi-
cal environment.13 While all political forces recognized the need, there were sub-
stantial disagreements as to the specific remedial course. In The end, a consensus 
was reached on instituting a minimum 5% vote threshold for representation in the 
Sejm, so as to preclude participation in the policy making process of parties with 
minimal voters' support. The intent of this innovation was to curb the tendency to 
political fragmentation by imposing both mechanical and strategic constraints on 
the proliferation of parliamentary parties. In the 1993 elections, however, only the 
mechanical effects worked as many politicians did not respond in time to the new 
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rules by altering their strategic behavior. This was especially true of the political 
right, who failed to coalesce around a standard bearer. Instead many parties on the 
right contested the election independently, and were unable to clear the 5% mini-
mum requirement. 
For the political system, this meant that the prior fragmentation was replaced 
by another phenomenon: political disproportionality.14 In the 1993 contest, close 
to 35% of the vote was "wasted," for that portion of the vote was so dispersed 
among numerous parties that none could clear the 5% requirement for entry into 
the legislature, so a third of the electorate was left without parliamentary repre-
sentation. In turn, this produced extreme disproportionality, for the left coalition 
was able to muster 66% of the Sejm's seats based on 36% of voter support. This 
pattern did solve governance instability, but at the cost of political misrepresenta-
tion and legitimacy. So while a left political coalition was able to maintain power 
in the ensuing parliament, it was on the basis of minority support by the Polish 
population. In contrast, the political right had claimed a third of that support but 
due to its splintering was unable to have a voice in legislative policy deliberations. 
The post-1993 disproportionality, in other words, preempted the representation of 
some interests and overstated that of others. This called into question the legiti-
macy of the ruling SLD-PSL (Democratic Left Alliance-Polish Peasant Party) 
coalition, founded by parties previously associated with the communist regime. 
However, to mount an effective challenge to the status quo, the right extra-parlia-
mentary opposition had to revert to the former politics of identity and values. 
The Politics of Values 
The resurgence of normative identities as the primary contestation in Polish 
politics after the 1993 election was driven by the political imbalance created by 
the disproportionality of legislative politics and the continued fragmentation of 
societal interests. To overcome the disequilibrium, politicians on the right turned 
to the former division of the "we" versus "they" to undermine the political out-
come produced by the electoral process and their own strategic failures. To con-
test the procedural legitimacy of the democratic endeavor, the best option was to 
revert to the language of morality and values so as to question the identity of the 
emerging "community" of Poland. The reformed communists had betrayed the 
"true" Poland in the past, and could not be trusted to govern in the name of the 
renewed Polish nation. In that sense, the politics of old came to infuse with new 
vigor the political disputes of the 1990s. 
The net effect of the new political discourse was to repolarize Polish politics 
around the identities of "we" and "they," a division that echoed Polish history 
both distant and proximate.15 In many ways the appeal for popular support around 
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the moral categories of good and evil and the values of unity and community was 
a long-standing practice associated with the historical struggles of the Polish na-
tion against foreign occupation and for resurgence as an independent state. In that 
struggle, the perception of Poland as "Christ among nations" was a deeply in-
grained ethos that helped to preserve Polish culture and traditions. This historical 
path was reinforced by the immediate past of the communist period, when social 
outbursts against an alien regime expressed political struggles as normative, moral 
commitments — visible most forcefully in the Solidarity-regime divide of the 
1980s. This powerful collective memory was an important element of the 
postcommunist transformation, but had been undermined by the give and take of 
interest politics. 
In the mid-1990s, the disfranchised forces of the political right reached for this 
neglected symbolism to reassert their political legitimacy and regain a place in the 
political game. The symbols of old were to serve the needs of today, so the past 
divide along the communist-anticommunist axis was to serve as a political marker. 
The task here was to rebuild the former Solidarity ethos of freedom, dignity, and 
unity as universalistic message, but now serving partisan needs. The inclusive 
notion of national solidarity and of the true Poland was cast as a weapon of the 
political right against the political left, a reformulation that was appealing pre-
cisely because it echoed the values and struggles of the Polish people against 
communism. 
Value Contestation in Polish Politics 
The infusion of values as a currency of politics was manifest in a number of 
ways throughout the second half of the postcommunist decade. Its most signifi-
cant elements were (1) the awakening of dormant, nostalgic movements as the 
primary political actors, (2) the framing of a political discourse of contestation 
around the former struggle between "we" and "they," good and evil. Both these 
factors have shaped the political style of Polish democratization during the latter 
half of the decade, which has come to be characterized increasingly around an 
indivisible, value mode of politics. 
Political Actors 
One of the primary factors affecting development in Poland was the activation 
into politics of institutional actors whose basic identity lay outside the realm of 
political action, notably the trade-union Solidarity and the Polish Catholic Church. 
Of course, these institutions had in the past played an important political role and 
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even in the post-1989 period engaged in public policy discourse. But the results of 
the 1993 parliamentary and 1995 presidential elections signified escalation in their 
public, political visibility, precisely because of the defeat of the forces associated 
with Solidarity and the Church. Their claim as symbols and guardians of the Polish 
nation came into the fore, to safeguard these values against the reviving power of 
the former communist side. 
Most important in the structuring of Polish politics at the time was the reformu-
lation of the Solidarity trade union as an overt political force. Since the defeat of 
communism in 1989, Solidarity has been mainly relegated to and concentrated on 
its role as a union representative of the workers. Its political nature has been ef-
faced by the mushrooming of diverse political parties and groups associated with 
the movement during the anti-Communist struggle. Now, the electoral defeat of 
these forces had deprived that political side of a meaningful presence in the for-
mal institutions of power. To create a new equilibrium, the Solidarity trade union 
moved to form a political movement capable of challenging the dominance of the 
left coalition. To that end, Solidarity became the primary agent in the formation of 
a broad political movement in June 1996, known as Akcja Wyborcza Solidarnosc 
(AWS), the Electoral Action Solidarity. As its very name intones, AWS had a dual 
purpose. One was to engage in electoral politics as a means to revive the fortunes 
of the political stance left without a voice in the aftermath of the 1993 and 1995 
vote. The second was to invoke the tradition and the mystique of the Solidarity 
trade union as a powerful weapon in the political contest. 
In essence, the purpose of the June 1996 action was to revive the pre-1989 
coalition that challenged the communist regime and perform once again the same 
task by defeating the successor communist parties. The Solidarity union was able 
to use its legacy to act as a pivot in the new AWS movement, bringing together a 
variety of political parties, trade unions, family associations, social groups, and 
think tanks. The new political formation was grouped around common roots and 
common values, exemplified foremost by a nationalist and religious identity and 
the former struggle with communist power. In its founding declaration, AWS openly 
proclaimed its identity and its aim as a political undertaking uniting diverse social 
and political groups committed to a rightist political agenda centered on truth and 
solidarity in order to build "an independent, just, and democratic Poland."16 
A similar attempt to mobilize support on the basis of historical roles and na-
tional traditions was played out by the Roman Catholic Church. The hierarchy of 
the church had pursued an active social and political agenda throughout the tran-
sition period, bridging its anticommunist stance in the pre-1989 days with an ef-
fort to find a new place for the church in the days of democratization. The latter 
period was devoted to the safeguarding of religious values in the new Poland. To 
attain that goal, the church clergy and its lay supporters constructed an ambitious 
agenda around the issues of religious education, antiabortion legislation, ratifica-
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tion of the concordat with the Vatican, and a general preservation of Christian 
values in Polish society. These undertakings were not without political conflicts, 
and precisely for that reason placed the Church in a more vulnerable position in 
the aftermath of the 1993 and 1995 election results. Fearful that the victory of the 
postcommunist left and its government would lead to an erosion of its social agenda, 
the Church moved to reassert its political weight by supporting the AWS initiative 
and engaging in the debate on the political front.17 The urgency of the initiative 
was enhanced by the fact that the constitutional process that was to bestow a new 
democratic foundation for the country was coming to fruition, now under the he-
gemony of the postcommunist party coalition. The fear of a Constitution that would 
enshrine values and practices outside the religious nature of Poland was tanta-
mount to a call for political vigilance. The Church engaged in the political debate 
on the constitution to preserve its Poland, one committed to traditional religious 
values. 
On the other side of the political divide, the practice of building political coali-
tions around a diversity of organizations and interests was well established by the 
mid-1990s. The former ruling communists had taken on the mantle of a reformed 
socialist party soon after the collapse of their regime, and had moved to create a 
broad social democratic movement, the Left Democratic Alliance. The latter was 
compromised of the ex-communist SdrP (Social Democracy of Poland) party, the 
previous pro-regime trade union movement OPZZ, and several other leftist trade 
unions and social associations. Nonetheless, the 1993 parliamentary victory cre-
ated the impetus to forge a left ruling coalition with the Polish Peasant Party, itself 
a satellite organization of the communist in the pre-transition period. The post-
1993 ruling coalition was the recreation of forces associated with the communist 
regime, representing a diversity of political actors united foremost by a common 
political heritage rather than similar interests. Indeed, the coalition included sup-
porters of a liberal and statist economy, of religious and secular legislation, and 
pro-Europe integrationists and nationalist protectionists. The point is that the po-
litical identity of this grouping was based in their past association with the com-
munist regime; and was governed by their identity as the "they" of the previous 
political epoch and their fear of a new accounting with the past. 
It is evident that several institutional political actors in the mid-1990s contin-
ued to reflect the old division in Polish politics between pro- and anti-communist 
regime forces. The identity of these movements was vested in their past actions 
and reflected the normative, value divisions of old. Driven by heritage associa-
tions and future concerns, the organization of politics was an echo of "we" the 
people of Solidarity and "they" the rulers of communism. In that sense, the public 
scene was the continuing politicization of institutional arrangements along the 
inherited value differentiation. In a similar vein, it meant the infusion into 
the political realm of actors that were a reflection of past "umbrella" movements 
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rather than "pure" parties. These movements were catchall, heterogeneous en-
claves that grouped together diverse interests but still espoused a common ethos 
along a moral, normative identity that transcended their respective policy prefer-
ences and agendas. 
Political Discourse 
Reference to a normative political worldview was grounded in more than the 
institutional makeup of the political organizations active in Poland's transition. 
Even more so, the political discourse of the past decade was increasingly framed 
in the language of morality, identity and value. In many respects, the construction 
of a new language of politics was vested with a mission mentality driven by the 
struggles of the past.18 First, as noted above, the call was for a collectivist ethos 
that required the sacrifice of distinct interests and separate goals for the common 
good: solidarity was essential for success. More important than the specific inter-
ests of social constituencies was the assurance of the historical mission embodied 
by the anticommunist coalition and the resurrection of the true Poland. Second, 
the very substance of the political discourse was framed along a stance that tran-
scended past and present. The language of politics was a reprise of the national-
liberation movement that fought the regime in the previous era, and had to echo 
the same values and morality to defend the Polish people against the treacherous 
acts of the ex-communists. In these terms, the AWS political position was vested 
in the values that had defined the duality of Polish politics throughout the years of 
communist rule. 
A number of issues came to the forefront during the debate concerning the 
political future of Poland, represented mainly by ratification of the new constitu-
tion and mobilization for a new round of elections in 1997. In these controversies, 
the predominant language of politics was that of morality and history, with a vir-
tual disregard of the economic and social interests that were being transformed by 
the rapid and vast socioeconomic transformation of the country. While the issues 
of contention were varied, they can be grouped round three principal arenas: na-
tional identity, decommunization, and social values. 
The question of national identity took several forms, but was most evident in 
the debate on the constitution.19 The draft worked out in the legislature for ap-
proval by the citizenry was a compromise among different political forces, but 
tied in the eyes of many to the dominating parliamentary side at the time, the 
leftist ruling coalition. For that very reason the extra-parliamentary opposition, 
represented by AWS and supported by the Church, denounced the working ver-
sion of the constitution. It saw the document as failing to reflect the true nature of 
Poland, and perceived it instead as an assault on its basic values, such as sover-
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eignty, faith and family. For some, it was a "foreign" creation written by former 
communists, and thus meriting condemnation as an act of betrayal. Instead, the 
AWS movement and the Church favored an alternative citizens' draft that empha-
sized the historical identity of the Polish nation and culture, tied to God and Chris-
tian virtues. The debate on the constitution produced intense political debate and 
mutual recriminations. The disagreement was particularly contentious in conjunc-
tion with the preamble to the constitution, which sought to define the very nature 
of the new democratic Poland. The eventual solution to the rival understandings 
of Poland's identity was the inclusion of two distinct definitions, reflecting both 
preferences. This resolution on the preamble was not a true "compromise," for 
neither side could give up its particular normative vision of the Polish state. Rather 
the compromise consisted of the inclusion of both versions of Polish identity in 
the constitutional foundation, joining side by side an ethnos definition and a civic 
one. Among the opening words of the 1997 constitution, we read: 
We, the Polish Nation - all citizens of the Republic, Both those who 
believe in God as the source of truth, justice, good and beauty, As 
well as those not sharing such faith but respecting those universal 
values as arising from other sources ... Beholden to our ancestors for 
their labors, their struggle for independence achieved at great sacri-
fice, for our culture rooted in the Christian heritage of the Nation and 
in universal human values. 
The text thus combines two views. One of the Poland as the historical nation 
tied to Christian faith and traditions, defining the very existence of the country 
through past struggles of the Polish people. The other view asserts a civic under-
standing of the country, where citizenship is not a reflection of religious beliefs or 
nationalist traditions but universal and civic values. 
The two definitions of Poland found in the basic document are testimony to the 
politics of identity and values defining the contemporary political scene in the 
country. They represent core elements of a moralistic faith that sees the world in 
terms of right and wrong, of we and they, and of truth and betrayal. Under such 
circumstances, there is little room for a true compromise that helps to narrow the 
difference between the two sides by reducing the difference, and instead moves to 
a solution where both worldviews are simultaneously incorporated into the very 
definition of Poland. Even this solution proved problematic, for the constitutional 
draft was opposed by social forces associated with AWS and the Church, which 
called for a rejection of the document in the referendum. The October 1997 popu-
lar vote did endorse the constitution, by a 54% to 46% margin, but with a turnout 
of only 43% of eligible voters. In the end, then, the acrimonious debate surround-
ing the constitutional issue led to the adoption of the supreme basic law by only 
one-quarter of the Polish citizenry. 
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The problematic nature of the politics of value in Poland was further evident in 
the growing resurgence of the decommunization issue. An earlier attempt sought 
to remove the matter from the political agenda. Thus the first postcommunist Prime 
Minister of Poland, Tadeusz Mazowiecki, proclaimed a policy of the "think line" 
- a clear demarcation between past and present, preferring to look to the future 
rather than settle accounts with the past. But the thick line policy was never fully 
accepted by the entire political spectrum, and was denounced early on by some 
groupings with Solidarity lineage, even becoming fodder for political intrigue. 
The turn to the left in the 1993 and 1995 elections and the ensuing infusion of the 
politics of identity revived the saliency of the issue. The power of ex-communists 
was again visible, and brought into sharp relief the question of settling accounts 
with the past. Opportunity came again in the aftermath of the 1997 election and 
the alteration in power in favor of the AWS coalition. Concerns with the commu-
nists' role in the nation's history became once more a prominent political dispute 
between forces of the right and left, couched in the discourse of value politics. For 
the right, lustration was part of a moral indignation that targeted the continuing 
influence of the "reds" in Polish politics and society, and decommunization was 
equated with the salvation of the Polish nation. For the left, the lustration policy 
was nothing but a political witchhunt design to remove legitimate political oppo-
nents and impose a religious, conservative cloak on the country. 
The two contrasting visions of decommunization became the object of intense 
political rhetoric and contestation. The predominance of the conservative political 
wing in the post-1997 Sejm, however, led to the passage of several acts and laws 
aimed at imposing a screening of the past, both through condemnation of the 
communist era and the association of individuals with its regime.20 Reflecting the 
first aspect was a June 1998 bill that held responsible "in the highest degree" the 
former ruling communist party, the PUWP, for the imposition of the communist 
system on Poland. Decommunization of the second type was pursued through a 
series of legal actions that limited the right of former communist officials to hold 
public office, set-up a Screening Court as a mechanism for the lustration of offi-
cials, and created an Institute of National Remembrance to house communist se-
cret police files. In all, these various steps represented a systemic attempt to come 
to terms with the immediate past. As such, the policy negated the concept of the 
"thick line" between the communist and democratizing periods of Poland's politi-
cal life. Instead, it reintroduced the old divisions as a litmus test in contemporary 
politics; divisions concerning attitudes under the former communist regime as 
symbolic elements in the competing vision of the new Poland. 
Another contentious arena in the definition of what the country represented 
and stood for concerned social and cultural understandings build around Christian 
and secular values. The discourse here was as intense as in the constitutional and 
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lustration debates, for the very identity of Poland was also vested in policies con-
cerning specific policies that enhanced or challenged the Christian roots of the 
nation. In that respect, history and morality were once again played out in the 
political battlefield. On one side stood the reading of Poland as a historically fash-
ioned set of values and moral precepts that were at the core of its self-identity, free 
to emerge after years of suppression, whether in the distant or more immediate 
past. To that end, the obligation of the people and its representatives was to en-
code those values in the constitutional and legal framework of the free, demo-
cratic Poland. The range of social and cultural concerns falling in the "identity" 
column was broad. It ranged across such steps as cementing the special relation-
ship between Poland and the Vatican through a Concordat, legalizing a strict abor-
tion law and a family planning policy, and placing a ban on the sale of porno-
graphic materials. Despite the Sejm's approval of legislative acts aimed at insti-
tuting this vision of Poland, the entity of the sociopolitical agenda was derailed by 
presidential vetoes. President Aleksander Kwasniewski, coming from a political 
lineage associated with the former communist party, stood on the opposite side of 
the normative discourse, and favored a more universalistic, civic, and secular iden-
tity for Poland. 
In many ways, then, Polish political discourse over recent years has centered 
on the overarching question of national identity, whether in the context of consti-
tutional, lustration, or social policies. The political confrontation is taking place 
against the backdrop of profound economic, social, and cultural transformations 
often too complex and too chaotic for easy comprehension. In these circumstances, 
the intensity of the change contributes to the desire to simplify reality through a 
"language of morality, memory, ideology, and faith."21 But the recourse to a nor-
mative worldview is not simply an escape from the politics of interests and its 
transformative socioeconomic reality. The language of values, the politics of iden-
tity, are no less real, and represent a genuine attempt to reclaim the very identity of 
the nation. For many, this struggle reflects echoes of the past around the former 
divide between "we" the nation and "they" the power. It is manifest foremost in 
the attempt to build a country rooted in the Christian traditions of the past, in the 
rejection of an alien communist ideology and its postcommunist variant, and in 
the preservation of moral strictures formed around the Church and the nation. For 
others, the revival of historical memory and Christian faith as definitions of politi-
cal identity signify a too narrow understanding of Polish-ness, and seek a concep-
tual expansion to a civic, secular, and democratic Poland that overcomes the past 
and its political divisiveness. 
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Conclusion: Repolarization 
Polish politics during the course of the postcommunist decade has moved to a 
more polarized setting, in terms of the main actors, their political discourse and 
style. Political space has come to be defined by extreme ideological positions that 
emphasis normative, value positions rather than pragmatic, interest policies. This 
is manifest first in the coalescence of the opposing camps at different ends of the 
political spectrum: the AWS coalition grouped around the Solidarity trade-union 
and rightist parties is clearly distinguished form a leftist coalition built around 
parties whose identity is vested in the former communist regime.22 These con-
glomerate political actors have attained the predominant position in politics, and 
in the process have displaced parties with more narrow or centrist positions. For 
example, the PSL (Polish Peasant Party) representing the specific sectoral inter-
ests of rural Poland has declined significantly as a major player in politics. Simi-
larly, the UP (Labor Union), a centrist party that sought to bridge the gap across 
the value divide by incorporating elements from both the Solidarity and 
excommunist camp has been eradicated as a voice of the working class. 
While fewer political actors signify an improvement over the previous frag-
mentation, it is their political stance and their emphasis on an irreconcilable moral 
stance that has proved problematic. This is most manifest in the framing of the 
political discourse over the past several years, a language of politics that empha-
sizes identities rooted in the past, the embrace of moral and value positions, and 
the use of symbolic interactions. Such an approach precludes the exercise of mod-
erate, give and take politics in favor of entrenched, polarized agendas. The conse-
quence is a kind of "polarized pluralism," a political system defined primarily by 
parties and coalitions that are separated by wide value distance.23 In the case of 
Poland, this gap is created by the attachment to past identities and constructed 
around a collective ethos that perpetuates the former political abyss between Soli-
darity and the communist regime. In turn, these politics of identity and moral 
codes affects the style of politics. Rather than pluralist politics in the sense of 
bargaining and compromise around divisible interests and policies, we have a 
polarized political structure. The latter accounts for the turn to an "indivisible 
politics" mirroring entrenched positions in a zero-sum politics, where neither side 
is willing to give in on its substantive, normative positions. For the moment, the 
postcommunist transition is marooned in identities of the past that continue to 
define Poland's future. 
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At first glance it may appear that Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania belong in a 
separate post-communist transitional category from the pace-setting former peo-
ple's republics of East Central Europe such as Hungary, Poland, and the Czech 
Republic. As union republics of the USSR, the Baltic states were fully integrated 
into the Soviet political and economic system with virtually no opportunity for 
exercising autonomy in policymaking. Moscow's centralized control was evident 
in all phases of life, especially in the social policy of promoting massive in-migra-
tion of non-Baits that resulted in sweeping changes in ethnic composition during 
the decades of Soviet rule. Nevertheless, it is striking that the political and eco-
nomic transition in the Baltic states during the 1990s most closely paralleled that 
of the Visegrád countries rather than that of other former Soviet republics.1 His-
torically, Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania had experienced Central European, espe-
cially German and Polish, political and cultural hegemony, and they constituted 
the most Westernized and modernized parts of the USSR. Unlike other Soviet 
republics, they also benefitted from two crucial decades of independence during 
the 1920s and 1930s. It is thus no accident that the Baltic states played a key role 
in the collapse of the Soviet Union, particularly through the activism of such mass 
organizations as the Popular Fronts of Estonia and Latvia as well as Sajudis in 
Lithuania, all of which drew inspiration from East European models, especially 
Solidarity and the Prague Spring. The most significant difference between the 
Baltic states and the countries of East Central Europe in the twentieth century has 
been the greater geopolitical vulnerability in the Baltic case, as reflected in their 
location and size, although their current security concerns may well be mitigated 
by growing European and international integration. The following overview will 
stress the commonalities in the Baltic experience in the 1990s, but it also impor-
tant to bear in mind the distinctive profile of each country. 
The restoration of Baltic independence in August 1991 was the culmination of 
a long process that began more than five years earlier with demonstrations organ-
ized by the Latvian human rights group Helsinki '86.2 The East Central European 
events of 1989, especially in Hungary and Poland, and the withering away of the 
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Brezhnev Doctrine provided significant encouragement for the Baltic movements 
and helped convince public opinion that renewed independence was indeed possi-
ble. Lithuania declared outright restoration of its independence on March 11,1990, 
and Estonia and Latvia followed with declarations of a transition period toward 
the same goal on March 30 and May 4, respectively. The Kremlin refused to ac-
cede to these demands, but following a long political stalemate, the abortive Au-
gust 1991 coup by desperate hard-liners in Moscow - by discrediting the strong-
est supporters of a highly centralized political system - suddenly made the 
reestablishment of Baltic independence feasible. 
In all three Baltic states the domestic political transition was dominated by a 
similar process of relatively rapid democratization. The task of returning to con-
stitutional rule based on Western models became the first order of the day. Latvia 
took the lead by declaring the restoration of the interwar Constitution of 1922 
already in August 1991, and voters soon approved newly created constitutions in 
Estonia (June 1992) and in Lithuania (October 1992). In each case the emphasis 
was on continuity from the liberal democratic period (1920-1934 in Estonia and 
Latvia, 1920-1926 in Lithuania) of the interwar era. A restored unicameral parlia-
ment (the Estonian Riigikgu, the Latvian Saeima, and the Lithuanian Seimas) 
took the same name as in the 1920s and was intended to play the leading role in 
political life, particularly in Estonia and Latvia where the president was meant to 
be largely a figurehead, mainly performing symbolic functions. In Lithuania, on 
the other hand, the makers of the new constitution, following the views of Vytautas 
Landsbergis, the increasingly conservative head of Sajudis, created a rather strong 
presidency. Ironically, however, the first post-communist presidential elections in 
Lithuania in February 1993 resulted in victory not for the political right, but for 
the former leader of the Communist Party of Lithuania (CPL) Algirdas Brazauskas, 
who captured 60 percent of the total popular vote.3 His triumph points to a key 
political difference between Estonia and Latvia, on the one hand, and Lithuania, 
on the other, based on their experience under Soviet rule. In the northern two 
Baltic republics, the communist parties were never seen as representing the na-
tional interest, especially since native Baits were a bare majority (Estonia) or a 
minority (Latvia) of the membership, and as organizations, they faded from 
the scene with the fall of communism. In contrast, the CPL and its successor, 
the Lithuanian Democratic Labor Party, were viewed as legitimate national par-
ties by most Lithuanians, and Brazauskas maintained a high level of personal 
popularity.4 
Institutionalization of the electoral process is an important element in the con-
solidation of democracy. During the 1990s the Baltic states made significant 
progress in this direction as all elections, both national and local, were held as 
scheduled, and they were declared fair and free by international observers. Each 
country conducted regular parliamentary elections according to the respective 
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constitutional guidelines: Estonia in 1992, 1995, and 1999; Latvia in 1993, 1995, 
and 1998; and Lithuania in 1992 and 1996. Presidential elections took place every 
three to five years. As befitted the greater power of the presidency in Lithuania, 
the elections were direct in that country while Latvia and Estonia chose their chief 
executives in the parliaments. The simple majority stipulated in the Latvian case 
presented no logistical problems, but in Estonia, the requirement of a two-thirds 
majority for the election of a president proved to be a difficult task in practice. In 
1996, for example, the Riigikogu failed to agree on a successful candidate, and 
the election was thrown into the Electoral College, a larger body consisting of 
members of parliament and representatives of local government. Here the vote is 
by simple majority, but the procedure is cumbersome at best.5 On the local gov-
ernment level, elections were held every three years in each country. The distinc-
tive feature of the Estonian case is that non-citizens are also permitted to vote in 
local elections, although only citizens may run for office.6 
Perhaps the most striking aspect of the political transition in the Baltic states 
was the absence of violence, a key parallel with the situation in East Central Eu-
rope and a significant contrast with developments in the Balkans, the Caucasus, 
and Central Asia. Clearly, ethnic tensions and much economic hardship existed in 
the Baltic region, but they never spilled over into violence. With the minor excep-
tion of the unstable 1930s, the use of violence has never been part of modern 
Baltic political culture, and the Baits tended to look to the Nordic countires as 
models of stable development. As noted above, during the post-Stalin era, Baltic 
activists and intellectuals greatly admired the East European non-violent reform 
movements, especially the Prague Spring and Solidarity. Moreover, since Rus-
sians and other non-Baits were overwhelmingly recent immigrants, there was no 
long history of ethnic grievances to contend with in contrast to several other re-
gions in the post-communist world. Finally, any use of violence by the Baltic 
peoples would have been counterproductive from their own point of view since 
the major potential antagonists were ethnic Russians, who were representatives of 
the hegemonic nationality of the Soviet empire and later the Russian Federation. 
It is worth recalling that according to the 1989 census, there were 145.1 million 
Russians in the Soviet Union and only 5.3 million Baits in Estonia, Latvia, and 
Lithuania.7 
Despite the positive trends noted above, there remains the question of how 
deeply democratic values have been internalized in the Baltic societies. In all three 
countries, voter participation in parliamentary elections declined substantially 
during the 1990s. In Estonia, the proportion of eligible voters taking part in the 
Riigikogu elections fell from 69 percent in 1995 to 57 percent in 1999. In Latvia 
and Lithuania, the rate of decline was even greater- from 90 percent (1993) to 72 
percent (1995) in the Saeima elections and from 75 percent (1992) to 53 percent 
(1996) in the Seimas elections.8 Several factors contributed to this trend. Once 
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independence had been reestablished and the initial contests for post-communist 
parliaments had taken place, there appeared to be considerably less at stake in 
later elections for many voters. Despite the positive macroeconomic indicators by 
the second half of the 1990s, there is also little doubt that the economic difficulties 
most people experienced in their daily lives contributed to a certain level of voter 
alienation. Furthermore, it is likely that various scandals associated with some 
leading politicians in all three Baltic states tended to increase cynicism among the 
public. Although the level of corruption in the Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania was 
probably lower than in most post-communist countries, the public perception of it 
became more acute in the course of the 1990s. Fledgling political parties faced an 
enormous challenge in trying to overcome the legacy of the Soviet era and the 
profound cynicism it had fostered regarding any political organization, and opin-
ion polls suggested that popular identification with political parties was low. Vot-
ers were clearly bewildered by the large, fragmented, and unstable party land-
scape which seemed to be in state of flux. In addition, political parties generally 
lacked a strong grass-roots base and were created from above by small elites with 
little participation from below.9 
Another significant factor in assessing the process of democratization in the 
Baltic states is the question of citizenship, a particularly thorny issue in view of 
the major population changes that took place under Soviet rule. In the Lithuanian 
case there has been a remarkable stability in the proportion of the native popula-
tion in the country despite all the upheavals of the twentieth century. In contrast, 
the Estonian and Latvian proportions of the population in their respective coun-
tries plummeted between the mid-1930s and 1989 (26.7 percentage points in Es-
tonia and 23.7 in Latvia) while the ethnic Russian share more than tripled in both 
cases. Such a precipitous decline was unique among union republic nationalities 
in the former Soviet Union. On the eve of the collapse of the USSR, the Latvians 
comprised a bare majority in their homeland, and the Estonians constituted just 
over 60 percent in theirs. Although all three nationalities suffered the same kinds 
of population losses in the 1940s (mainly, Soviet deportations, wartime deaths, 
and flight to the West), the greater demographic dynamism in the Lithuanian case 
allowed them to maintain the native share of the population. Furthermore, this 
situation helped Lithuania to limit the in-migration of Russians and other non-
Baits, a trend which Estonia and Latvia were much less able to withstand.10 As a 
result of these developments, in the early 1990s, Estonia and Latvia had the high-
est foreign-born populations in Europe (over 25 percent) after Luxemburg, while 
the proportion stood at just over 10 percent in the case of Lithuania.11 
In view of the large non-native populations in their countries, the governments 
of Estonia and Latvia were reluctant to move rapidly on the citizenship issue be-
fore the restoration of independence for fear of committing themselves to a long-
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term solution before the question of political sovereignty was resolved. In con-
trast, the Lithuanian government, with a solid native majority in place, felt able to 
offer the "zero option" already in November 1989, i.e., citizenship (after a two-
year waiting period) to all permanent residents, who declared their loyalty to Lithua-
nia. The great majority of non-Lithuanians in the country exercised this option, 
and thus the issue of voting rights was quickly settled in the Lithuanian case. In 
Estonia and Latvia, however, the process dragged on much longer. After the resto-
ration of independence, in November 1991, Estonia reinstated its 1938 citizenship 
law, which meant that all persons who had been citizens in June 1940 and their 
descendants, regardless of ethnic background, were automatically considered citi-
zens. All others desiring citizenship, including the great majority of the Russian 
and other non-Estonian population, had to follow a three-year naturalization pro-
cedure, including a modest level of competence in Estonian.12 In practice, this 
meant that the citizenship rolls would only expand incrementally. By 1999 the 
non-Estonian population in Estonia was divided as follows: about 30 percent were 
citizens of Estonia, nearly 20 percent were citizens of Russia, and about 50 per-
cent were stateless.13 Clearly, this situation was not desirable from the point of 
view of political integration, and finding a workable solution remained a chal-
lenge for the Estonian authorities. In Latvia, where a citizenship law was passed 
only in July 1994, the process of inclusion was even more difficult, especially 
since a complicated timetable for eligibility slowed naturalization in the initial 
years of implementation.14 
The evolution of the Baltic political systems in practice in the 1990s witnessed 
wide swings of the political pendulum in each country. In every succeeding par-
liamentary election the ruling party or coalition failed to retain its hold on power, 
largely because the voters blamed the existing government for the difficulties they 
had experienced during the post-communist transition. In Lithuania, the Demo-
cratic Labor Party's huge victory in 1992 was matched by a crushing defeat at the 
hands of the conservative Homeland Union in 1996.15 Despite a threshold of 4 or 
5 percent in order to gain representation in parliament, Estonia and Latvia in par-
ticular were plagued with the problem of fragmentation and the multiplicity of 
political parties, a phenomenon that substantially complicated the formation of 
governing coalitions. In all three countries as well, the presidents proved to be the 
most popular politicians according to public opinion polls, probably because they 
were seen as standing above day-to-day politics and infighting. As suggested above, 
the political spectrum in the Baltic states was checkered and changing. Neverthe-
less, it can be argued that the basic political fault line in each country was already 
evident in the waning years of Soviet rule and continued during the 1990s, i.e., a 
division between "fundamentalists," who emphasized issues of principle and com-
pletely rejected the communist past, and the "pragmatists," who proceeded from 
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the concrete situation at hand and were willing to make compromises in a less 
than ideal world. In the post-communist era the experience of governing narrowed 
the gap between these two broad groupings.16 
Since the first period of Baltic independence ended with the military occupa-
tion and forced annexation of Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania by the Soviet Union, 
security issues played a major role in the transition of the 1990s. Given geopoliti-
cal realities and the legacy of the recent past, it was clear that Baltic relations with 
the Russian Federation would be the most important challenge in this decade. 
During these years, Russia struggled with its own post-Soviet identity crisis, which 
was further exacerbated by continuing economic and political instability. A sub-
stantial proportion of its political and military elites still exhibited an imperial 
mentality, and as former Soviet republics, which had been part of the Russian 
Empire since the eighteenth century, the Baltic states were generally viewed as 
part of the "near abroad" (Russ. blizhnee zarubezh V), i.e., within a special sphere 
of influence reserved for Russia. In the early 1990s the issue of ex-Soviet troops 
in Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania dominated all others, since their presence was a 
continuing affront to Baltic sovereignty. From a total of about 300,000 troops in 
the Brezhnev era, the numbers declined quickly in the glasnost' era and the early 
1990s to some 30,000 in July 1993. In large part because of its relatively small 
Russian minority, Lithuania's relations with Russia were the smoothest among 
the Baltic states, and it was not surprising that ex-Soviet troops left that country 
first in August 1993 and only in August 1994, after considerable pressure from 
the West, did they agree to leave Estonia and Latvia.17 
Nevertheless, Lithuania continued to face the unique question of Russian land 
access to Kaliningrad, the anomalous ex-Soviet exclave and prize of World War II 
to its west. In the second half of the 1990s, Russia dragged its feet on a final 
resolution of border issues with Estonia and Latvia and often criticized the treat-
ment of the large Russian minorities in the two countries. It is also noteworthy 
that Russia has refused to accept responsibility for Soviet actions in the Baltic 
states or to apologize for them, in contrast to its willingness to do so for the Katyn 
massacre in the case of Poland and the Winter War with Finland.18 However, there 
were also indications that the priority assigned to the Baltic states in Russian for-
eign policy towards former Soviet republics was in decline, particularly in com-
parison to such larger entities as Ukraine, Belarus, and Kazakhstan. 
In order to balance the unsettled relations with Russia and to return to the Eu-
ropean and international community of nations, which they had been part of dur-
ing the interwar era, the Baltic states placed great emphasis on integration with 
Europe and the West in the 1990s. Following quick admission to the United Na-
tions and the Conference (later, Organization) on Security and Cooperation in 
Europe in fall 1991, Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania became founding members of 
the Council of Baltic Sea States (CBSS) in March 1992, a ten-country regional 
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organization that also included the Nordic states, Germany, Poland, and Russia. 
The CBS S was particularly attractive to small countries such as the Baltic states, 
not only as a means to foster regional cooperation in a number of areas but also to 
moderate the powerful influence of large states such as Russia and Germany.19 An 
important milestone in the early independence years for all three Baltic states was 
admission to the Council of Europe (Estonia and Lithuania in May 1993, Latvia in 
February 1995) since its membership criteria demanded adherence to strict stand-
ards on democratic elections and human rights. 
By the second half of the 1990s, the foreign policy of the Baltic states focused 
increasingly on gaining membership in the European Union and NATO. In June 
1995, the EU concluded similar association agreements with all three Baltic coun-
tries, but Estonia's alone did not stipulate a transition period. In July 1997 Estonia 
was invited, along with Poland, the Czech Republic, Hungary, Slovenia, and the 
Greek portion of Cyprus, to enter into negotiations for EU membership in the next 
round of expansion. Although Estonia argued that the entry of one Baltic state 
into the EU would open the door for the other two, it was clear that the exclusion 
of Latvia and Lithuania from this first group of candidates raised intra-Baltic ten-
sions. Nevertheless, in December 1999 Latvia and Lithuania joined Slovakia, 
Romania, Bulgaria, and Malta as additional EU candidate members, and it re-
mained possible that Estonia's two southern neighbors could catch up in the nego-
tiations.20 However, the pace of the projected EU expansion would clearly be 
uncertain since it depended on a wide range of factors, not the least of which was 
the organization's capacity for internal reform. None of the Baltic states was se-
lected by NATO for its first round of post-Cold War enlargement in which Hun-
gary, Poland, and the Czech Republic became full members in March 1999, and 
the governments of Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania repeatedly expressed concern 
about the possibility of a "gray zone" of insecurity emerging between a partially 
expanded NATO and Russia, as Baltic-NATO negotiations continued. Among the 
Baltic states in the year 2000, Lithuania was best prepared to enter NATO, but in 
all three countries, a growing public debate was joined about the cost of associa-
tion. Public opinion regarding possible membership in both the EU and NATO 
during the second half of the 1990s showed considerable volatility.21 
An intriguing issue regarding the post-communist Baltic states is the extent to 
which they will develop a substantive regionalism and sense of solidarity. The 
historical record of Baltic cooperation in the interwar period was rather dismal, 
dramatically illustrated by their inability to come together in a united front in the 
crisis of 1939-1940. However, the common experience under Soviet rule brought 
the Baits closer together, and the height of cooperation clearly came during the 
glasnost' years when the need for solidarity against Moscow was greatest. Fol-
lowing the restoration of independence, each Baltic state tended to follow its own 
path, seeking to develop ties to its richer and more powerful neighbors. For exam-
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pie, Estonia strengthened its already strong connections to Finland, and Lithuania 
formed a new alliance with Poland that moved beyond their troubled historical 
relations. Relations between the Baltic states became tense at times in the 1990s 
over oil deposits and fishing rights in the Baltic Sea and over trade disputes. On 
the other side of the coin, the three countries did show solidarity in foreign policy 
toward Russia, and military cooperation, especially the formation of the Baltic 
Battalion in September 1994, went much further than during the 1920s and 1930s.22 
In addition, with the opening up of the entire Baltic Sea region in the post-Cold 
War era, Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania had an important model in the neighboring 
Nordic countries with their long experience in regional cooperation. 
One of the most difficult challenges facing the post-communist states was the 
necessity of simultaneously coping with the political and the economic transition. 
Nevertheless, in the economic realm as well, the Baltic states outpaced the other 
former Soviet republics and achieved considerable macroeconomic success, al-
though not on the level of the Czech Republic or Hungary. Led by Estonia, the 
Baltic states quickly established new currencies and thus escaped the "ruble zone," 
which in turn allowed them to bring inflation under control. They were also able 
to diversify their trade relations and move away from strong dependence on Rus-
sia as a commercial partner. By 1998 Estonia and Latvia (whose main trading 
partners were Finland and Germany, respectively) had the most success in this 
regard, as in both cases trade with Russia only comprised about 12 percent of the 
total. For Lithuania, Russia remained the leading partner, but the share of this 
trade had fallen to less than 20 percent of the country's total in 1998. Following 
the inevitable economic downturn in the early transition years, all three countries 
showed strong economic growth during most of the second half of the 1990s. 
However, their continuing vulnerability to events in Russia was demonstrated by 
the negative growth rates in each Baltic state in 1999, a direct result of the impact 
of the Russian financial crisis of August 1998. Per capita GDP was highest in 
Estonia as was direct foreign investment, the latter clearly encouraged by the coun-
try's liberal economic policies.23 
Despite this relatively strong economic performance in the 1990s, the actual 
impact of the transition on the daily lives of much of the population in the Baltic 
states was no doubt painful. As elsewhere in the post-communist world, there was 
substantial socioeconomic dislocation and a heightening of inequality of income 
and wealth. The gap in standard of living between urban and rural areas and be-
tween richer and poorer regions of each country increased, and generational dif-
ferences also grew, as older workers and retired persons found it harder to adjust 
to the new conditions of a free market. As measured by Eurostat's purchasing 
power standard (PPS), the average living standard in Estonia at the end of the 
1990s was only slightly more than one-third of the EU average, while in Lithuania 
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and Latvia it was about one-third and one-fourth, respectively. Even in relatively 
well-off Estonia, the per capita GDP was only one-seventh ofthat of neighboring 
Finland.24 
With regard to society, the greatest challenge for the Baltic states was coming 
to terms with the sweeping population changes brought about under Soviet rule, 
especially in Estonia and Latvia. As can be seen in Table 2, the native proportion 
of the population crept upward in these two countries in the 1990s, mainly due to 
out-migration of Russians and other non-Baits. However, by the late 1990s, emi-
gration slowed to a trickle and became a minor factor in the demographic balance 
sheet. As Baltic politicians assessed their options in the post-communist years, it 
became increasingly clear that the only viable alternative was integration, i.e., the 
goal of a tolerant multicultural society in which each ethnic group retained it sepa-
rate cultural identity, but also acquired a common civic identity based on loyalty 
to the given Baltic state and a working knowledge of the state language.25 It was 
obvious that creating such a common identity in each of the Baltic countries would 
require enormous resources and good will on all sides and that integration would 
be a long-term process. There was also little doubt that a fully reformed and effec-
tive educational system would have to play a major role in achieving this goal. 
In conclusion, it may be noted that there were numerous parallels between the 
post-communist transitions in the Baltic states and those in East-Central Europe, 
including substantial progress toward democratization, absence of violence, mac-
roeconomic success, and growing participation in the process of European and 
Western integration. Nevertheless, distinctive features could also be found in the 
Baltic case, especially the challenges of integrating large numbers of non-Baltic 
immigrants from the Soviet era and reaching a viable modus vivendi with Russia 
after fifty years of Soviet occupation and rule. Among the smallest states in Eu-
rope in terms of population, Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania debated the future of 
their identity during the 1990s as part of an integrating continent and a globalizing 
world. The recent experience of their northern neighbor Finland, an EU member 
since 1995, suggested that a national and a European identity could coexist in a 
small country. 
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BELA LUGOSI - EIN LIEBHABER, EIN DILETTANT 
HARUN MAYE 
Universität zu Köln, Köln, 
Deutschland 
I. 
„I am Dracula". So lautete der erste Satz, den ein Vampir in einem amerikani-
schen Tonfilm sagen mußte, und der auch seinen Darsteller unsterblich machen 
sollte. Bei dem Namen Dracula bedürfen wir weder der Anschauung noch auch 
selbst des Bildes, sondern der Name, indem wir ihn verstehen, ist die bildlose 
einfache Vorstellung einer Urszene, die 1897 zum ersten Mal als Roman erschie-
nen, und dank dem Medienverbund zwischen Phonograph, Schreibmaschine, 
Hypnose, Stenographie und der Sekretärin Mina Harker schon im Roman selbst 
technisch reproduzierbar geworden ist.1 Aber ausgerechnet über ein Medium, das 
im Roman nicht erwähnt wird, sollte Draculas Wiederauferstehung seitdem Nacht 
für Nacht laufen. 
Weil Vampire und Gespenster Wiedergänger sind, und im Gegensatz zu Bü-
chern und ihren Autoren bekanntlich nicht sterben können, müssen sie sich neue 
Körper und Medien suchen, in die sie fahren können. Der Journalist Abraham 
Stoker hat den Nachruhm und die Wertschätzung seines Namens zusammen mit 
dem Medium eingebüßt, das ihn berühmt gemacht hatte, nur damit fortan der 
Name seines schattenlosen Titelhelden für immer als belichteter Schatten über 
Kinoleinwände geistern konnte. Aber Spielfilme kennen so wenig originale 
Schöpfersubjekte wie Individuen. Dracula ist eben bloß ein Name, und als solcher 
ein „individuelles Allgemeines" wie die Bezeichnung der Goethezeit, jener Epo-
che und Dichtungskonzeption, der auch Dracula poetologisch noch angehörte, für 
sogenannte Individuen und Phantome gleichermaßen lautete. Es ist in diesem 
Namen, daß wir Bela Lugosi denken.2 
IL 
Seit Tod Brownings Dracula von 1931 braucht dieser Name um vorstellbar zu 
sein, nicht mehr verstanden werden, weil er selbst angefangen hatte, sich vorzu-
stellen. Zu Zeiten Stokers lernten die Bilder laufen, zu Zeiten Lugosis brauchten 
die auf Phonograph gespeicherten Stimmen des Romanpersonals nur noch mit 
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den Kamerabildern synchronisiert zu werden, damit der Graf sein „ich bin der 
ich-bin-da" zitieren und also sagen konnte: „I am Dracula". Dieser Name als tö-
nendes Wort verschwand nicht mehr zwischen Buchdeckeln und in der Zeit, viel-
mehr wurde die Rede des Vampirs, wie sie gewesen ist, unsterblich. Solange 
Dracula eine bilderlose einfache Vorstellung in einem Vampirroman der schwar-
zen Romantik (Mario Praz) war, konnte er noch wahlweise als das Unbewußte, 
das Andere oder als Personifikation des eigenen Kolonialismus aus „dem tiefen 
Schacht des Ich" (Hegel) seiner westeuropäischen und amerikanischen Leser her-
vorgebracht werden. Erst Bela Lugosi und der Hollywood-Film haben dem Na-
men mit den vielen Masken ein unverwechselbares Gesicht gegeben: „Let me 
admit with no apology that to me Dracula is Bela Lugosi, and Lugosi is Dracula. 
There is no separation of the two".3 Der Doppelgänger seiner Leser ist zu einem 
einzigen Schauspieler geworden, und die Wunschkonstellationen von Zuschauern 
und Produzenten richten sich nicht mehr an bilderlose Namen, sondern direkt auf 
die Schauspieler und das Universal4-Mediu\m Film. Im Imaginären des Films wird 
das Unbewußte von Namen und Zuschauern unmittelbar in Medientechniken über-
setzbar. Rückblenden, Großaufnahmen, Zoom, Totale, Kamerafahrt und Schnitt 
vertreten und manipulieren Assoziation und Aufmerksamkeitsselektion. Im Film 
hören Namen auf bloße Vorstellungen zu sein, und fortan konnte Dracula auch im 
Tageslicht des Realen seine Opfer heimsuchen. 
Seitdem wurde der damals fast fünfzigjährige Lugosi seinen Wiedergänger nicht 
mehr los. Anstelle des romantischen Liebhabers,5 den er so gerne auf der Theater-
bühne gegeben hatte, aber niemals in Hollywood darstellen durfte, waren die 
Monster getreten. Wunschprojekte Lugosis wie eine Faust-Verfilmung oder Cyrano 
de Bergerac kamen über Probeaufnahmen nie hinaus. Der 'Dracula-Fluch',6 wie 
Lugosi die neue Machtkonstellation des Genrekinos für sich benannte, befahl ihm 
regelmäßig auf der Leinwand zu sterben, nur um im nächsten Film wieder von 
den Toten auferstehen zu müssen. Die Rolle, die ihn unsterblich machte, hat ihn 
auch buchstäblich in das Grab gebracht. Ob er diese Form der Unsterblichkeit 
wirklich geliebt hat, ist nicht sicher. Fest steht aber, daß Bela Lugosi auch als 
Monster eigentlich immer ein Liebhaber geblieben ist. Nicht nur erscheint er in 
vielen seiner Filme als „bösartige Karikatur des romantischen Liebhabers euro-
päischer Herkunft",7 sondern er hat sich vor allem selbst liebhaberisch - oder 
eben auch: ohne sein Metier wirklich zu beherrschen - seiner Profession gewid-
met. 
III. 
Obwohl er für einige Jahre am Ungarischen Nationaltheater in Budapest ge-
spielt hatte, besaß Lugosi keine Ausbildung als Schauspieler. Aus Liebe zum Thea-
ter brach er mit elf Jahren die Schulausbildung ab, riß von zu Hause aus, nur um 
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sich einige Jahre später der Theatergruppe seines Schwagers anzuschließen. Seine 
ersten Bühnenauftritte in der Stadt Szabadka gerieten nicht zufallig zur Präfiguration 
seiner späten Film- und Bühnenauftritte zwischen 1945 und 1956: 
Ich ging in den Chor, aber da ich nichts anderes gewesen war als 
Handarbeiter, war ich unbeholfen. Sie versuchten mir kleine Rollen 
in ihren Stücken zu geben, doch ich war so ungebildet, so einfaltig, 
daß die Leute nur über mich lachten. Aber ich schnupperte Bühnen­
luft. Und ich kostete auch den ranzigen Geschmack von Demüti­
gung.8 
Wie Goethes Wilhelm Meister reiste Béla Ferenc Dezső Blaskó, wie der spätere 
Dracula-Darsteller mit bürgerlichem Namen hieß, mal unter dem Namen Géza 
Lugosi oder Dezsö Lugosi mit einer Wanderbühne durch Ungarn und Rumänien. 
Schon bald nahm er dann endgültig den Künstlernamen Bela Lugosi an, den er 
auch gerne als Lugossy buchstabierte, da das 'y' adlige Herkunft signalisiert. Dazu 
passend behauptete er in Hollywood, sein Vater sei ein ungarischer Baron gewe­
sen, um den gleichsam naturgemäß aristokratischen Anspruch auf seine Dracula-
Interpretation zu unterstreichen. Für die Star-Filmproduktionsgesellschaft in Un­
garn spielte er unter dem Pseudonym Arisztid, was direkt 'Aristokrat' bedeutet. 
Mit anderen Worten: er war ein Hochstapler und Dilettant, was ja schon etymolo­
gisch nichts anderes bedeutet, als eben ein Liebhaber zu sein. Das italienische 
dilettante (abgeleitet vom lateinischen delecto, delectare = sich oder jemanden 
„erfreuen") bezeichnet ursprünglich den Liebhaber (einer Kunst) aus reinem Ge­
nuß und Unterhaltung. Der sich liebhaberisch an allen Künsten und Wissenschaf­
ten beteiligende Dilettant war ein Bildungsideal der europäischen Oberschicht bis 
ins 18. Jahrhundert.9 Adelige Beteiligung an höfischer Kunstproduktion oder auch 
an den literarischen Gesellschaften des 17. Jahrhunderts sind daher die bekannte­
sten Erscheinungsformen des Dilettanten. Dieser alteuropäische Dilettant war ein 
normaler Künstlertypus, der sowohl in der Rezeption als auch durch seine Pro­
duktionen am Kunstbetrieb ganz selbstverständlich teilnahm. Seine Nachahmun­
gen fielen als solche nicht besonders auf, weil die gesamte Kunstproduktion und 
Poetik der vormodernen Zeit auf mimetischen Verfahren basierte. 
Erst mit der Ausdifferenzierung eines autonomen bürgerlichen Kunstsystems 
wird der Dilettant zum Gegenstand von Kritik und soll aus dem Kunstsystem 
ausgeschlossen werden. Die neue Autonomie- und Genieästhetik setzt auf strikte 
Trennung: „sachlich: Trennung von Produktion und Rezeption, Schreiben und 
Lesen; zeitlich: Trennung von Primärem und Sekundärem; sozial: Trennung von 
Profis auf der einen und Laien-Publikum auf der anderen Seite. Was diese Ord­
nung verletzt, wird als Dilettantismus abgetan".10 Erst durch diese tiefgreifenden 
Veränderungen im europäischen Kunstsystem bekommt der Dilettant seine 
pejorative Bedeutung als 'Pfuscher', 'Lügner' oder 'Stümper', und erscheint da-
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mit als Bastard, als illegitimer Bruder des (jetzt) professionell ausgebildeten Künst-
lers, der sich auch etymologisch als 'Kenner' und 'Könner' ausweist. Der Dilet-
tant war von einem kultivierten Amateur und gern gesehenen Teilnehmer am 
Kunstbetrieb selber zu einem Monster geworden. Nicht umsonst weicht das adeli-
ge Liebesideal mit seiner Betonung der Momente von Verführung und Genuß 
stark von den bürgerlichen Tugendidealen ab - erst recht bei einem 
transsylvanischen Fürsten, der als Vlad Tepes seine Perversion schon im Namen 
trägt.11 
In Goethes und Schillers Entwurf zu einem Schema Über den Dilettantismus 
(wie man seitdem erst sagt) hat die neue Kritik an dem Dilettanten ihre Programm-
schrift bekommen. Bezeichnenderweise wird dort ausgerechnet der dilettantische 
Schauspieler als „schlimmster Fall" des Dilettantismus bestimmt: „Ueberall, wo 
die Kunst selbst noch kein rechtes Regulativ hat, wie in der Poesie, Gartenkunst, 
Schauspielkunst, richtet der Dilettantism mehr Schaden an und wird anmaßender. 
Der schlimmste Fall ist bei der Schauspielkunst".12 Die Schauspielkunst ist be-
sonders anfällig für dilettantische Verfahren, weil dort das Verhältnis von Ursache 
und Wirkung nicht eindeutig zu bestimmen ist: 
Weil der Dilettant seinen Beruf zum Selbstproducieren erst aus der 
Wirkung der Kunstwerke auf sich empfangt, so verwechselt er diese 
Wirkungen mit den objektiven Ursachen und Motiven, und meint 
nun den Empfindungszustand in den er versetzt ist auch produktiv 
und praktisch zu machen, wie wenn man mit dem Geruch einer Blu-
me die Blume selbst hervorzubringen gedächte.13 
Der Dilettant scheint im Schauspieler zu sich selbst zu kommen, weil beide 
ihre Kunstproduktion auf Nachahmung gründen. In der Tat sind die „objektiven 
Ursachen und Motive" der Nachahmungen des Schauspielers schwer zu bestim-
men, denn direkt sichtbar ist nur deren Wirkung. Indem der Dilettant, insofern er 
Schauspieler ist, durch Nachahmung etwas anderes darstellen soll, als er selbst 
empfindet, verdoppelt er nicht nur das Problem der Nachahmung, sondern droht 
die Unterscheidung zwischen Künstler und Dilettant selbst ad absurdum zu füh-
ren. Das macht den Schauspieler wie den Dilettanten nicht nur grundsätzlich ver-
dächtig, sondern zum Problemfall der goethezeitlichen Kunsttheorie. 
Der Schauspieler ist eine zentrale „Reflexionsfigur" für die zeitgleichen De-
batten um Originalität und Naivität als den neuen ästhetischem Idealen in der 
Kunst.14 War in der gelehrten Tradition die simplicité noch selbstverständlich ein 
rhetorisches Prinzip und eine Tugend in Kunst und Rede, so sollte die neu konzi-
pierte Naivität natürlich sein, und frei von aller Künstlichkeit und rhetorischer 
Technik. Das Naive soll aus einer natürlichen Seele kommen, und in Gedanken, 
Manieren, der Sprache und des Körpers, kurz: überall zum Ausdruck kommen. 
Der naive Ausdruck in der Kunst sollte für die Wahrheit, Schönheit und Aufrich-
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tigkeit der Gedanken einstehen. Für die Schauspielkunst liegt darin ein unauflös-
bares Paradox begründet, denn wie sollen naive Ursachen und Motive an einer 
Kunst festgestellt werden, deren offensichtliche Verfahren Nachahmung und Si-
mulation sind: 
Daß aus dem Munde des Nachahmers die Herzenssprache vernom-
men und seine Gebärdung als natürlich-unmittelbare Aktion begrif-
fen werden kann, ist nur dann einsichtig, wenn man - anders als das 
bekannte Diderotsche Paradox, welches die Abwesenheit von Emp-
findung zur Voraussetzung ihrer Darstellbarkeit erklärt - einen wahr-
haftig empfindenden und erlebenden Akteur vorsieht.15 
Die Paradoxic der Nachahmung darf demnach nicht reflektiert werden. Viel-
mehr muß der professionelle Schauspieler jede Künstlichkeit und bewußte Refle-
xion auf seine Tätigkeit dissimulieren, damit seine Simulation von Natürlichkeit 
gelingen kann. Der dilettantische Schauspieler ist dazu nicht in der Lage. Ihm 
merkt man das 'Gewollte' und die Künstlichkeit seiner Handlungen immer an. Er 
ist in mehrfacher Hinsicht ungeschickt, und das ist Naivität in einem sehr trivialen 
Sinne. 
IV. 
Obwohl diese Unterscheidung nicht funktioniert, nicht funktionieren kann, war 
sie mehr als erfolgreich, und bestimmt noch heute das Bild vom Schauspieler. 
Aber auch die Probleme sind geblieben: „Ueberall, wo die Kunst selbst noch kein 
rechtes Regulativ hat" (Goethe/Schiller) erweist sich der Dilettant als unabweis-
bar, als eingeschlossener ausgeschlossener Dritter.16 Vor allem am Anfang, wenn 
eine Kunstform noch neu ist, sich überhaupt erst als Kunst etablieren muß, darf es 
nur wenige Standards geben, damit Innovationen möglich werden. Noch weiß 
niemand so genau was funktioniert und was nicht. Dieses Nicht-Wissen ist eine 
Lücke im System, die eine Unentscheidbarkeit zwischen wirklicher Innovation 
und Dilettantismus erzeugt. 
1931 fielen in Dracula zwei Innovationen zusammen, von denen man noch 
nicht wußte ob sie funktionieren würden: Der Tonfilm und der erste amerikani-
sche Horrorfilm mit einer 'übernatürlichen' Kreatur. Daß der dilettantische Schau-
spieler Bela Lugosi einzig in der Rolle des Grafen Dracula Erfolg haben konnte, 
war, so gesehen, alles andere als Zufall. Der Horror ist kein naives Genre. Um 
aber überhaupt erst einmal in diese 'Lücke' eindringen und im professionellen 
Hollywood bestehen zu können, mußte Lugosi fingieren. Also erzählte er allen, 
die ihn nach seinem Werdegang befragten, „rather grim tales from my home castle 
in Transylvania": 
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Aus Publicitygründen, um zu vereinfachen, habe ich es stets für bes-
ser erachtet, eine Lüge über die frühen Jahre meines Lebens zu ver-
breiten. Ich habe immer erzählt, ich sei auf die übliche Weise zu 
Ungarns Royal National Theater gestoßen. Ich habe immer erzählt, 
ich hätte höhere Schulen, Universitäten, die Akademie der Theater-
künste, das Gymnasium in Budapest besucht. Mit Lügen zu prahlen 
ist vielleicht die Tollheit junger Menschen, wo die geistige Reife fehlt 
zu erkennen, daß die Wahrheit zu sagen manchmal wirklich achtba-
rer ist.17 
Manchmal ist aber eine Lüge der notwendige Anfang einer Karriere. Das Spiel 
mit falschen Namen beherrschte er ja schon gut, als ein Darsteller für den Namen 
mit den vielen Masken gesucht wurde. Lon Chaney, der berühmte Stummfilm-
Horrorstar und „Mann mit den 1000 Gesichtern" war 1930 gerade gestorben, und 
obwohl erst alle anderen möglichen Schauspieler und sogar Verwandte der Produ-
zenten getestet worden waren, fand sich niemand, der die Rolle spielen konnte. 
Erst dann probierte man es mit Lugosi, der die Rolle schon seit einigen Jahren 
erfolgreich auf der Bühne spielte. Aber weil er die Schauspielkunst nur als Auto-
didakt, mit einer Faszination für große Gesten und pathetische Mimik sich ange-
eignet hatte, konnte er den Dracula im Film, wo im Gegenteil eine Zurücknahme 
aller Bühnentheatralik gefordert war, nur hoffnungslos überspielen. Und genau 
darin lag sein überraschender Erfolg, wie auch das schnelle Ende seiner 'Karrie-
re'. 
Schon in The Silent Command (1923), Lugosis erstem amerikanischen Film, 
waren alle Komponenten der dilettantischen Künstlichkeit sichtbar, die sein Spiel 
auszeichneten: 
This film revealed early trade-mark Lugosi mannerisms which became 
familiar in horror films particulary in closeups of the piercing eyes, 
menacing hand movements and the smooth way in which Bela smoked 
cigars. [...] Lugosi's destiny in wicked roles was fixed in this first 
American film, a preliminary for the characterization that would 
follow him to his grave.18 
Manierismus war in der Tat schon immer das pejorative Markenzeichen des 
dilettantischen Schauspielers und eine Abweichung, die zeitgleich auf der Theater-
bühne oder in einem anderen Genre negativ beurteilt wurde.19 Für den Erfolg von 
Dracula war Lugosis Inkompetenz mit dem Medium und der Darstellung jedoch 
die entscheidende Voraussetzung. Das schlechte Englisch, die zusätzliche Beto-
nung langgezogener Vokale, die pathetischen Blicke, die kinderhafte Begeiste-
rung für Grimassen und weit ausgestreckte, verkrampfte Hände: all das waren 
unvorhersehbare Neuerungen für ein Filmmonster, das zum ersten Mal keine häß-
lichen Masken und verkrüppelte Gliedmaßen vorzeigte (wie Chaney diese Rollen 
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geprägt hatte), sondern ganz ohne unheimliche Kostüme, lange Zähne, Schminke 
und Blut einfach nur im Smoking auftrat. Was in späteren Rollen - wenn es nicht 
sowieso Komödien waren - das Publikum zum Lachen anregte, konnte in Dracula 
überzeugen. Ein vormoderner Liebhaber, der schon seines Blutes wegen weder 
arbeiten noch mit technischen Medien umgehen konnte, dessen Macht sich auf 
Rituale und sexuelle Anziehungskraft verlassen muß, anstelle über Geld und Wis-
sen verfügen zu können - wer hätte diesem unzeitgemäßen Namen ein besseres 
Gesicht geben können als Bela Lugosi? 
V. 
Das Geheimnis seines Erfolges als Schauspieler sah der Autodidakt in einer 
bestimmten Technik des Selbst: 
...daß ich die Fähigkeit hatte, meinen Willen, meinen Verstand, mei-
nen Körper, meine Gefühle in einem einzigen tiefen und strömenden 
Kanal zusammenzuführen [...] wenn das, was ich damals tat und noch 
heuet tue, Wahnsinn ist, dann laßt mich wahnsinnig sein, da ich so 
mein Ziel erreicht habe.20 
Ganz wie sein gräfliches Vorbild sah er sich auch in der Lage durch Hypnose 
oder eben gleich durch Wahnsinn, alle Sinne und Daten, die ihm zur Verfügung 
stehen, in einem einzigen Informationsfluß bündeln und damit verstärken zu kön-
nen. Aber allen Hypnotiseuren, die Lugosi im Film gespielt hatte, zum Trotz, war 
diese Fähigkeit allerdings weder einer natürlichen Gabe noch hypnotischen Fä-
higkeiten Lugosis zuzuschreiben, sondern ganz einfach der Konditionierung von 
autodidaktischen, d.h. passionierten und anleitungslosen Lesern durch das Medi-
um Buch.21 Denn aller Wille, Verstand und alle Gefühle Lugosis stammen aus 
Büchern. Um seine kaum vorhandene Schulbildung zu kompensieren, entschloß 
sich der Autodidakt zu dem einzig möglichen „self-improvement program: „For 
ten years, day and night, night and day, with only one, two, three hours sleep, I 
read and read and read until I could talk with any college professor in the world".22 
Der vermeintlich wahnsinnige Schauspieler war ganz einfach ein 'ausschweifen-
der' Leser, der sich rühmte, täglich sechs verschiedene Zeitungen zu lesen.23 So 
viel typographische Informationsverarbeitung bleibt nicht ohne Folgen. Der Buch-
druck hatja nicht nur zu einem Niedergang des lauten Lesens geführt, den Leser 
isoliert und verstummen lassen, sondern - wie Marshall McLuhan immer wieder 
betont hat - vor allem durch die Linearität der Buchstaben- und Gedankenführung 
die Vielfalt der Sinneswahrnehmungen in den Hintergrund gedrängt und in einen 
einzigen Gesichtspunkt, einen Sinn gebündelt.24 Dieser „Kanal", in dem Lugosi 
alle seine Sinne bündeln zu können glaubte, heißt nicht „Wahnsinn" sondern ist 
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ein „Engpaß der Signifikanten" (Kittler), durch den alle Information fließen muß 
- erst recht wenn sie durch das technische Medium Druck in eine lineare Reihe 
gebracht wird. 
Aber weil nicht nur Wahnsinnige, sondern auch Dilettanten aus dem professio-
nellen Ablauf jedes Systems und Metiers ausgegrenzt werden, war Lugosis Erfolg 
nur geliehen. Durch die Systemlücke Dracula, die Hollywood notwendig nicht 
schließen konnte, war Lugo si nicht nur der Eintritt in eine unerreichbar scheinen-
de Welt gelungen, sondern gleichzeitig auch jede Chance auf individuelle Verän-
derung genommen. The Mark of the Vampire, wie sein nächster Film mit dem 
Dracula-Regisseur Tod Browning heißen sollte, hat ihn nie mehr losgelassen. Im 
Zeichen des Vampirs sollte Bela Lugosis einzig mögliche Zukunft in Hollywood 
verlaufen. Das Establishment hatte zurückgebissen, und den eingeschlichenen Di-
lettanten exakt durch die Rolle, die ihm Einlaß gewährte, als solchen enttarnt und 
markiert. 
Nach dem Ende des Zweiten Weltkriegs und der Medienkonkurrenz mit dem 
Fernsehen, war Bela Lugosis kurze Karriere zu ihrem Ende gekommen. Seine 
alten Filme wurden mittlerweile im Fernsehen gezeigt - ein Medienwechsel, der 
sein unnatürliches Spiel unnatürlicher Kreaturen plötzlich lächerlich aussehen ließ. 
Der Film war das „ideale Medium" für den Horror gewesen, ganz einfach weil 
dem Unheimlichen der Romantik ein Gesicht gegeben wurde, und dessen psycho-
logischen Funktionen direkt als filmtechnische Verfahren implementiert werden 
konnten.25 Im detailarmen Fernsehformat verflüchtigten sich romantische 
Phantastik und Effekte des Films gleichermaßen. Wie Philip Auslander gezeigt 
hat, wird jeder Kinofilm, der im Fernsehen ausgestrahlt wird, zu einer Auffuh-
rung in der Gegenwart ('live performance') „remediatisiert".26 Die Performanz 
des Mediums Fernsehen beruht auf der Erzeugung einer Rezeptionshaltung von 
Unmittelbarkeit und Natürlichkeit der gezeigten Ereignisse. Nicht nur die Nach-
richtensendungen mit ihrem Anspruch auf Realität und Wahrheit, sowie eine Viel-
zahl von Live-Sendungen machen den Unterschied zum Film aus, sondern vor 
allem die Selbstinszenierung des Fernsehens als Theater: 
It is my contention that this ideologically engrained sense of television 
as a live medium makes its historical relationship to the theatre diffe-
rent from that of film, and enabled television to colonize liveness, 
the one aspect of theatrical presentation that film could not replicate. 
[...] Whereas film could only remediate the theatre at these structural 
levels, television could remediate theatre at the ontological level 
through its claim to immediacy. It is also significant in this context 
that television not only remediates live performance, it remediates 
film in a way that film has never remediated television.27 
In der erzeugten Illusion von Aktualität und Unmittelbarkeit des Fernsehens, 
sowie dem mitaufgerufenen Kontext einer Theaterauffuhrung, fiel Lugosi wieder 
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als nicht naiver, dilettantischer Schauspieler auf, dessen Bewegungen übertrieben 
und Figuren überspielt waren. 
Dementsprechend mußte der verarmte Schauspieler im hohen Alter und seinen 
letzten Tod vor Augen aus finanziellen Gründen immer noch in der (Wander-) 
Bühnenversion des Dracula für kleines Geld vor einem ebenfalls kleinen und 
gröhlenden Publikum auftreten. Der alte Mann, gehüllt in einen schwarzem Um-
hang, mit seinen manierierten Bewegungen, war längst zu seiner eigenen Karika-
tur geworden.28 Selbst in einem Nachtclub in Las Vegas gab der über 70jährige in 
der „Bela Lugosi Revue" sechs Wochen lang noch jeden Abend den Dracula. Er 
wünschte sich sogar ein 3-D Remake in Technicolor. So sollte sich für sein Leben 
bewahrheiten, was er als Dracula schon zu Mina Seward gesagt hatte: „...to die, to 
be really dead: that must be glorious. There are far worse things, awaiting man, 
than death". In einem seiner späten Interviews wußte er bereits, daß er die letzte 
Ruhe wohl niemals finden würde: 
- „Did the role depress you?" 
- „Very much. It hunted me. I often dreamed of the dead." 
- „Doesn't Dracula ever end for you?" 
- „No, no. Dracula never ends. I don't know whether I shall call it a fortunate 
recall, but it never ends".29 
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